THE POST-SOVIET SPACE THREE DECADES LATER TIME OF TROUBLES OR TRIUMPH?

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Foreword

At the end of June 2018, over a hundred students, scholars, and members of the public met at Warsaw University to review, analyze, and discuss the ongoing transformation of Central and Eastern Europe. A variety of panels focused during three days on issues that challenge governments and societies both in and out of area such as: NATO and its eastern flank, Nord Stream 2 and diversification of energy supply, climate change, hate speech, the foreign policies of small states, information disorder, recovered national consciousness, and Russian interference in US elections.

In this volume, we present the research of those scholars whose work was recommended by panel chairs and reviewers and who were willing and able to meet the deadlines and rules for inclusion in this year's edition of the Warsaw East European Review. We trust it will meet with our readers' approval. The tenth edition of the Warsaw East European Review will surely be an interesting addition to the bookcases of post-Soviet-space researchers. We encourage you to read it and continue to work with us in the future. We have barely scratched the surface of this interesting and important topic.

Paweł Kowal   John S. Micgiel

Nord Stream 2
Current State of the Project and its implications for European Energy Security

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History of the Project

Nord Stream 2 is a planned pipeline through the Baltic Sea within the project Nord Stream. The pipeline Nord Stream 2 would flank the already existing Nord Stream 1 in transporting natural gas over 1,220 km from the large reserves in North-Western Russia to the German Baltic coast. In particular, Nord Stream 2 is expected to link Ust Luga in Russia with Greifswald in Germany. The project is planned to double the existing Nord Stream 1 pipeline, with the total volume of both ventures being a maximum of 110 bcm per year. Indeed, Nord Stream 2 is expected to transport annually 55 billion cubic metres (bcm), which is the same amount of Nord Stream 1.

The history of Nord Stream project began in 1997, when the Finnish-Russian consortium "North Transgas Oy" was established to explore the possibilities of transporting gas from Russia to Europe. In 1999 the consortium concluded the exploration stating that an offshore route through the Baltic Sea is the best option from economic, technical and environmental points of view. Then, in 2000 the EU recognized the need for a new pipeline. In 2005, the North Stream consortium was formed with the participation of Gazprom, the German companies Wintershall and E.ON Ruhrgas. Later two other companies joined the consortium: the Dutch company Gasunie and the French GDF SUEZ SA. The construction of the lines of Nord Stream 1 lasted from April 2010 until October 2012, when Line 2 of Nord Stream 1 officially became operational.

In June 2015, Nord Stream 2 was officially announced with the signing of a memorandum and the establishment of the company Nord Stream 2 AG. The financing agreement between Gazprom, the French company ENGIE, the Austrian OMV, the British-Dutch Shell and the German Uniper and Wintershall was confirmed in April 2017. The cost of the project is estimated to be €9,5 billion, but some documents reported that it will cost €9,8 or even more if there will be any changes in the project, as in the event of the modification of

The landfall of Nord Stream in Germany. Current State of the Project in March 2019.
Photo credit: www.nord-stream.com.

the expected route.[1] Late 2019 is the target date set for completion of Nord Stream 2, but there are already some doubts regarding the actual construction times.[2] Furthermore, it should be noted, that the cost of Nord Stream is only the cost of the offshore pipeline and it excludes for example the cost of the EUGAL pipeline, which has to be built in order to transport the gas through Germany.[3]

The creation of Nord Stream 2 AG immediately ran into some problems, because the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection forced a change in the participation quotas in the project. In fact, Gazprom had to bear the entire financial cost of the project and by doing this Gazprom remained the sole shareholder of Nord Stream 2 AG. The signed agreement of 2017 provided loans from the European companies interested in the project to Nord Stream 2 AG.

The transported gas of Nord Stream 2 is expected to be transferred to other European states through Germany. Nord Stream 2 is being promoted as a solution to the EU's growing gas demand in the near future and the decreasing domestic production of the blue fuel in the EU countries and in Norway. In addition, the advocates of Nord Stream 2 justify

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1 Alan Riley, "Nord Stream 2: Understanding the Potential Consequences," Atlantic Council, June 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Nord_Stream_2_interactive.pdf.

2 „Kommersant": Nie uda się zapełnić Nord Stream 2 do końca 2019 roku," GazetaPrawna.pl, last modified March 20, 2018, https://serwisy.gazetaprawna.pl/energetyka/artykuly/1112224,nord-stream-2-opozniony.html.

3 Alan Riley, "Nord Stream 2: Understanding the Potential Consequences."

the project by saying that Nord Stream is the best way to transport gas to Europe since it is the shorter and the cheapest one. Another argument used by the supporters of Nord Stream is that a low-emission transition can only be achieved with natural gas. Finally, they are convinced that Nord Stream 2 would definitively guarantee the security of energy supply for Europe.

In January 2018 Nord Stream 2 AG received permits from the Russian Environmental Authority. In the first months of 2018 Germany gave all the needed permits to build the pipeline in its territorial waters and in the German Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In April 2018 also Finland gave a full set of permits for the construction of the 374-kilometre Finnish section of the pipeline. On 15 May 2018 Nord Stream 2 AG started offshore preparatory works for the pipe-laying in the Bay of Greifswald. In June 2018, Nord Stream 2 AG received permits from Sweden for the approximately 510-kilometres to build in the Swedish EEZ and from Russia by the Russian Ministry of Construction and Utilities. In August 2018 Russia gave all the necessary permits, then in September work started in Finland and in October in German territorial waters. On 6 November, Nord Stream 2 AG announced that the project was progressing as planned, and to date over 200 kilometers of pipeline have been laid in the Baltic Sea.[4] The last permit needed for the completion of the pipeline was the Danish one, which was finally given on the 30th October 2019. As reported by the official sources, today: "more than 2,100 km of the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline have been laid. Pipelay has been completed in Russian, Finnish and Swedish waters, and for the most part in Ger-

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4 "Nord Stream 2 Has Laid over 200 Kilometres of Pipeline," Nord Stream 2, November 6, 2018, https://www.nord-stream2.com/media-info/news-events/nord-stream-2-has-laid-over-200-kilometres-of-pipeline-113/.

Photo credit: sputniknews.com

The alternative rout es for Nord Stream 2. Photo credit: www.nord-stream.com

man waters. The construction of both landfall facilities in Russia and Germany is nearing completion."[5]

Nord Stream 2 and Denmark

Denmark was the last country to authorize the laydown of Nord Stream 2 in its continental shelf area. Before, in August Nord Stream 2 AG applied for an alternative to the initially planned route, bypassing Danish territorial waters and passing only through the Danish EEZ north of Bornholm, while the original route should have passed to the south of Bornholm, along the same route of Nord Stream 1. However, this possibility was also perplexing for Copenhagen. The biggest problem for Nord Stream 2 appeared at the moment when, on the 30th November 2017, Denmark changed the law regarding the laying of pipelines in the territorial waters deciding that this kind of infrastructure has to compatible with Denmark's foreign and security policy interests. At this time the majority of parties in Danish Parliament oppose Nord Stream 2, but the Danish government does not want to take sole responsibility for taking such an important decision that divides two of the most

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5 "Nord Stream 2 Granted a Construction Permit by Denmark," Nord Stream 2, October 30, 2019, https://www.nord-stream2.com/media-info/news-events/nord-stream-2-granted-a-construction-permit-by-denmark-139/.

important allies of Denmark, which are Germany and the US.[6] Danish ex-Prime Minister Lars Rasmussen, after a meeting with the prime minister of Ukraine, expressed the will of Denmark for a decision to be made at the European level.[7] However, a decision at European level still seems unlikely due to the complex situation within the EU members and the different interests.

Finally, on 30 October 2019 Denmark gave Nord Stream 2 AG a permit to construct its planned pipeline system in the Danish Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) south-east of Bornholm. The chosen route was the last one proposed by the Danish government. Indeed, the Danish Energy Agency considers this route as the best one, because it is the shortest one and it is the less dangerous in environmental terms.[8] Probably, it is not by chance that the decision of the Danish government to permit the construction of Nord Stream 2 came just few days after the Danish decision to approve the offshore part of the Baltic Pipe[9] project. Arguably, the new Danish center-left government headed by Mette Frederiksen chose to act in the most neutral way possible.

Nord Stream 2 and the US

Another obstacle in the realization of the pipeline is represented by the United States' sanctions on Russia. The US has opposed Nord Stream since it was announced in 2015, and the opposition has become stronger with Donald Trump's administration. The reasons why the US opposes Nord Stream 2 are basically two: in the first place the Americans perceive the project as a threat to European Energy Security, because it goes against the policy of diversification of the gas supply and could represent a serious danger for the Central and East European countries, mainly for Ukraine. The second reason is related to the Trump administration's energy policy goal, which is to increase exports of American LNG to Europe.[10] This strategy is warmly approved by Poland, Lithuania, Croatia, and Greece, which are building new LNG terminals in order to decrease their dependence on the Russian gas supply. The opposition of the US is becoming a real danger, because of the implementation of the so-called CAATSA, the sanctions package imposed on Russia in 2017. This package affects the Russian energy sector and existing or planned export pipelines from Russia and gives the US president the right to impose decisions. The risk is to see the American sanctions imposed on the European companies, which are working on the pipeline. The American attitude towards Nord Stream was probably the main reason for Berlin's change of rhetoric regarding the project in 2017-2018. Indeed, Germany

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6 Agata Łoskot-Strachota, Rafał Bajczuk, Szymon Kardas, "Nord Stream 2 divides the West," June 18, 2018, Centre for Eastern Studies, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2018-06-18/nord-stream-2-divides-west.

7 Andrzej Kublik, "Dania blokuje Nord Stream 2 i chce decyzji całej Unii w sprawie rosyjskiej rury," Wyborcza.pl, June 27, 2018, http://wyborcza.pl/7,155287,23599065,dania-chce-decyzji-ue-w-sprawie-nord-stream-2-a-bruksela-grozi.html.

8 Barbara Bodalska, "Dania zgodziła się na budowę Nord Stream 2," Euractiv.pl, October 31, 2019 , https://www.euractiv.pl/section/energia-i-srodowisko/news/dania-zgodzila-sie-na-budowe-nord-stream-2/.

9 Baltic Pipe is a pipeline project between Norway and Poland, which passes though Denmark and should be operational in 2022. The project is recognized as "a project of common interest of the EU" and it is viewed as fundamental for the diversification of gas suppliers in many Central-Eastern European countries.

10 Agata Łoskot-Strachota, Rafał Bajczuk, Szymon Kardaś, "Nord Stream 2 divides the West."

started to build an LNG terminal and began to care more about the Ukrainian transit, trying to be a mediator between Kiev and Moscow, guaranteeing that Germany will not allow the completion of Nord Stream 2 if the Ukrainian gas transit will not be renewed.[11] It remains to be seen whether Germany will succeed in its attempt. Meanwhile the American threats are well received in Poland, where Prime Minister Morawiecki has said:

> *I welcome today's statement of the State Department on sanctions that may be encountered by companies involved in the Nord Stream II project. It is washing up European energy security, leading to the monopolization of gas supplies and threatening Ukraine. It should be detained.[12]*

It remains disputable whether the US will impose sanctions on the companies involved in the construction of the pipeline. If on one hand the American Congress seems ready to vote in favor with the support of the majority of Democrats and Republicans of imposing sanctions on the ships laying the pipeline in the framework of the law for the protection of the European Energy Security, on the other hand the unpredictability of Donald Trump must always be taken into consideration. In addition, the rules concerning the CAATSA package have been updated under pressure from Germany and Jean-Claude Juncker and now each decision has to be taken after consultations with the allies of the US, Germany included.[13]

Nord Stream 2 and the EU

In Europe the opponents of Nord Stream 2 put their hopes on EU law. Indeed, if the Third Energy Package would be applied to Nord Stream 2, it would bring many troubles concerning even the realization of the project. The Polish Institute of Foreign Affairs mentions also the non-binding so-called IGA decision of the European Parliament and Council, which clearly states that the "proper functioning of the internal energy market requires that the energy imported into the Union be fully governed by the rules establishing the internal energy market."[14] This idea is also supported by the Commission, which in 2016 stated that: "each of the potential new infrastructures can have a systemic impact on the entire European Union energy market. It is therefore essential that they are compatible with EU law."[15] In view of this, the European Commission becomes an important actor that could

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11 "Merkel: No Nord Stream 2 without guarantee for Ukraine's gas transit role," Euractiv.com, April 10, 2018, https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/merkel-no-nord-stream-2-without-guarantee-for-ukraines-gas-transit-role/.

12 "Premier Morawiecki: Nord Stream 2 podmywa europejskie bezpieczeństwo energetyczne," TVP Info, March 21, 2018, https://www.tvp.info/36466760/premier-morawiecki-nord-stream-2-podmywa-europejskie-bezpieczenstwo-energetyczne.

13 Andrzej Kublik, "Bliżej sankcji USA za budowę Nord Stream 2," Euractiv.pl, August 2, 2019, https://www.euractiv.pl/section/gospodarka/news/blizej-sankcji-usa-za-budowe-nord-stream-2/.

14 Aleksandra Gawlikowska-Fyk, Marcin Terlikowski, Bartosz Wiśniewski, Szymon Zaręba, "Nord Stream 2: Inconvenient Questions," The Polish Institute of International Affairs, July 2018, http://www.pism.pl/Publikacje/PISM-Policy-Paper-no-165.

15 Aleksandra Gawlikowska-Fyk, Marcin Terlikowski, Bartosz Wiśniewski, Szymon Zaręba, "Nord Stream 2: Inconvenient Questions."

solve these conflicts. In June 2017 it launched the process to obtain a mandate from the member states to negotiate an international agreement with Russia on the legal regime concerning the pipeline. The attempt was to make Nord Stream 2 subject to EU energy law in the broadest scope possible. This attempt was protested by many European states, including Germany, which questioned the European Commission's competence regarding the project. In particular, the Council Legal Service disagreed with the European Commission stating that there is no legal basis for granting a negotiating mandate to the European Commission.[16] In November 2017 the European Commission started a legislative process to amend the gas directive adopted in 2009, which was supported by the European Parliament. Indeed, there were many doubts as to whether the new infrastructure is subject to EU law, and more specifically to the established rules of the 2009/73/EC Directive on natural gas. In addition, some legal proceedings of the European Court of Justice indicated that the rules laid down in specific EU legislation are to be implemented in the EEZ of the member states concerned, and not only in their territorial waters. From the Russian perspective, the possibility of seeing the implementation of the EU law on gas to Nord Stream 2 is problematic, and both Gazprom and the Russian Government oppose any attempt to ensure the compliance of Nord Stream 2 with EU energy law.[17]

The European Commission has raised this issue numerous times, arguing that the Gas Directive should be fully applicable, and that Nord Stream 2 cannot be constructed in a "legal void" or in a context in which different parts of the pipeline would be governed by different legal regimes.[18] Applying the Gas Directive to Nord Stream 2 would mean that Gazprom would have to comply with provisions for ownership unbundling, third-party access and non-discrimination in tariff setting. At present Nord Stream 2 does not comply with these provisions. To meet these requirements, Nord Stream 2 would have to offer some of the gas it delivers each year to third parties and to comply with the provision that the pipeline owner and the gas supplier cannot be the same legal entity. In particular, Gazprom, being the owner of the pipeline, could use 50% of the pipeline's transfer capacity. The European Commission claims that these rules are fully applicable to new gas infrastructure entering the internal energy market of the EU through member state waters. Furthermore, the Commission holds that the project may go against the Energy Security Strategy and the goals of the recently established European Energy Union. According to Commission President Juncker, Nord Stream 2 raises questions that go beyond legal matters, since it could not give access to a new source of supply or a new supplier and by doing this alter the EU's gas market.[19]

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16 Szymon Kardaś, "Projekt nowelizacji dyrektywy gazowej przyjęty przez Radę UE," February 13, 2019, Centre for Eastern Studies, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/node/27054.

17 Aleksandra Gawlikowska-Fyk, Marcin Terlikowski, Bartosz Wiśniewski, Szymon Zaręba, "Nord Stream 2: Inconvenient Questions."

18 Dimitar Lilkov, Roland Freudenstein, "The Case Against Nord Stream 2," April 2018, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, https://www.martenscentre.eu/publications/european-energy-security-focus-case-against-nord-stream-2.

19 Dimitar Lilkov, Roland Freudenstein, "The Case Against Nord Stream 2."

Amendments to the European Gas Directive

There was, therefore, the need to amend the Directive of 2009 in order to remove all doubts regarding its implementation. This process, after many obstacles put in place by Germany and Austria that in fact delayed works on the Directive, led to a meeting of the Committee of Permanent Representatives which was held on 8 February 2019. The decision taken at this meeting was to transfer the draft amendments to the gas directive to further legislative work. The Gas Directive, amended by France and Germany, provide for a solution that makes it uncertain to fully submit the Nord Stream pipeline to the principles of EU energy law.[20] In light of the draft amendment, if a pipeline is completed before the entry into force of the Directive, that is before the 23rd May 2019, each EU country obtains the right to grant unilateral exemptions from many rules of EU law with absence of clarity as to the European Commission's control. In the case of Nord Stream 2, where the entry into force of the Directive happened before the completion of the pipeline, the principles of exploiting new infrastructure become de facto subject to bilateral Russian-German arrangements limited by the control powers of the European Commission granted in the Directive.[21] However, with this amended Directive the role of the European Commission can only affect the works in German territorial waters and on the German coast, while Danish territorial waters would not be subject to this Directive. This excludes other member states and assign to Germany all the tasks related to the negotiations with Russia, but the European Commission could stop negotiations between Russia and Germany if: 1) such negotiations were contrary to EU Law; 2) would have a detrimental effect on the functioning of the internal market, competition or security of supply of a Member State or of the EU; 3) negotiations would undermine the objectives of the ongoing inter-governmental negotiations conducted in parallel by the EU; or 4) negotiations would be discriminatory. In addition, the Directive gives the European Commission the opportunity to propose negotiating directives and requests to include specific clauses in contracts concluded to ensure compliance with EU law.

Diversification Vs Non-Discrimination

Nord Stream 2 AG and Gazprom have reacted immediately saying that the European directive damages the company's interests. In July has elapsed the deadline Nord Stream 2 gave to the European Commission, in order to settle the dispute.[22] Immediately, in April 2019, the company sent a letter to the president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, in which was basically stated that the European Union is treating the new pipeline with a discriminatory legislation, since Nord Stream 2 would be the only pipeline that cannot benefit from the derogation mentioned in the Directive as it would be com-

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20 Szymon Kardaś, "Projekt nowelizacji dyrektywy gazowej przyjęty przez Radę UE."

21 "Gas directive: Council agrees negotiating mandate," February 8, 2019, European Commission, https://www. consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/02/08/gas-directive-council-agrees-negotiating-mandate/.

22 Georgi Gotev, "Nord Stream 2, EU drifting towards legal arbitration," Euractiv.com, July 12, 2019, https://www. euractiv.com/section/energy/news/nord-stream-2-eu-heading-towards-legal-arbitration/.

pleted after the 23rd May 2019, the date in which the new amendments entered into force. At the end of the letter, the company mentioned the possibility of some legal arbitrations.[23]

One possible international arbitration could be the one based on the Energy Charter Treaty,[24] which would be the riskiest one for both parts since the court can impose fines of billions of Euros. At the end of September 2019, Nord Stream 2 AG eventually decided to appeal to this court. Moreover, In July 2019, Nord Stream 2 AG appealed to the Court of Justice of the European Union, which can impose changes to the European legislation. It worth to mention that legal arbitrations against the "discriminatory" European legislation are not an innovation, given that Russia already in 2018 appealed without success to the World Trade Organization.[25]

The results of all these trials are still uncertain, especially the one based on the Energy Charter Treaty. In the meantime, Germany is trying to take advantage of the provisions of the European Directive changing the law governing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. What the German parliamentary majority is now trying to do, is to change the European legislation, which must be accepted by each member state, modifying one fundamental provision. The majority coalition is trying, indeed, to exempt from the European antitrust laws also those pipelines that were laid in German territorial waters before the Directive was introduced, not taking into consideration the entire pipeline route.[26] It remains to be seen, whether Germany will succeed with its attempt and what will be the results of the ongoing arbitration proceedings.

Possible outcomes

If on one hand it is worth noting that there are even some voices in Germany which are against Nord Stream 2, as the Leader of the European People's Party Manfred Weber, the amendments to this Directive put in doubt the willingness of Germany to act as a mediator between Moscow and Kiev and reminds everyone that eventually Germany wants to complete this project.[27] The support for the completion of the pipeline is also confirmed by the speeches of Chancellor Angela Merkel, who during the Munich Conference warned about the risk of seeing a rapid rapprochement between Russia and China, which includes a narrow collaboration in the energy sector, that goes to the detriment of European countries. She also stated that:

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23 Nord Stream 2 AG, Letter to the President of the European Commission Mr. Jean-Claude Jucker, April 12, 2019, https://www.euractiv.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/07/Letter-CEO-Nord-Stream-to-Juncker.pdf.

24 The Energy Charter Treaty is document that regulates the energy trade and investments in Europe. It was signed in 1991 by 46 countries. The basic goal of the Treaty was the settlement of the disputes between the Western European energy companies and their counterparts in the Post-Soviet space. Russia signed it, but it has not ratified the document until now. Nevertheless, a legal arbitration is possible since the company Nord Stream 2 AG is registered in Switzerland, which is a full member of the Charter.

25 Michał Strzałkowski, "Spółka Nord Stream 2 znów pozwała UE ws. dyrektywy gazowej," Eurcativ.pl, September 12, 2019, https://www.euractiv.pl/section/polityka-zagraniczna-ue/news/spolka-nord-stream-2-znow-pozwala-ue-ws-dyrektywy-gazowej/.

26 Andrzej Kublik, "Niemcy chcą zwolnić Nord Stream 2 z unijnych przepisów," Eurcativ.pl, November 12, 2019, https://www.euractiv.pl/section/energia-i-srodowisko/news/niemcy-chca-zwolnic-nord-stream-2-z-unijnych-przepisow/.

27 Szymon Kardaś, "Projekt nowelizacji dyrektywy gazowej przyjęty przez Radę UE."

German gas system. Photo credit: www.euroactive.com.

…no one wants to be unilaterally dependent on Russia, but if we received Russian gas during the Cold War, not only in the DDR where I lived but also in West Germany, then I do not see why the times and the situation today should be so much worse that we can no longer say that Russia remains a partner.[28]

US Vice President Mike Pence did not hesitate to respond to the German Chancellor, and just after her speech he said:

The United States commends all our European partners who have taken a strong stand against Nord Stream 2 and we recommend others to do the same.[29]

The threats posed by the US are perceived in Germany as proof of the European need to become more independent from Washington, at least in the energy sphere. Not by chance in June 2017 the former German Minister of Foreign Affairs and the former Chancellor of Austria in a letter warned against: "US interference in the EU's energy security."[30]

The outcome of all these negotiations could be similar to that regarding the OPAL pipeline, which connects Nord Stream 1 to the existing grid in Germany and the Czech Republic. This case shows how difficult it is to implement EU law if the gas is import-

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28 "Merkel backs Nord Stream 2 hitting out at pipeline's critics," YouTube video, RT, February 16, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UnXbcYKEdYk.

29 "Merkel backs Nord Stream 2 hitting out at pipeline's critics," YouTube video.

30 Aleksandra Gawlikowska-Fyk, Marcin Terlikowski, Bartosz Wiśniewski, Szymon Zaręba, "Nord Stream 2: Inconvenient Questions."

ed through a pipeline that does not operate in line with EU gas rules. In fact, in OPAL's case, Gazprom has a monopoly on gas transited through Nord Stream 1 and requested the Commission exempt it from the EU's Third Energy Package with respect to OPAL, in accordance with the EU gas directive. Upon receiving the exemption, which had been limited only to a certain portion of the pipeline's capacity, Gazprom claimed that the remaining portion was left unused because of a lack of interest among its competitors. This came as no surprise, since there was no other way to feed the pipeline with gas from any other source than Nord Stream 1. Gazprom was then allowed to "access" the remaining "under-utilized" capacity by the European Commission.[31] In 2017 a Polish diplomatic effort sought to annul the decision of the European Commission by appealing to the European Court of Justice, but the Court dismissed the complaint.[32]

If Nord Stream 2 faces serious troubles, as it could under the obligation to use no more than the 50% of the pipeline's capability or even the non-realization of the whole project, Gazprom will have to seek other routes for the gas, as the Russian journal Kommersant has reported. Indeed, to avoid the renewal of the contract with Ukraine about transit costs or at least to minimize the amount of gas that would transit through Central Europe, the Turk Stream project might be resumed. In fact, with Turk Stream Russian gas would enter into European Union through Turkey and there would be no difficulties under EU law.[33] Another possibility if the European Commission implements EU law on Nord Stream 2 would be the end of Gazprom's monopoly over external Russian pipelines. The fact should also be considered that there are other big energy Russian companies that would be interested in selling gas abroad. In 2013 Russia liberalized the rules concerning the trade of LNG and since that time Novatek and Rosnieft started to sell LNG in other countries. Anyhow, Rosnieft did not get a permit to sell gas to China through the pipeline "Power of Siberia" built by Gazprom. Surely Russia would not be happy to respect EU law concerning a pipeline built by a company (Nord Stream 2 AG) which belongs 100% to Gazprom. On one hand the monopoly of Gazprom on external Russian pipelines seems to be almost untouchable, on the other hand Rosnieft and Novatek are also strictly connected with the Kremlin. As a matter of fact, Rosnieft is mostly controlled by Rosnieftegaz, which is controlled by the state, and the Head of the Directors' Board of the company is Gerhard Schroeder, the ex-German chancellor who had been directly involved in the Nord Stream consortium.[34]

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31 Aleksandra Gawlikowska-Fyk, Marcin Terlikowski, Bartosz Wiśniewski, Szymon Zaręba, "Nord Stream 2: Inconvenient Questions."

32 "Sąd UE oddalił wniosek Polski i PGNiG ws. gazociągu Opal," TVP Info, July 22, 2017, https://www.tvp.info/33317158/sad-ue-oddalil-wniosek-polski-i-pgnig-ws-gazociagu-opal.

33 "Decyzja ws. dyrektywy gazowej, to potężny cios w Nord Stream 2. Przyznają to nawet rosyjskie media." Niezależna.pl, February 18, 2019, https://niezalezna.pl/259319-decyzja-ws-dyrektywy-gazowej-to-potezny-cios-w-nord-stream-2-przyznaja-to-nawet-rosyjskie-media.

34 Bartosz Bieliszczuk, "Konkurencja pod kontrolą: perspektywa zastosowania prawa UE wobec Nord Stream 2," The Polish Institute of International Affairs, December 6, 2017, http://www.pism.pl/publikacje/biuletyn/nr-122-1564.

Implications of Nord Stream 2 for European Energy Security

Some positive aspects of Nord Stream 2Nord Stream 2 is presented as the solution to compensate for decreasing domestic gas production and fill a part of the growing demand for imported gas. Moreover, Nord Stream 2 would represent an additional option for importing gas, and this would make the EU's gas supply more robust and safer.

The idea that Europe will need more gas in the next years is doubtful, since even the EU Reference Scenario 2016 says that Europe's gas demand is expected to remain stable over the coming 20 years. On the other side, the fact that domestic production of gas in Europe is decreasing is irreproachable. In addition, the supporters of Nord Stream 2 argue that gas exports from Northern Africa will be increasingly constrained by its own consumption while only small amount of gas will go to Europe from the Caspian region.

The advocates of Nord Stream 2 also justify the project saying that the LNG gas market is more oriented towards Asia, where little pipeline capacity exists, and is subject to cyclical market shifts. Instead of this, Nord Stream 2 will offer capacities to compensate lower LNG availability in Europe and will cover the gap of 120 bcm caused by the decreasing European domestic production. Another reason in favor of Nord Stream 2 is the economic one: the Russian reserves are among the most cost-effective sources from which Europe can be supplied with gas and this would mean for some European countries lower prices for gas already in 2020.[35]

The opponents respond to these arguments saying that even in 2017, when the import of gas from Russia to EU peaked, only 62% of the existing pipelines' capacity has been used.[36] Moreover, they raise the question related to the importance of LNG, since thanks to imports by European countries from mainly the US and Qatar, all gas prices were lowered.

Energy as a tool of Russian Foreign Policy

The fact that energy can be used as a means of coercion is very well known. The Swedish Research Agency reported that the majority of the 55 supply interruptions to Russia's near abroad between 1991 and 2006 were driven by political or economic factors. The dominant position of Gazprom, which has a monopoly over all the pipelines that link Russia to Europe, has been recognized as a problem also by the European Commission in 2015 and in relation to this the Commission started proceedings against the Russian company.[37] In fact, the Statement of Objections sent by the European Commissioner for Competition notes that the three Baltic States, Poland and Bulgaria have to pay unfairly high prices. From the perspective of the Central European Countries, with Nord Stream 2 Russia will achieve two strategic goals which are the limitation of the Ukrainian role in talks with Gazprom and the strengthening of political and economic German-Russian ties.[38] The

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35 "Nord Stream 2: New Pipeline for Europe's Energy Future," Nord Stream 2, April 2018, https://www.nord-stream2.com/en/pdf/document/4/.

36 Aleksandra Gawlikowska-Fyk, Marcin Terlikowski, Bartosz Wiśniewski, Szymon Zaręba, "Nord Stream 2: Inconvenient Questions."

37 Dimitar Lilkov, Roland Freudenstein, "The Case Against Nord Stream 2."

38 Aleksandra Gawlikowska-Fyk, Marcin Terlikowski, Bartosz Wiśniewski, Szymon Zaręba, "Nord Stream 2: Inconvenient Questions."

European gas need. Photo credit: www.nord-stream.com.

Russian action is perfectly in line with the policy of "divide et impera" from the Central and Eastern European point of view. These countries argue, that despite the hopes of Western countries, which had believed in a normalization of relations with Russia through commerce, Russia will not change the attitudes towards neighboring countries thanks to European-Russian relations' normalization. In fact, even the completion of Nord Stream 1 did not prevent Russia from the aggression on Ukraine. In addition, as the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) pointed out, Nord Stream would imply an increasing Russian presence in the Baltic sea through the creation of a zone with privileged interests. In fact, there is the risk of transforming Nord Stream 2 into a game-changer in a number of crisis scenarios.[39]

Increasing Dependence on Russian Gas

Russia is already the most important supplier of gas to European Union, and surely with Nord Stream 2 this position would be strengthened. Today dependence on Russian

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[39] Aleksandra Gawlikowska-Fyk, Marcin Terlikowski, Bartosz Wiśniewski, Szymon Zaręba, "Nord Stream 2: Inconvenient Questions."

Table 1 Major Russian export pipelines to Europe

Pipeline project	Ukrainian gas network to the EU	Nord Stream 1 (to Germany)	Yamal pipeline (via Belarus to Poland)	Blue Stream (to Turkey)	Nord Stream 2 (planned)	TurkStream (planned)	South Stream (cancelled)
Maximum capacity (per annum)	143 bcm	55 bcm	32.9 bcm	16 bcm	55 bcm	31.5 bcm	63 bcm

Russian export pipelines to Europe. Photo credit: Wilfied Martens Centre for European Studies.

gas is a serious problem in the eastern countries of the EU, since there are 8 countries that receive more than 80% of their annual consumption of gas from Russia. These countries are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia. It is not by chance that at least 6 of these countries are strongly against Nord Stream 2. Indeed, the consequence of the construction of the pipeline could be, among others, higher gas prices in this region. This would happen because Gazprom would transport Russian gas into this area not only from East, but also from the West, since Germany and Austria are the staunchest supporters of having Russian gas in their countries. Moreover, Gazprom could cease to deliver gas through Ukraine, and this could force East European countries to buy Russian gas paying more for the longer transport which would have to go through the Baltic Sea and Germany at least.[40]

Nord Stream 2 would not help to diversify the external suppliers of gas to the EU, since the amount of Russian gas would increase. From the legal perspective this project is not in line with the Energy Security Strategy of 2014 and the established European Energy Union. If Nord Stream 2 will be completed, it will reduce route diversity.[41] Europe probably would be left with the Yamal pipeline carrying about 30 bcm of Russian gas into Poland and Nord Stream 1 and 2 will transport 110 bcm, excluding completely transit across Ukraine and leaving just two routes instead of today's four. The concentration of routes in one place is dangerous, since an accident can block the whole supply even to an entire country.[42]

Furthermore, the minor diversification of gas suppliers could undermine future diversification efforts by lowering the profitability and increasing the economic risk of some investments. Among those investments are: the Baltic Pipe, which is designed to transport Norwegian gas to Poland; the Easting, a pipeline that has the goal of connecting the gas systems of Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Hungary and Slovakia; and the planned inter-

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40 Dimitar Lilkov, Roland Freudenstein, "The Case Against Nord Stream 2."
41 Dimitar Lilkov, Roland Freudenstein, "The Case Against Nord Stream 2."
42 Alan Riley, "Nord Stream 2: Understanding the Potential Consequences."

connectors between Poland and Slovakia and between Poland and the Czech Republic, which could transport the gas delivered to the Polish LNG terminal on the Baltic coast.[43]

Debate on Decarbonization

The argument on the de-carbonization is also questionable. The supporters of the project are convinced that a low-emission transition can only be achieved with natural gas. A modern offshore pipeline produces a smaller carbon footprint than onshore transportation, say the supporters of Nord Stream 2. Compared to transport through Ukraine, the official documents of Nord Stream 2 AG report that the new pipeline can save 8.9 million tonnes of CO_2 per year.[44] Offshore transportation is also greener than the energy intensive liquefaction needed for the production of LNG. And more gas will be indispensable to substitute for coal, since it can be said that natural gas is the cheapest means of carbon reduction.[45]

On the other hand, the opponents of the project point out the fact that the pipeline is located near Natura 2000 conservation sites in eight countries. Moreover, there is a risk related to the presence of four pipelines in the Baltic Sea, where World War II munitions were dumped including explosives and large quantities of chemical warfare agents, among which there is even the Zyklon B gas. The Polish Institute of International Affairs mentions the example of the United Kingdom, one of the more advanced countries which is increasing its use of renewable resources. In the process of increasing the use of green resources, the UK has had the biggest decline in gas consumption observed in Europe (1,7 bcm). According to the Polish Institute, soon under the Paris Agreement EU countries will have to put forward also gas reduction aims. Thus, according to PISM, Nord Stream 2 instead of giving Europe an environmentally friendly resource, can petrify the structure of the energy mix in some European countries and slow the transition to renewable energies.[46]

A New Division within the EU?

The division within the European Union in the attitude towards Nord Stream 2 project is already visible. It is not the only critical issue that divides the EU, since in past years topics such as migration policy, the EU budget, and differences in food product quality have been hotly debated. Nord Stream 2 can be seen as a project that Germany wants to pursue for its own interest, and this would confirm the popular idea that Berlin has too much influence on the EU.

The realization of Nord Stream 2 goes also against the liberalization of the European gas market, whose characteristics are competition, liquidity and gas trading. The European gas market needs also a big number of inter-connectors and there are still problems with this issue, since there is a lack of them. Nord Stream 2 surely would not lead to an

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43 Aleksandra Gawlikowska-Fyk, Marcin Terlikowski, Bartosz Wiśniewski, Szymon Zaręba, "Nord Stream 2: Inconvenient Questions."

44 Nord Stream 2 AG, "Project Background", 4, July 2019, https://www.nord-stream2.com › document.

45 "Nord Stream 2: New Pipeline for Europe's Energy Future," Nord Stream 2.

46 Aleksandra Gawlikowska-Fyk, Marcin Terlikowski, Bartosz Wiśniewski, Szymon Zaręba, "Nord Stream 2: Inconvenient Questions."

increasing of inter-connectors, since it will double the OPAL pipeline capacity. As a matter of fact, inter-connectors are needed if there are new sources, such as the realization of the Baltic Pipe from Denmark to Poland or the construction of new LNG terminals on the Baltic coast. A clear example of diversifying supplies could be the expansion of capacity of the pipeline between Spain and France, in order to transport more gas from the LNG terminal in Spain to France. Nord Stream 2 can liberalize market gas only in northwestern Europe, where there are already many alternative suppliers. On the contrary, it leaves the central part of the European Union with one big supplier, that is Gazprom. Finally, it is worth noting that Central European Countries began to liberalize the gas market much more later than the Western countries, after they joined EU in 2004. For this reason, these countries are still living in a space with a strong Soviet legacy, which in the gas market is manifested by a single east-to-west pipeline.[47]

Germany

Thanks to Nord Stream 2 Germany could become the potential recipient of the majority share of the gas coming from Russia to the EU. Germany already exports more than 20 bcm yearly. If Nord Stream 1 and 2 work at full capacity, 70%-80% of the Russian blue fuel and about 1/3 of total EU imported gas would pass through Germany. This would mean that Germany would replace completely Ukraine and the United Kingdom as the major European gas hub.[48]

Alan Riley from the Atlantic Council argued that Nord Stream 2 can bring some problems even for Germany. This can come as a surprise, since with Nord Stream 2, Germany, as the European gas hub, and this would presumably enjoy lower prices and greater gas exports. However, reducing route diversity for Germany should not be forgotten. As pointed out above, Germany will have only two gas routes, and the risk of that situation was illustrated in September 2017. At that time, maintenance work on Nord Stream 1 impeded gas transit through the Baltic and increased the gas flow through the Ukrainian Brotherhood pipeline. When Nord Stream 2 becomes operational, the same issue would be more difficult since it is unlikely that the Brotherhood pipeline will be able to maintain today's capacity of transport. Then, with Nord Stream 2 operational it would be very difficult for Germany to reduce dependence on Russian gas.[49]

Ukraine

It can be said that Nord Stream 2 is maybe the most famous effort made by Gazprom to circumvent Ukraine as a transit country. Since Nord Stream 1 became operational in 2011, the volume of gas transported to Europe through Ukraine has declined. As a matter of fact, in 2004 137 bcm of Russian gas passed through Ukraine, in 2014 62 bcm.[50] In view of this, the idea that Nord Stream 2 is built with the sole goal of meeting a growing need

47 Alan Riley, "Nord Stream 2: Understanding the Potential Consequences."

48 Dimitar Lilkov, Roland Freudenstein, "The Case Against Nord Stream 2."

49 Alan Riley, "Nord Stream 2: Understanding the Potential Consequences."

50 Bartosz Bieliszczuk, "Negocjacje w sprawie utrzymania tranzytu gazu przez Ukrainę," The Polish Institute of International Affairs, August 14, 2018, http://www.pism.pl/publikacje/biuletyn/nr-108-1681.

European gas system. Photo credit: www.nord-stream.com.

for gas from Europe does not seem to be reality. Someone has argued that the current transit infrastructure located in Ukraine needs expensive technical improvements to function optimally and to satisfy the growing need for gas in Europe. However, according to the World Bank, those costs would be much lower than the cost of Nord Stream 2. Moreover, the Ukrainian gas market is being reformed and thanks to this it is now certain that Ukraine has the economic means to undertake proper maintenance of the pipelines.[51] With a fully operational Nord Stream 2, Ukraine could lose $2 billion in transit fees annually, which represents more than 2% of the Ukrainian GDP.[52] The existing Russia-Ukraine transit contracts expire in 2019 and if Nord Stream 2 is completed by that time, the next contract would be totally different than the current one. As expected, Gazprom wants to maintain only 15 bcm of gas transiting though Ukraine and this amount is unacceptable for Kiev, since the costs of maintaining the transporting system required at least 50 bcm of gas.[53] Since 2015, when Gazprom halted direct exports to Ukraine, Kiev has been buying re-exported gas from Slovakia, although this gas has been arriving to Slovakia through Ukraine. Obvi-

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51 Alan Riley, "Nord Stream 2: Understanding the Potential Consequences."
52 Dimitar Lilkov, Roland Freudenstein, "The Case Against Nord Stream 2."
53 Bartosz Bieliszczuk, "Negocjacje w sprawie utrzymania tranzytu gazu przez Ukrainę."

Gas transported through Ukraine and NS1 since 2011 (Based on Gazprom's data).
Photo credit: Centre of Eastern Studies.

ously, if Slovakia would not have the gas coming from Ukraine but from Nord Stream 2 or other sources located in Central or Western Europe, the cost of transit for Ukraine probably would be higher than for any other country in Europe. In addition, it would be impossible for Ukraine to benefit from the reverse flows of gas coming back from European countries.

The need to maintain an amount of gas transiting through Ukraine is recognized by the whole EU, but it may not be enough to avoid a worsening of the geopolitical position of Ukraine.[54] Until today the European Commission has not had the chance to play a key role in resolving the Russia – Ukraine gas conflict. Will Ukraine lose one of its most important trump cards in its confrontation with Russia, namely, the status of transit country for Russian gas?

Conclusions

In any scenario, the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline will leave someone unhappy. At this time the project does not seem to be compromised. However, the possibility of applying EU law to the project could become a problematic issue for Germany and especially for Russia. Moscow could be forced to accept European law or, more probably, find another 'legal void' that will annoy even more the Central European countries and the US. The final outcome of the whole controversial history concerning the pipeline could illustrate whether the EU is becoming more independent from the US by not considering Russia such an enemy as the Americans now believe it is. In my opinion this scenario of a European-Russian rapprochement can split the EU even more and above all can undermine the Ukrainian approach to Europe. Are the Europeans, and especially the Germans, ready to take such a risk?

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54 Bartosz Bieliszczuk, "Negocjacje w sprawie utrzymania tranzytu gazu przez Ukrainę,"

Climate change and health

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Introduction

The phenomenon of climate change, observed for years and constantly intensifying, has had a negative impact on health, significantly deteriorating the quality of life of people in many regions of the world, including Poland. Already now we are dealing with increasingly frequent extreme weather phenomena; hurricanes, storms and increasingly longer heat waves no longer surprise us. Unfortunately, this is merely the beginning of the negative effects of climate change. Others will come before long.

In the coming years, many other new threats will be observed, such as flooding of ocean islands, desertification of areas exposed to water scarcity or serious loss of biodiversity, which will translate into food security. Unfortunately, it does not end there.[1]

The greenhouse effect is a process by which radiation from the Earth's atmosphere warms the planet's surface to a temperature above what it would be without this atmosphere. We can differentiate short-term solar radiation (0.15-4.0 nm) and long-term radiation. Thermal radiation escapes into the cosmic sphere and heat radiation returns to the ground, being stopped by a layer of GHG – greenhouse gases (CO_2, CH_4, N_2O, SF_6, water vapor etc.), which warm up Earth's athmosphere to a dangerous level – even a 1°C degree increase (in comparison to pre-industrial level, when emissions stared to rise) in the average world temperature can be detrimental to human health and change the conditions of life on this planet (Figure 1). However, we currently face a risk of global warming even up to 3°C degrees, unless GHG emissions are significantly reduced. Any further rise of the global temperature will have deteriorating impact on people and whole humanity, as well as staying at the current level of emissions.

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1 HEAL, Koalicja Klimatyczna, 2018: Wpływ zmiany klimatu na zdrowie

THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT

Figure 1. The greenhouse effect (Source: IPCC, 1990[2])

It has not always been obvious for scientists as to how to approach this issue and the level of trust has changed over the past decades. In 1990 there was a common understanding that there is a natural greenhouse effect and anthropogenic emissions of CO_2, NH_4 and CH_4 contribute to their concentration in the atmosphere. Eleven years later (ICCC 1990), in 2001, it was understood and proved by scientific evidence that in the last 50 years man has had the greatest impact on the climate[3]. In 2014, the percent of scientists convinced that climate change has an anthropogenic background extended to over 95%[4]. A year ago (2018) scientists spoke with one voice: we can still stop the changes. But we have about 12 years to do so, as the CO_2 concentration rises, followed by a significant rise in the worldwide average temperature. It is crucial to stop the rise under 1,5°C compared to the pre-industrial level. At the same time a group of hundreds of scientists gathered around the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reported that to keep the rise in global temperatures below 1.5°C this century, emissions of carbon dioxide would have to be cut by 45% by 2030. That is why climate policy (also with regard to health pro-

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2 IPCC, 1990: The first assessment report – overview. The Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, New York.
3 IPCC, 2001, Climate change 2001: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. The Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, New York
4 IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 151 pp.

tection) must be strictly based on scientific data. If it remains undermined – there will be always an argument for not taking action[5].

What is particularly important is that climate change is not the future. Its negative effects are already present today, felt by hundreds of millions of people every day. There is no, and probably will not be a, disease entity named climate change. But climate change affects health and the healthcare system, causing extremely high external health costs, suffering and the death of numerous people. The purpose of the article is to discuss the main directions of this impact[6].

Climate change and health

Climate change leads to a number of negative health effects, through direct consequences of this process like heat waves, extreme weather patterns, longer growing seasons, higher average temperature, water and food shortages and other risks. Health impacts of these consequences can be divided into direct impacts – like sudden deaths, injuries, mental diseases or allergies, and indirect impacts – like vector diseases, chronic diseases and non-specific symptoms, all related to climate change (Figure 2).

Fig. 2. Impact of climate change on human health

5 IPCC 2018 : Global warming of 1.5 °C: an IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty. Synthesis Report. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 32 pp.

6 Please note that only selected issues concerning climate change are discussed in this article. Climate change has also direct links to worldwide streams of migrations, likelihood of international and internal conflicts, probability of limiting food production, probable impact on the effectiveness of drugs and therapies (initially confirmed by results in psychiatry).

The World Health Organization estimates that currently climate change is directly responsible for more than 140,000 deaths per year, particularly in Africa and South-East Asia. By 2040, this number will increase by 250,000 deaths per year due to malaria, heat stress, diarrhea and malnutrition. On a global scale, the direct economic costs of climate change in terms of health deterioration may amount to USD 2–4 billion per year[7].

According to the Global Risks Report 2018 published by the World Economic Forum, extreme weather phenomena are the greatest threat to world order and stability over the next decade. With each passing year, not only does the frequency of their occurrence increase perilously, but also the severity of their devastation[8].

Research has shown that the effects of climate change have a greater negative impact on the health of children and pregnant women than on adults[9]. Women and children are particularly vulnerable to negative impacts in low- and middle-income countries, especially those where the air quality is bad[10].

It is also estimated that almost 88% of all cases related to the effects of climate change occur in children under five years of age[11]. Children are particularly vulnerable to dehydration. There is also a high risk of kidney disease, mental health problems and emotional disorders in children[12].

High temperatures and high humidity may increase the risk of pregnancy poisoning including preeclampsia and eclampsia. Exposure of pregnant women to very high air temperatures, especially in the second and third trimester, increases the risk of prematurity and/or low birth weight[13]. Pregnant women and nursing women are more exposed to kidney problems in periods of heat waves. There is a statistically confirmed difference in hospitalization for this reason in periods of high temperatures.

They are (indirectly) the cause of premature deaths, hospitalization, and lowering of work efficiency. US research shows that during heat waves, premature deaths increase by 1.1 people/1,000,000 inhabitants. Data from Hungary are even more severe - from 10.1 to even 38.2 people/1,000,000 inhabitants[14].

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7 https://www.who.int/globalchange/publications/COP24-report-health-climate-change/en/

8 The Global Risks Report 2018, World Economic Forum. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GRR18_Report.
   pdf. Accessed: 5/13/2018

9 Kelishadi R., Poursafa P., 2014 : The effect of climate change and air pollution on children and mother's health [in]
   Global Climate Change and Pubil Health. Business Media. New York

10 Haines A., Kovts R.S., Campbell-Lendrum D., Corvalan C., 2006 : Climate change and human health : impact ,
    vulnurability and mitigation. Lancet 367 : 2101 - 2109

11 Kelishadi R., Poursafa P., 2014 : Ibidem

12 Mandeville J.A., Nelson C.P. 2009 : Pediatric urolithiasis. Current Opinion in Urology 19(4): 419 - 23

13 Rylander C., Odland J., Sandanger T.M., 2013: Climate change and the potential effects on maternal and preg-
    nancy outcomes: an assessment of the most vulnerable – the mother, fetus, and newborn child. Global Health
    Action 6: 1 - 9

14 Paldy A., Bobvos J., 2010: Health impacts of heat waves of 2007 in Hungary – background and experiences. In:
    Dincer, I. et al. [eds.]: Global Warming. Green Energy and Technology. Springer : 629 - 642
Paldy A., Bobvos J., 2012: Impact of heat waves on excess mortality in 2011 and 2012 in Hungary. Central European
Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 67(2): 33–39.

Heat waves in Europe in 2003 caused premature death in at least 70,000 people[15]. In Russia, in 2010, 11,000 people died prematurely.[16] In Poland, during the heat wave in July 1994, the risk of premature deaths increased from 23% (Szczecin) to 63% (Łódź)[17].

Heat waves also increase the number of hospitalizations and days with limited work capacity and affect the increase in the concentration of ground-level ozone, which also has a negative impact on human health. Interactions with other pollutants require further research, but a high probability of a significant relationship with the increase in suspended particulate matter. In Poland, the length of the growing season has increased by more than 25 days since 1970[18]. This leads to a prolonged period of high concentrations of plant pollen in the air and increases the risk of allergies, as well as affects the reduction of Poland's food security. In hot weather, in the absence of wind and rainfall, the concentration of allergens and pollen in the air increases. This results in the malaise and poor health condition of allergy sufferers and asthmatics, whose number is estimated to be over 300 million.

Climate change is also associated with the spread of infectious diseases transmitted by living organisms (vectors) such as flies, mosquitoes, ticks, lice and rodents which increase a risk of vector diseases: dengue, malaria or Lyme disease. In 2018, in the Czech Republic, the first death of a person who never traveled outside the country was recorded. Vector-borne diseases already account for more than 17% of all infectious diseases, causing more than 700,000 deaths per year[19].

Also extreme weather events like hurricanes or floods are direct consequences of the global warming. In 2005 hurricane Katrina caused the death of 1,836 people in the USA. A further 705 people were declared missing. Hurricanes are also a problem in Europe. Hurricane Ophelia, which hit Ireland in October 2017, caused three deaths. Floods comprise nearly 40–50% of all natural disasters. In 2000–2014 they caused over 2,000 deaths in Europe, with approximately 8.7 million people exposed to their effects[20].

The greatest threat to health and life from floods occurs in Asia, especially in developing countries. In recent years, ca. 400 million inhabitants of the continent have been exposed to the adverse effects of floods every year. Between 1987–1997, 228,000 people died in floods on the Asian continent.

The number of extreme meteorological and weather events is increasing. Since 1970, the frequency of hydrological disasters (floods) has increased four times (since 2004 - twice), and storms and droughts have doubled[21]. The increase in the frequency of these phenomena causes an increase in the number of people losing their lives or seriously

15 Bono A de, Giuliani G, Kluser S, Peduzzi P., 2004: Impacts of summer 2003 heat wave in Europe. Environment Alert Bulletin 2. UNEP-GRID Europe.

16 Shaposhnikov D1, Revich B, Bellander T, Bedada GB, Bottai M, Kharkova T, Kvasha E, Lezina E, Lind T, Semutnikova E, Pershagen G., 2014: Mortality related to air pollution with the moscow heat wave and wildfire of 2010. Epidemiology 25(3):359-64. haposhnikov et al., 2014

17 Błażejczyk K., Baranowski J., Błażejczyk A., 2015: Wpływ klimatu na stan zdrowia w Polsce: stan aktualny oraz prognoza do 2100 roku. Instytut Geografii i Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania PAN Warszawa 2015. pp. 226

18 Lorenc 2013

19 Vector-borne diseases, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs387/en/, accessed: 4/1/2018

20 R. D. Knabb, J. R. Rhome, D. P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report Hurricane Katrina 23-30 August 2005, National Hurricane Center 2005 [updated in 2011], p. 11.

21 www.omicsonline.org/open-access/trends-in-extreme-weather-events-since-1900 Access 30.08.2019

injured. Extreme weather phenomena also affect mental health, leading to numerous disorders.

Climate change effects in Poland

The health effects of climate change are also present in Poland, through consequences of drought, hail, hurricane winds, floods and heat waves.

The increase in drought frequency is alarming, as in the years 1951 - 1981 there were 6 noted droughts (one every five years), in the years 1982 - 2011 - 18 droughts (one every 2 years), and after 2012 there is a permanent summer drought in Poland[22]. The droughts in 2018 and 2019 were the most serious since at least 100 years.

Fig. 3 Summer drought in Poland, 2008 (Source: IUNG -PIB, 2008)[23]

Apart from crop losses and damage drought directly contributes to illnesses and premature deaths of citizens. The heat wave in 1994 contributed to the increase in mortality by 66 deaths in Warsaw alone (30 people died due to cardiovascular diseases). An increased

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22 System monitoring Suszy Rolniczej. http://www.susza.iung.pulawy.pl/ Access 30.08.2019
23 System monitoring Suszy Rolniczej. Ibidem

risk of death occurred in many Polish cities: in Szczecin the risk increased by 23%, Wrocław – 43%, Poznań – 49%, Łódź – up to 63%. According to research carried out in Poland, air temperature has an impact on the increase in mortality due to circulatory failure. The number of deaths in the years 1960–1990 increased from 100 to over 550 per 100,000 inhabitants. The rise of air temperature in Poland is also related to the increase in the incidence of allergic diseases. The number of patients with allergic rhinitis and bronchial asthma has doubled in the last decade.

The risk of violent weather events is growing year on year. Between 1997–2012 there were 9 floods in Poland, affecting nearly 370,000 people and causing the deaths of 113 people. In 2010, more than 20 people died as a result of floods, with damage estimated at more than PLN 10 billion. The flood in 1997 was even more severe, contributing to 55 deaths and damage at the level of PLN 12.8 billion. In 2001–2011, the costs caused by the effects of climate change in Poland, including violent weather events, amounted to as much as PLN 56 billion. Meanwhile, damage caused by atmospheric phenomena at that time reached PLN 90 billion.

An increased frequency of hurricanes and whirlwinds has been observed, as in the 1980s, there were 1-2 incidences per year, in the 1990s already 4-5, after 2001 – 7-8 per year, and in 2006 – even 52 noted incidences of hurricane winds or whirlwinds. Currently each year there are constantly over 20 events of this type in Poland[24].

Also a significant increase in the frequency of hail – directly threatening human health and life, but mostly causing economic loss - (compared to 1960 - 78) in the years 2010 – 2012 has been noted in many of the Polish voivodships, with the highest increase rate in the southern part of Poland[25] (Figure 4):

Fig. 4 Changes in frequency of hail in selected voivodeships in Poland (Source: Kołkowska K, Lorenc H., 2014[26])

24 Lorenc H., 2012 : Struktura maksymalnych prędkości wiatru w Polsce. [w] Klęski żywiołowe a bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne kraju. Pod red. Lorenc H. IMGW. Warszawa pp. 33 - 60
25 Kołkowska K, Lorenc H., 2012: Ryzyko występowania gradu w Polsce. [w] Klęski żywiołowe a bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne kraju. Pod red. Lorenc H. IMGW. Warszawa pp. 80 - 98
26 Ibidem

The spread of infectious vector-borne diseases is a major threat to health in Poland. One of the biggest threats is posed by the castor bean tick, which causes Lyme disease. Between 2005–2014, the number of cases more than tripled from 4,406 to 13,868 per year (Figure 5), and now extends to over 20,000 incidences per year.

Fig 5 Number of Lyme disease in Poland 2005 – 2015 (Source: National Institute of Public Health)

All above-mentioned factors, extreme weather patterns, illnesses, premature deaths and external health costs will most likely be escalated in the upcoming years, unless a strict and urgent climate policy is implemented. The only way to reduce these risks is to reduce the GHG concentration in the atmosphere (which also contributes to reducing air pollution which kills seven million people worldwide each year).

PCC and HEAL report on climate change health impacts

A report by the Polish Climate Coalition and HEAL Poland entitled "Climate change health impacts" (2018) presents two scenarios presenting the health impacts of climate change. The first assumes that by 2100 the increase in global average temperature will exceed 3˚C, i.e. measures to protect the environment will be insufficient to halt climate warming. In the second one, the increase in global average temperature will be limited to well below 2˚C, thus achieving the 2100 objective set in the Paris agreement.

The analysis showed, both globally as well as with regard to Poland, that the implementation of the second scenario means a significant reduction in the negative health effects of climate change, but does not eliminate them altogether. The number of premature deaths from fossil fuel combustion in the EU, the US and China would decrease by nearly 1.2 million. This scenario would create savings of around USD 490 billion in these three regions by 2030 by reducing coal transport costs alone! These funds could be used, for

instance, to improve the quality of the health care system. The fact that an average of 27% of the EU population negatively assesses the overall quality of health care (in Poland this number is several times higher and equals 62%) proves how much this is needed.

The health care system will have to prepare for a number of new challenges which lie ahead. These include the need to identify and monitor the growing public health risks associated with the direct effects of climate change (e.g. droughts, floods, extreme weather events). Of extreme importance is also the ability to cope with the indirect effects of warming, such as the deepening social inequalities or threats to the groups most at risk. Further challenges include preparing physicians and medical staff for the treatment of diseases which may occur in Poland, as well as developing strategies to combat the spread of vector-borne diseases. Educating patients about the risks of climate change is also immensely important.

Achieving the above objectives will require an increase in financial outlays on the health care system. In 2016, the value of public subsidies for mining and coal-fired power generation in Poland amounted to PLN 9.2 billion. This is more than 11% of the state's health care spending. If these resources were to support the health care system, it would facilitate the preparation for the challenges linked to the current and projected effects of climate change. It would also increase the safety and quality of life of Polish citizens.

Conclusion

Climate change has and will have an impact on health and the health care system. Some of these impacts will be directly related to the effect of climate change, others to degradation and environmental pollution resulting from activities contributing to anthropogenic climate change.

In Poland, politicians and the healthcare system are poorly prepared to manage these effects (due to climate skepticism and a low level of awareness). Therefore, the most urgent actions are required – including further research, education and investment to both mitigate the consequences and adapt to its effects already felt by the healthcare system and all citizens.

The Modern Interfaces of Intermarium and the Fight against Destiny

Adrian Popa*, Cristian Barna**

Russia's recent buildup of A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) forces in Crimea and Kaliningrad, coupled with its increasingly confronting rhetoric in the Black and Baltic Seas, pose a serious challenge for the NATO's Eastern flank countries. While the *mare sui generis* status of the Black Sea might be altered under the expected inauguration of Canal Istanbul in 2023 as it would probably require the revision of the Montreux Convention, the *mare liberum* status of the Baltic Sea might also be questioned as Russia contests NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence in this region. Facing this challenging geostrategic context, Pilsudski's ideas of *Intermarium* seem to have revived within the Central and Eastern European countries under modern interfaces such as the Bucharest Nine and the Three Seas Initiative. This paper proposes a comparative analysis between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea in terms of their newly-emerged geostrategic context, discusses the feasibility of the recent endeavours to promote cooperation within the Central and Eastern European countries and not ultimately, highlights the utility of a regional military alliance in support of NATO.

Keywords: Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Intermarium, NATO, Russia.

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Introduction

Nowadays, the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus is the hotspot where Russia's strategic *Rimland* clashes with NATO's eastern flank. Indeed, this is in general terms the space whose domi-

nation is the first key step for the ultimate world supremacy as referred to it by both the British strategist Halford Mackinder – who initially called it the geographical pivot of history[1] and later Heartland[2] – and the American strategist Nicholas Spykman – who identified it as one of the most important parts of his Rimland theory[3].

The current challenges to the security of the Euro-Atlantic space originating from this regional security complex are generated, among others, by: the democratic reconstruction of the riparian states (following the collapse of the USSR), the management of frozen conflicts, the maintenance of peace, the delimitation and protection of the borders, the security of energy resources, the combat against trafficking of human beings, arms and drugs, as well as the high potential for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.

Their management far exceeds the resources of any government or organization located in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus. Therefore, there was an acute need for large scale concerted action, this development being possible only through the operationalization of international and regional partnerships[4].

In the meantime, Great Power status cannot be fully-claimed by Russia unless it assures its full-access to open seas. The loss of hegemonic influence in Central and Eastern European states once they joined NATO was assumed by Russia as a never-again compromise inherent in the process of transition from the USSR.

Depicting the outcome of the Cold War as a victory for the Atlanticists amid an alleged betrayal of Mikhail Gorbachev that lead to the self-destruction of the tellurocratic power[5], Aleksandr Dughin appraises Boris Yeltsin's decision of August 1999 to appoint Vladimir Putin as prime minister of Russia[6]. Indeed, it was during Vladimir Putin's leadership when Russia strongly denied through hardcore military interventions Ukraine and Georgia's aspirations for NATO membership. Putin's actions are claimed to have resulted in the restoration of the tellurocratic civilization and its crystallization as an alternative to a traders' society[7].

However, Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, one of the main promoters of the Soviet Union's thalassocracy during the Cold War, argued that only naval forces are capable of projecting, in time of both peace and war, the state's economic and military will[8]. Russia's recent

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1 Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History", *The Geographic Journal* XXIII, no. 4 (1904): 421-437.

2 Idem, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1919), 92-95;

3 Nicholas John Spykman, "Frontiers, Security and International Organization", *Geographical Review* 32, no. 3 (1942): 441-442.

4 Stephen Blank, "*Black Sea Rivalry*", *Perspective* XVII, no. 2 (March-April 2007), https://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol17/blank.html (accessed May 14, 2019)

5 Aleksandr Dughin, *Last War of the World-Island* (London: Arktos Media Ltd., 2015), 38-40;

6 Ibid., p. 70.

7 Ibid., p. 74.

8 Apud Robert Weinland, Michael MccGwire and James M. McConnell, *Admiral Gorshkov on 'Navies in War and Peace'* (Arlington: Institute of Naval Studies, 1974), 64.

buildup of A2/AD forces in Crimea[9] and Kaliningrad[10] may be a sign that this country is not neglecting certain advantages of thalassocracy meanwhile reinforcing its tellurocratic status.

Being an extension of recently-published works of the authors[11], the following discusses both Russia's re-emergence as a potential threat in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus and the regional initiatives resembling the historical *Intermarium* project that are promoted by the Central and Eastern European countries in order to assure their security and prosperity.

Russia's re-emergence as a potential threat in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus

Russia's re-emergence as a threat is coupled nowadays with an increasing confrontational rhetoric comprising airspace violations[12] and even incidents limiting the freedom of navigation[13] in the Black and Baltic Seas. This might not be a surprise for those who have thoroughly followed the geostrategic evolutions in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus.

On the one hand, the role of the Black Sea as the southern part of Russia's strategic *Rimland* and NATO's eastern flank is modeled by the interests pursued in this regional security complex by the Great Powers. Over the centuries to date, the geostrategic importance of the Black Sea has been based on the role that this region played simultaneously as a 'connecting bridge' and 'border' between former powers and empires and as a 'buffer' and 'transit' zone between Europe and Asia[14].

In the twentieth century, the Euro-Atlantic thalassocratic powers referred to the Black Sea only from the perspective of their need to cover a security deficit that risked distorting the strategic balance in the region and subsequently altered the security arrangements of the bipolar world order[15]. Generally, the Black Sea was considered almost a 'Russian

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9 Ruslan Minich, *Russia Shows its Military Might in the Black Sea and Beyond*, Atlantic Council, November 6, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russia-shows-its-military-might-in-the-black-sea-and-beyond (accessed May 15, 2019).

10 Sergey Sukhankin, *Kaliningrad oblast – Russia`s formidable A2/AD bubble*, New Eastern Europe, August 2, 2017, http://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/08/02/kaliningrad-oblast-russia-s-formidable-a2-ad-bubble/ (accessed May 15, 2019).

11 See Cristian Barna, *Rom*ânia între prieteni şi duşmani (Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 2014); Adrian-Vasile Popa, "Reconfiguring the Balance of Power in the Wider Black Sea Region: the Romanian Proposal for an Allied Naval Cooperation", *Romanian Intelligence Studies Review*, no. 19-20 (2018).

12 See The Moscow Times, *Russia Says It Intercepted U.S., Swedish Spy Jets Over Baltic Sea*, June 11, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/06/11/russia-says-it-intercepted-us-swedish-spy-jets-over-baltic-sea-a65956 (accessed June 12, 2019); Radio Free Europe, *Estonia Says Russian Plane Again Violates Airspace*, June 21, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/estonia-russian-plane-violates-airspace/29310815.html (accessed June 12, 2019).

13 See BBC, *Russia-Ukraine tensions rise after Kerch Strait ship capture*, November 26, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46340283 (accessed June 12, 2019); David B. Larter, *Russian military 'harassed' US-flagged merchant ship in the Baltic ahead of exercises*, June 27, 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2017/06/27/russian-military-harassed-us-flagged-merchant-ship-in-the-baltic-ahead-of-exercises/ (accessed June 12, 2019).

14 George Cristian Maior, *Noul aliat. Regândirea politicii de apărare a României la începutul secolului XXI*, 2nd edition (Bucharest: RAO Publishing House, 2013), 73.

15 George Cristian Maior and Sergey Konoplyov, *Cunoaștere strategică în zona extinsă a Mării Negre* (Bucharest: RAO Publishing House, 2011), 106.

lake', being a veritable power projection platform for Soviet naval forces into the Mediterranean Sea[16]. However, the disintegration of the USSR altered Black Sea power relations as emerging states have diminished the shore area of the newly-formed Russia which still seeks to preserve the geopolitical 'pivot' role played by the USSR in building and maintaining 'the Cold War architecture of shores'[17].

Nowadays, unlike the role it played during the Cold War - a region located on the periphery of the European continental land mass, the Wider Black Sea Region is evolving as key-component of Euro-Atlantic strategic defence. In this sense, while NATO formed and strengthened the southern part of its eastern flank, the United States multiplied its military bases in the Black Sea region by using the infrastructure of its Black Sea riparian allies and partners - Romania: Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base, Babadag training base, Smardan training area, Cincu training area and the AEGIS Ashore missile defence facility in Deveselu; Bulgaria: Aytos Logistics Center, Novo Selo Range, Bezmer Air Base and Graf Ignatievo Air Base; Ukraine: Ochakov Naval Base; and Georgia: a potential joint development of the Vaziani military aerodrome.

However, probably the most important position in terms of security for the Wider Black Sea Region remains the Bosphorus-Dardanelles system which facilitates sea-going navigation to the Atlantic Ocean. Having been signed in 1936, the Montreux Convention sets the navigation rules through the Straits for both merchant vessels and warships in time of peace and in time of war[18]. Despite the fact that the Montreux Convention established Turkish control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, Russia's recent destabilizing action in the region transformed the Black Sea into a two-hegemon regional security complex. However, the recent increased American focus on the Black Sea suggests its desire to alter the current status quo by contesting the anachronic provisions of the Montreux Convention, especially in terms of the access and stationing in the Black Sea of warships belonging to the non-riparian states. This potential development would fully-ensure the security guarantees offered to its allies and partners in the region. The operationalization of the Kanal Istanbul, a man-made canal sought to be completed by Ankara in 2023 as a celebration of the centenary of the Turkish republic, might be such a chance for the alteration of the *mare sui generis* status of the Black Sea as it would probably require the renegotiation of current provisions of the Montreux Convention.

On the other hand, representing the northern part of Russia's strategic *Rimland* and NATO's eastern flank, the Baltic Sea is also highly-important in terms of geostrategy. As Michael Peck put it, in the Baltic region "geography is not on NATO's side. The Baltic States are on Russia's western border, near Russian bases, supplies and reinforcements, while NATO forces are mostly in Western Europe and the United States (...) which means that NATO cannot count on relieving the Baltic nations before Russia had time to entrench"[19].

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16 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Marea tablă de şah* (Bucharest: Encyclopedic Universe Publishing House, 2000), 48.

17 Oleg Serebrian, *Geopolitica spaţiului pontic*, 2nd edition (Chişinău: Cartier Publishing House, 2006), 11.

18 For full details regarding the provisions of the Montreux Convention, see League of Nations, "Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits, with Annexes and Protocol. Signed at Montreux, July 20th, 1936", *Treaty Series* CLXXHI, No. 4001-4032, 213-241 (1936).

19 Michael Peck, *Want to Stop Russia from Invading the Baltic States? Turn Poland Into a Military Powerhouse*, The National Interest, March 23, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/want-stop-russia-invading-baltic-states-turn-poland-military-powerhouse-48692 (accessed May 15, 2019).

In addition, the shallow waters and narrow straits of the Baltic make it easy for Russia to lay mines and hard for NATO to maneuver warships (…) making it impossible to support the tiny Baltic states in case of war[20]. As Robbin Laird argued, "the Russians with the advantage of having significant Russian minorities in the Baltics (as a result of the dissolution of the USSR) can play a probing game similar to Ukraine if they deem this necessary or useful"[21].

The Baltic Sea, as a potential area of Russian influence, is indissolubly linked to the Kaliningrad enclave - located on its shores between Poland and Lithuania. Over time, Kaliningrad became a strategically important area, with the Russian fleet stationing in this area from where an offensive against the West could be launched anytime[22]. It is worth mentioning that currently the Kaliningrad enclave is Russia's only uncontested European maritime port that does not freeze in winter – except for the Port of Sevastopol whose annexation by Russia is highly-disputed – allowing it to keep its borders secured. After the United States announced that elements of its missile defence shield will be installed near Kaliningrad, the Russian Federation endowed its Baltic fleet with high-tech capabilities[23]. Indeed, the *mare liberum* status of the Baltic Sea might be questioned by Russia in the near future. In this sense, there is no surprise that this year's Baltic Operations naval drill headed by the US reborn 2nd Fleet, with some exercises being staged off the coast of Kalinigrad[24], was counter-maneuvered by Russia through a similar training operation in the area[25].

As a consequence, only through a strengthened presence in the Baltic Sea could NATO at least balance potential Russian aggressions while fully-ensuring the security guarantees offered to its members. Indeed, more than even in the case of NATO's members in the Black Sea, the 2016 Warsaw summit represented a turning point in the perception of NATO vis-à-vis the defence of its members along the Baltic Sea. As Iulia Joja and Octavian Manea remarked, "though in the aftermath of the Crimea annexation the Alliance promised to increase readiness in Europe and consolidate defense on the eastern flank, the 2016 Warsaw meeting focused only on the Baltic Sea. The differentiation between the northern (Baltic Sea) and the southern part (Black Sea) of the eastern flank was conceptualized as an 'enhanced' versus 'tailored' forward presence and translated into four battalions of Western combat troops on the ground and the continuous rotational presence in the North, while only training and staff units, no Western framework nations and

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20 Sabine Siebold, *Germany strengthens Baltic naval alliance to counter Russian buildup*, Reuters, October 26, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-baltic-military/germany-strengthens-baltic-naval-alliance-to-counter-russian-buildup-idUSKCN1N0287 (accessed May 15, 2019).

21 Robbin Laird, *European Direct Defense: The Case of the Baltics*, Second Line of Defence, January 25, 2019, https://sldinfo.com/2019/01/european-direct-defense-the-case-of-the-baltics/ (accessed May 15, 2019).

22 Alexander Diener and Joshua Hagen, *"*Geopolitics of the Kaliningrad exclave and enclave. Russian and EU perspective*"*, *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 52, no. 4 (July 2011): 574.

23 BBC, *Kaliningrad: New Russian missile deployment angers Nato*, November 22, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38070201 (accessed May 22, 2019).

24 Carlos Munoz, *U.S. Navy sends message to Russia with 2nd Fleet's Baltic Operations*, The Washington Times, May 22, 2019, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/may/22/navy-2nd-fleet-sends-message-russia-baltops-drill/ (accessed May 24, 2019).

25 Alexander Prokopenko and Roman Goncharenko, *NATO and Russia: Maneuvers and countermaneuvers in the Baltic Sea*, Deutsche Welle, June 14, 2019 https://www.dw.com/en/nato-and-russia-maneuvers-and-countermaneuvers-in-the-baltic-sea/a-49188875 (accessed June 15, 2019).

intermittent rotational presence in the South"[26]. In addition, Poland, NATO's main defence pillar in the northern part of the eastern flank, proved that it is ready to complement Allied efforts by conducting national security projects aimed at strengthening its position in relation to Russia. Indeed, after the 2015 inauguration of the liquefied natural gas plant in Świnoujście[27], three more major projects are expected to be operationalized on Polish territory in this sense in the near future – i.e. the Baltic Pipe infrastructure project[28], the Vistula Spit canal[29] and the American military base known as Fort Trump[30].

As can be seen in the Polish case, facing the above-discussed prospective challenging geostrategic context in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus, NATO's eastern flank countries could not wait for the 'great game' of the West and Russia to reach an outcome, but rather acted pro-actively in the fight for their destiny. Indeed, Pilsudski's ideas of Intermarium seem to have revived within the Central and East European countries under modern interfaces such as the Bucharest Nine and the Three Seas Initiative. Before discussing the feasibility of these recent developments, it is necessary to look briefly into the most widely-known product of the interwar Polish school of thought, namely Intermarium[31].

Intermarium - lessons from a less cohesive past in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus

Despite a variety of existing Intermarium interpretations - deriving from its historical nonexistence, geopolitical diversity and theoretical ambiguity - making the concept very fuzzy[32], the Intermarium concept is regarded within this context as the land between the Black and Baltic Seas – with certain extensions in Scandinavia and the Balkans – which might be fertile for the Central and East European countries' endeavours to promote cooperation as a way of dealing with common threats.

Tracing back its history to the Jagiellonian dynasty's attempts of the fifteenth century to obtain Polish predominance over the territory between the Baltic and Black Seas and strongly influenced by the example of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth which con-

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26 Iulia Joja and Octavian Manea, *2018 NATO Summit: Finally a focus on the Black Sea?*, Real Clear Defense, July 11, 2018, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/07/11/2018_nato_summit_finally_a_focus_ on_the_ black_sea _113596.html (accessed May 20, 2019).

27 See Radio Poland, Świnoujście *gas terminal officially opened*, October 12, 2015, http://www.thenews.pl/1/12/ Artykul/224582,Swinoujscie-gas-terminal-officially-opened (accessed June 5, 2019);.

28 See Natalia Konarzewska, "Baltic Pipe to Cut Poland's Gas Dependence on Russia", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 16, no. 69 (May 2019).

29 See The Telegraph, "Poland to build canal in order to avoid ships passing through Russian waters", October 13, 2016, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/13/poland-to-build-canal-in-order-to-avoid-ships-passing-through-ru/ (accessed June 5, 2019).

30 See William J. Hennigan, *Fort Trump? The Pentagon Takes a Step Toward Establishing Base in Poland*, Time, March 14, 2019, https://time.com/5551061/poland-military-base-fort-trump/ (accessed June 5, 2019).

31 Extensive analyses have been dedicated to this topic - for example, see Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, *Intermarium: the Land between the Black and Baltic Seas* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2013); Robert Ištok, Irina Kozárová and Anna Polačkov, "The Intermarium as a Polish Geopolitical Concept in history and in the Present", *Geopolitics*, December 6, 2018.

32 For details, see Ostap Kushnir, *Why great national ideas end up on the backstage of regional politics*, New Eastern Europe, July 6, 2017, http://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/07/06/why-great-national-ideas-end-up-on-the-backstage-of-regional-politics/ (accessed May 22, 2019).

trolled this territory from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century[33], the crystalisation of the Intermarium concept coincides with the revival of Polish statehood following the end of the First World War when various Polish political elites under the leadership of statesman Jozef Pilsudski believed that forming an alliance and not ultimately a federation comprising Poland and its neighbours would be the best solution to resist challenges from both the East (Russia) and the West (Germany).

Rising from Pilsudski's Prometheism platform whose main objective was accomplished as an outcome of the dissolution of the Russian centre of power through the emergence of a belt of new independent states following World War I, Intermarium envisaged a leading role for Poland in a broad federation of East European states[34]. Highly-criticised by Pilsudski's main political opponent, Roman Dmowski, for being unrealistic and drifting away from Poland's necessity to retain only those territories that once belonged to the Piast founding dynasty, the federative approach of Intermarium was thwarted with the signing of the 1921 Treaty of Riga which established a *de facto* partition of Ukraine and Belarus between Russia and Poland, ultimately ruining Poland's relations with other countries in the region.

Pilsudski's ideas were continued by Polish Foreign Minister Gabriel Narutowicz who concentrated his efforts on fostering collaboration between five of the Baltic States - Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia - with the eventual aim of forming a common bloc. Narutowicz's assassination shortly after his election as the first Polish president brought an end to this plan while the newly formed government started to implement Dmowski's policies instead[35].

Initiating the renaissance of the Intermarium geopolitical concept, Jozef Beck - the Polish foreign minister between 1932 and 1939 - sought collaboration with East Central European countries as a result of the existential danger to which Poland was exposed by Germany and to a larger extent by the Soviet Union[36]. Beck's efforts to revive the Intermarium idea, in the form of a Third Europe bloc comprising countries of no choice on the Warsaw – Budapest – Bucharest – Belgrade – Rome axis, failed once World War II broke out in 1939. Indeed, despite Germany's defeat during World War II, the Soviet Union celebrated victory and as a result of the Yalta Conference the latter managed to keep for almost half a century the whole Ponto-Baltic Isthmus in its direct and indirect sphere of hegemony. Subsequently, during the Cold War era the Intermarium concept was kept alive by Polish exiles such as Jerzy Giedroyć, while in the Eastern Bloc it was still treated as a danger to Soviet rule and subsequently censored[37].

Surprisingly, the Intermarium concept was not revived immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union because the countries in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus were more inclined to accept their newly-emerged geopolitical offers, namely EU and NATO membership. Indeed, some attempts such as those made in the 1990s by Polish President Lech Walesa

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33 Robert Ištok, Irina Kozárová and Anna Polačkov, "The Intermarium as a Polish Geopolitical Concept in history and in the Present", *Geopolitics*, December 6, 2018, p. 6.

34 Ibid., pp. 8-9.

35 Ibid., p. 9.

36 Ibid., p. 10.

37 See Daria Nalecz, *Intermarium vs the Three Seas Initiative*, New Eastern Europe, July 6, 2017, http://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/07/06/intermarium-vs-the-three-seas-initiative/ (accessed May 22, 2019).

- to forge a strategic partnership with Ukraine - or by Polish historian Leszek Moczulski - to propose cooperation between the East Central European states as an intermediate stage in their integration process into the European Union – were just weak reminders of a glorious Intermarium idea.

However, based to a certain extent on the EU's not fullfiling expectations for more than a decade after integration, and coupled with Russia's re-emergence as a potential threat, we see nowadays a crystallization of some potential modern interfaces of Intermarium, endeavours to promote cooperation within the Central and East European countries such as the Three Seas Initiative and the Bucharest Nine. Therefore, as will be discussed below, these initiatives might have all the premises to soon accomplish George Friedman's prediction that the eastern flank of the European Peninsula will have a cohesive group, backed by the United States, forming a line of demarcation between Russia and the rest of Europe[38].

The modern interfaces of Intermarium and a potential prospect

The most popular recent form of cooperation between the Central and East European countries is no doubt the Three Seas Initiative, also known as Trimarium. Envisaged at the Polish-Croatian presidential level in 2015 and operationalised at its first summit in Dubrovnik in 2016 as a forum for regional dialogue along a north-south axis from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic and Black Seas, the Three Seas Initiative comprises twelve member countries - the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), the Visegrad Group (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary), Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, Croatia and Slovenia.

On the one hand, the declared economic nature of the Initiative has been followed ever since its second summit held in Warsaw in 2017 confirmed in the presence of US President Donald Trump its following priorities: "enhanced transportation connections of our region to develop and further integrate into the trans-European transport (TEN-T) network, implementation of the Union's energy policy objectives, promote business character of joint economic projects, full synergy with the EU policies"[39]. Subsequently, the third summit of the Three Seas Initiative held in Bucharest in 2018 witnessed the signing of an agreement on forty-eight priority interconnection projects within the region[40] and a letter of intent to establish the Three Seas Investment Fund to generate resources for project financing[41]. The most recent summit of the Three Seas Initiative held in Ljubljana in June 2019 reconfirmed the determination of the Central and East European countries

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38 George Friedman, *From the Intermarium to the Three Seas*, Geopolitical Futures, July 7, 2017 https://geopolitical-futures.com/intermarium-three-seas/ (accessed May 22, 2019).

39 The Three Seas Initiative Summit Warsaw, *The Second Summit of the 3 Seas Initiative - Joint Declaration*, July 6-7, 2017, http://three-seas.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/WARSAW.pdf (accessed May 22, 2019).

40 For details, see The Three Seas Initiative Summit Bucharest, *The Three Seas Initiative – Priority Interconnection Projects*, September 17-18, 2018, http://three-seas.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/LIST-OF-PRIORITY-INTERCONNECTION-PROJECTS-2018.pdf (accessed May 22, 2019).

41 For details, see The Three Seas Initiative Summit Bucharest, *Joint Declaration of the Third Summit of the Three Seas Initiative*, September 17-18, 2018, http://three-seas.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/BUCHAREST-SUMMIT-JOINT-DECLARATION.pdf (accessed May 22, 2019).

to continue the implementation of their interconnection projects agreed in Bucharest the previous year[42].

The Three Seas Initiative may have also incorporated security ambitions in the meantime. Since its first summit held in Dubrovnik, there were some voices such as American General James Jones, former National Security Advisor of President Obama, urging that the Three Seas Initiative also become an element in strengthening European security[43]. Indeed, as Petar Kurecic has recently remarked:

> despite their diversities and some differences in stances towards Russia, the member states of the Initiative are showing certain common interests, such as heavy reliance on NATO as a protector (de facto the U.S. 'security umbrella'), determination to lower the dependence on Russian gas, develop new transit corridors and gas pipelines, and act jointly as a barrier towards a renewed German-French vision of Europe, which comprises a tighter integration of the fiscal and political aspects of the EU[44].

Given the US and China's potential interests in the Initiative[45], some authors are even advancing the idea that the Three Seas Initiative could function in the near future as a territorial 'cut off' between Western Europe and Russia and as a potential gateway into Western Europe[46]. This potential development is not perceived in a positive manner by the rest of the European continent because as George Friedman put it, "few in Europe want to revert to Cold War politics; most Europeans believe they can accommodate Russian interests without creating a new containment line"[47].

Overall, some authors remain cautious when associating the Intermarium concept with the Three Seas Initiative, mainly because the former is a historical project of regional integration while the latter is a project of regional cooperation[48]. However, there is no doubt that the Three Seas Initiatiative may evolve as a modern interface of Intermarium as long as the scope of Jozef Beck's interwar federal vision of a Third Europe bloc can be understood in present times as a Central and East European countries' loose alliance against both the Russian threat and the EU's ascendancy over their domestic affairs.

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42 For details, see The Three Seas Initiative Summit Ljubljana, *Joint Declaration of the Fourth Summit of the Three Seas Initiative*, June 5-6, 2019, https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/comunicate-de-presa/joint-declaration-of-the-fourth-summit-of-the-three-seas-initiative-ljubljana-5-6-june-2019 (accessed June 10, 2019).

43 Visegrad Post, *The Three Seas Initiative: Central and Eastern Europe takes charge of its own destiny*, August 28, 2016, https://visegradpost.com/en/2016/08/28/the-three-seas-initiative-central-and-eastern-europe-takes-charge-of-its-own-destiny/ (accessed May 25, 2019).

44 Petar Kurecic, "The Three Seas Initiative: geographical determinants, geopolitical foundations, and prospective challenges", *Hrvatski Geografski Glasnik* 80, no. 1 (2018):122.

45 See Georgi Gotev and Alexandra Brzozowski, *The Brief – Three Seas, two leaders*, Euractiv, September 17, 2018, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/the-brief-three-seas-two-leaders/ (accessed May 15, 2019);

46 Robert Ištok, Irina Kozárová and Anna Polačkov, Op. cit., 25.

47 George Friedman, Op. cit.

48 See Dariusz Góra-Szopiński, *Trimarium is not Intermarium*, New Eastern Europe, July 6, 2017, http://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/07/06/trimarium-is-not-intermarium/ (accessed June 2, 2019); see Emil Avdaliani, *Poland and the Success of its 'Intermarium' Project*, Modern Diplomacy, March 31, 2019, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2019/03/31/poland-and-the-success-of-its-intermarium-project/ (accessed June 2, 2019).

Another recently-established form of cooperation within the Central and East European countries is the Bucharest Nine platform. Being operationalized in 2014 as a joint Romanian-Polish proposal and comprising nine EU and NATO members from Central and Eastern Europe – Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria – the official scope of this platform is to create a forum for the coordination of the participating countries' defence policies.

The Bucharest Nine platform has created so far the context for a number of meetings of the member countries at various levels: presidents, foreign affairs ministers, defence ministers and members of Parliament[49]. While the impact of this platform is not as visible to the public as in the case of the Three Seas Initiative – mainly because its effects reside in the sphere of national security - the ambition of the participating countries, in full compliance with the principles of solidarity and security indivisibility of all NATO Member States, is more than clear: to promote joint approaches and to further contribute to Euro-Atlantic security. Indeed, as Poland's National Security Bureau head Pawel Soloch stated during the Bucharest Nine defence ministers' meeting of April 2019, the participating countries have assumed a common assessment of threats, meanwhile its attendance by US high-representatives shows the significance of the Bucharest Nine to NATO and trans-Atlantic relations[50].

Even though there are no clear perspectives regarding the further development of this platform, the Bucharest Nine format has, as can be seen below, all the chances in the near future to be transformed into a regional alliance in support of NATO. The regional dimension of NATO's security environment seems to be a new trend in assuring the security of the Alliance. Being based on the success of the Operation *Unified Protector* of 2011, the first NATO intervention led by member states other than the US – i.e. France and Britain –[51], the European states have proved ever since that they are more inclined to engage militarily as long as they are part of a regional alliance rather than a continental one.

Indeed, Europe has witnessed in recent years the emergence and intensification of defense co-operation agreements at the regional level, examples in this sense could be represented by the Benelux Defence Cooperation, the Visegrad Group, HELBROC or the Nordic Defence Cooperation. According to some authors, these clusters of trusted and like-minded neighbouring states have the best potential for deepening defence coop-

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49 For details, see Bucharest Nine Initiative, *Joint Declaration of the Heads of State Bucharest 9 meeting in Warsaw*, June 8, 2018, https://www.presidency.ro/en/media/press-releases/joint-declaration-of-the-heads-of-state-bucharest-9-meeting-warsaw-8-th-june-2018 (accessed June 2, 2019); Ministry of National Defence – Republic of Poland, *The eastern flank of NATO is the first line of the Alliance*, https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/the-eastern-flank-of-nato-is-the-first-line-of-the-alliance (accessed June 2, 2019); Robert Lupitu, *Formatul București 9: Klaus Iohannis co-prezidează vineri, la Varșovia, reuniunea cu omologii de pe flancul estic al NATO înaintea summitului din iulie*, Calea Europeană, June 5, 2018, https://www.caleaeuropeana.ro/formatul-bucuresti-9-klaus-iohannis-co-prezideaza-vineri-la-varsovia-reuniunea-cu-omologii-de-pe-flancul-estic-al-nato-inaintea-summitului-din-iulie/ (accessed June 2, 2019).

50 Poland In, *Bucharest Nine unity strengthens NATO: official*, April 5, 2019, https://polandin.com/42074301/bucharest-nine-unity-strengthens-nato-official (accessed June 2, 2019).

51 See Nick Harvey and Alexander Nicoll, "AngloFrench defence: 'Entente Frugale Plus' ", *Strategic Comments* 17, no. 10 (2011):1; Steven Erlanger, *Panetta Urges Europe to Spend More on NATO or Risk a Hollowed-Out Alliance*, The New York Times, October 5, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/world/panetta-exhorts-european-nato-members-to-share-defense-spending.html (accessed May 25, 2019).

eration[52]. As a consequence, bearing in mind that some of these regional military alliances have been tested in war theaters and that the classic scenario of creating a common European army remained at the stage of an election sermon, NATO might encourage a regional approach to European security. The Warsaw Summit Communiqué can also be read in this sense[53].

Therefore, taking into account that NATO also employs the logic of economic cooperation, the modern interfaces of Intermarium discussed above can be a trigger for the formation of a regional military alliance in support of NATO in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus. This would not be something completely new as various bilateral or multilateral military alliances were formed freely by the Central and East European countries both in the interwar[54] and post-Cold War periods[55]. Currently, apart from strengthening the eastern flank through a better knowledge on the ground, a military alliance of the Central and East European countries would definitely represent a good modus operandi for their reconciliation given their historical divisions. However, cooperation has never been easy in this part of the world and as George Friedman warned when considering such an evolution, "multinational institutions are difficult to create. They require time, money and political will, and rarely do members have the same of any of these as the others"[56].

Conclusion

The Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga's remark made after World War I that "pushed to its steppes, Russia requires open seas for its expansion (...) whoever separates Russia from them, must be destroyed"[57] is more valid nowadays than ever. Learning the lessons derived from the consequences of the Yalta Conference, the states formerly belonging to the Eastern Bloc have proved recently that they are no longer eager to accept their *Moirai[58]*, being rather ready to fight against a destiny that placed them at the crossroads of continents and geostrategic interests.

In this sense, the Central and East European states are currently attempting to develop a system of economic, political and military regional arrangements that offer them leverage in terms of denying their presumed status of buffer states or a 'cordon sanitaire'.

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52 See Margriet Drent and Dick Zandee, "European defence: from strategy to delivery", *Global Affairs* 2, no. 1 (2016): 75.

53 NATO, *Warsaw Summit Communique*, July 9, 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_ 133169. htm (accessed May 16, 2019).

54 For example, the Romanian-Polish alliance was established in the interwar period. For details, see Legațiunea României în Polonia, Telegramă către MAE, No. 68537, December 8, 1923, Personnel and Confidential, AMAE, Folder 71/Polonia/1920-1926, Issue 52: Relații cu România, pp. 137-141; Tratatul de garanție între România și Polonia, January 15, 1931, AMAE, Folder 71/Polonia/1931-1933, Issue 54: Relații cu România, pp. 30-33; Marele Stat Major – Secția Operațiilor, Telegramă către MAE, No. 313502, February 20, 1943, *Lt. col. T. Paulian - Istoricul legăturilor militare româno-polone* în perioada *1921-1939*, Secret (today declassified), AMAE, Folder 71/Polonia/1941, Issue 65: Lucrarea 'Istoricul legăturilor militare româno-polone în perioada 1921-1939', pp. 265-277.

55 For example, the post Cold-War established the Visegrad Group. For details, see The Visegrad Group, *About the Visegrad Group*, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/about (accessed May 17, 2019);

56 George Friedman, Op. cit.

57 Legațiunea României în Polonia, Telegramă către MAE, No. 32586, June 23, 1924, *Nicolae Iorga - Alianța Polono-Română*, AMAE, Folder 71/Polonia/1920-1926, Issue 52: Relații cu România, pp. 122-124;

58 Deriving from the Greek mythology, it means destiny.

Having the potential of being modern interfaces of the historical Intermarium project, two platforms of cooperation have emerged so far in the recent years – i.e. the Three Seas Initiative and the Bucharest Nine. Based on their success, a regional military alliance might be configured in the near future.

Overall, conferring a current regional perspective to the remark made by Marceli Szarota, the interwar editor in chief of *Gazeta Lwowska*, when considering Romanian-Polish relations[59], it can be said that all of the Central and East European countries should be interested in the each other's destiny as in the end it will be a common one. Indeed, the developments discussed above are not intended to decouple Allied countries in the region from their main security pillar, namely NATO, but rather reinforce collective security guarantees in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus. Finally, probably nothing fits better than Marek Jan Chodakiewicz's remark: "History is alive in the East. Sorting out the past is the key to the future"[60].

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59 Consulatul General al României în Lwow, Telegramă către MAE, No. 062967, January 14, 1930, *Marceli Szarotta - Polonia* şi *România*, AMAE, Folder 71/Polonia/1926-1930, Issue 53: Relaţii cu România, pp. 286-288.
60 Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, Op. cit., 531.

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Lenin, Trotsky, and Parvus in the Battle for Russian Unity

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1. Introduction.

In this paper I examine two popular Russian television series: the historical drama *The Demon of the Revolution, or Parvus's Memorandum* (*Demon revoliutsii, ili Memorandum Parvusa*, dir. Vladimir Khotinenko, 2017) and the biopic *Trotsky* (*Trotskii*, dirs. Alexander Kott and Konstantin Statskii, 2017).[1] These mini-series were released on Russia's main television channels on the occasion of the centenary of the October Revolution.[2] Given their salience amidst otherwise subdued commemoration of the Revolution's centenary in Russia, it is important to analyze these films in the current ideological and political context. What do they tell us about present-day Russia? What is their cultural significance? In what way does the negative depiction of the Revolution and its leaders in *The Demon* and *Trotsky* relate to the Russian authorities' ideology concerning national unity and the nation's steady development? This discussion is especially pertinent for understanding how the creation and circulation of such narratives shape the public opinion in today's Russia. This, in turn, helps to understand current trends in the relation between power and culture.

Comprised of six episodes, Khotinenko's *Demon* depicts the life of Russian émigré revolutionaries in Western Europe in 1915-1917, a short period of time that preceded Lenin's return to Russia in April 1917. The story focuses on the role that Alexander Parvus (Israel Helphand (1867-1924)) played in helping the Bolshevik leaders to return to Russia via Germany in a 'sealed train.' Since *The Demon* is not a biopic about Parvus as a highly controver-

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1 Mediascope, a performance marketing agency, announced the top ratings of *The Demon* in the week 30 October – 5 November 2017 and the top ratings of *Trotsky* for the week 6-12 November 2017. Unsigned, "Demon revoliutsii," *Wikipedia* at https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%94%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%BD_%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%BB%D1%8E%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8.

2 *The Demon of the Revolution* premiered on 5 November 2017 on state-owned TV channel *Rossiia-1*. *Trotsky*'s first episode was shown on 6 November 2017 on *Pervyi kanal* that is formally owned privately but is considered to be the state's official channel, with the content supervised by the state.

sial figure in the European revolutionary movement, the viewer does not learn much of this character's life.[3] This makes it easier for the film creators to depict Russian revolutionaries as state traitors who accepted financial and logistic help from Russia's enemy in World War I. Through the numerous publication venues that he established, his own theoretical and publicist works, his entrepreneurship as well as his links to high-profile officials in Germany, Parvus worked to stir up revolutionary movement in Russia. Khotinenko's television series eschews Parvus's theoretical and practical contributions to the European revolutionary movement, trivializes his reasons for cooperating with the German Foreign Ministry, and leaves out his critique of Bolshevism before and especially after the October Revolution.[4] Instead, *The Demon* depicts Parvus as politically opportunistic and greedy. Theoretical and practical disagreements between the revolutionaries are portrayed as petty squabbles of irresponsible selfish individuals. Permeated with a thinly veiled anti-Semitism, this depiction highlights Parvus's perceived Russophobia and his desire to quicken Russia's defeat in World War I.[5] Obsessed with the idea of becoming wealthy, Parvus, according to the film's creators, becomes a liaison between the German Foreign Ministry and émigré Bolsheviks. On German money, he finances Russian workers' strikes in 1916, and, following the February Revolution 1917, arranges the return of Lenin and other prominent Bolsheviks to Russia so that they could spearhead the revolutionary movement there. In this film, Lenin is a morally unscrupulous, self-indulgent hypocrite for whom revolution is an experiment rather than an event that has been long-awaited by the masses.

Trotsky is an eight-episode biopic that focuses on Trotsky's role in the Revolution and his political legacy. The film offers an alternative view of the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917 by depicting Trotsky as almost single-handedly organizing the armed insurrection in Petrograd at the time when Lenin was in the hiding.[6] The formerly canonical view of the Revolution as an event of global significance is especially undermined in the scene in which Lenin confronts Trotsky minutes before the opening of the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (7-9 November 1917). The latter

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3 A victim of antisemitism in the Russian Empire in the early 1880s, Helphand developed political attitudes that eventually drew him to Marxism. He left Russia in 1886 to study in Basel, received his doctorate degree in political economy in 1891 and became a theorist of Marxism, a publisher, a prominent member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, and, at least for a few years, an influential figure among Russian revolutionaries. In particular, Parvus advanced Marx's observations on permanent revolution and proposed to view a revolution in Russia as a practical possibility in the early twentieth century rather than an event that might happen in a distant future. See Z. A. Zeman and W. B. Scharlau, *The Merchant of Revolution: The Life of Alexander Israel Helphand (Parvus), 1867-1924* (London, NY, Toronto: Oxford UP, 1965).

4 First published in 1964 in German and in 1965 in English, the aforementioned biography by Zeman and Scharlau remains an influential (perhaps the most influential) source on Parvus. The book appeared in the Russian translation in 1991: Z. Zeman i V. Sharlau, *Parvus – kupets revoliutsii*, transl. Nadezhda Bodanskaia (New York: Teleks, 1991). Parvus's story was further popularized in Russia through a new translation of the same biography: Z. Zeman and V. Scharlau, *Kredit na revuloitsiiu. Plan Parvusa*, transl. L.A. Igorevskii (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraph, 2007).

5 In fact, as Parvus's biographers demonstrate, he was neither a German patriot nor a Russophobe. In his opinion, the Russian defeat in the Russian-German front would lead to a socialist revolution in Russia, and, in order to achieve this goal, Parvus did not mind collaborating with the German Foreign Ministry and, supposedly, with German intelligence. See Zeman and Scharlau, *The Merchant of Revolution*, op. cit., Chapters 9-10.

6 Lenin went into hiding to avoid arrest on the charge of treason, following the investigation that the Provisional Government initiated on the issue of the Bolsheviks' use of money from the German government. See more in Robert Service, *Trotsky: A Biography* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard UP, 2009), 175.

was to ratify the transfer of power in the country from the Provisional Government to the Soviet of People's Commissars of RSFSR. Lenin accuses Trotsky of an illegitimate seizure of power. Trotsky cynically agrees with this assessment and, with even more cynicism, tells Lenin that even though the armed insurrection he had organized is indeed only a coup d'état, Lenin and the rest of the world will nevertheless call it a revolution. With the anti-Semitism even more pronounced in this film than in *The Demon*, Trotsky persuades Lenin to accept this idea by stating that he is happy to give Lenin the entire credit for the Revolution, since he realizes that Russia will never accept a Jewish leader.[7]

Like in *The Demon*, the Revolution in this film is presented from a narrow point of view, with the debates among the revolutionaries as a fight over the leadership in the movement. In *Trotsky* the story of the Revolution is framed as a series of the protagonist's conversations with Frank Jackson (Ramón Mercader), a fiancé of Trotsky's secretary in Mexico in 1940. While real Mercader successfully pretended to be a Trotskyite in order to be admitted in the Trotskys' residence in Mexico City, in the film Jackson is a persuaded Stalinist who challenges Trotsky by his provocative questions about the latter's role in history. Trotsky's responses are visualized as extensive flashbacks dating as far back as 1898 through the period of the Revolution, the Civil War, and the protagonist's struggle against Stalin for Lenin's mantle. Unlike in reality, in the film Trotsky finds out that Jackson is an NKVD agent sent to kill him. Instead of trying to save his life, he calmly bids good-bye to his wife and then, as if tired of living in constant fear over a looming assassination attack or perhaps even tired of himself, confronts his assassin and even provokes him to "finish" his mission.

Produced by Alexander Tsekalo and Konstantin Ernst, with the latter being the all-powerful CEO of *Pervyi kanal* and a well-known film producer in Russia, *Trotsky* has enjoyed more publicity and bigger commercial success than Khotinenko's TV series. Before its release on Russian television, this mini-series was shown in Cannes on 16 October 2017 at the trade show Marché International des Programmes de Communication. This led to the film's international distribution (Danish and Mexican television channels bought *Trotsky*). As of 2018, this TV series is also available internationally through the Netflix platform.[8] Whereas *The Demon* was not even nominated for major film and television awards in Russia, *Trotsky* received three prestigious TEFIs (Best TV series/Film; Best Director; and Best Actor (Konstantin Khabensky in the title role), awarded by the Russian Academy of Television. Additionally, the film also received ten awards from the Association of Film and Television Producers in Russia in 2018.[9]

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7 When Stalin consolidated his power, Trotsky's role in the insurrection was downplayed further. At the time when John Reed was working on his book *Ten Days That Shook the World* (1919) and until Lenin's death, it was still publicly known that Trotsky's role in organizing the Bolsheviks' seizure of power was as crucial as that of Lenin's. Following Lenin's death, however, the circulation of Reed's book was limited in the USSR until 1957 (and the book was not republished) precisely because, in Stalin's view, it gave too much credit for the Revolution to Trotsky.

8 See Luke Johnson, "You Might Be Binge-watching Russian Propaganda on Netflix," *Washington Post*, 20 February 2019, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/you-might-be-binge-watching-russian-propaganda-on-netflix/2019/02/20/fb08f5d4-346c-11e9-854a-7a14d7fec96a_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d29bb60e-19ba

9 In the categories Best Director, Best Sound, Best Editing, Best Makeup, Best Art Direction, Best Cinematography, Best Special Effects, Best Actress (Olga Sutulova), Best Actor (Konstantin Khabenskii), Best TV mini-series.

The fact that *The Demon* was not nominated for the same awards may indicate the filmmakers' desire to avoid unnecessary competition rather than suggests the inferior quality of Khotinenko's work. To compensate for his work's more modest place in the spotlight, Khotinenko showed his eight-episode "film director's version" of *The Demon* on Russian television again starting 15 January 2018. This time it aired on Channel *Rossiia-K* (commonly known as *Kultura* channel) under the title *Memorandum Parvusa* (*Parvus's Memorandum*). Khotinenko has also completed *Lenin: Neizbezhnost* (*Lenin: Inevitability*, 2019), a full-length feature film based on his television mini-series, appearing in movie theatres on 31 October 2019.[10]

2. Doubling the Effect.

The Demon and *Trotsky* are similar in quality, aesthetics, and ideology. As Andrei Arkhangelskii rightly notes, these narratives may be seen as complementing each other, especially since they first appeared on television almost simultaneously. In the same week, the viewer was confronted with two Lenins and two Parvuses plus with the doubles of several minor characters. This created a peculiar "stereophonic effect or even D3 effect." The effect of "complementary reality" is achieved thanks to the fact that, while in *The Demon* there is no Trotsky (Parvus only mentions him in negative terms), *Trotsky* depicts the interaction between Parvus and Trotsky in detail, and the viewer who almost simultaneously watches both series is likely to blend the images and story lines of both films.[11] One can only add to this observation that even if *The Demon* and *Trotsky* had not appeared on television in the same week, the similarities between these two works would still create the "stereophonic effect" and the effect of "complementary reality."

The actors' work, for example, may be viewed as contributing to the conflation of the two television series. Indeed, in their portrayal of Lenin, both Evgeny Mironov (Lenin in *The Demon*) and Evgeny Stychkin (Lenin in *Trotsky*) evoke acting clichés established by renowned Soviet actors, who played the Bolsheviks' leader in classical Soviet films about the Revolution.[12] It seems to me that Mironov's and Stychkin's portrayals are especially evocative of Boris Shchukin and Maxim Shtraukh.[13] However, since *The Demon* and *Trotsky*

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10 The situation with the two TV series to commemorate the centennial of the October Revolution reminds one of a similar situation when, in order to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Revolution, the Soviet authorities commissioned Sergei Eisenstein to create his *October* (1927) and, at the same time, albeit on a much smaller scale, supported Vsevolod Pudovkin's *The End of St. Petersburg* (1927). Whereas *October* had a big budget, Pudovkin had to be more modest. At some point, he asked for technical help (equipment) from Eduard Tisse, Eisenstein's camera man, in order to shoot certain scenes in Petersburg.

11 Andrei Arkhangelskii, "Rol' nalichnosti v istorii: Andrei Arkhangelskii – ob otrazhenii sovremennogo ponimaniia politiki v serialakh *Demon revoliutsii* i *Trotsky*," *Ogoniok* (No. 44, 6 November 2017), 34-36. See more on the series' similarity in Irina Chaikovskia, "Iskusstvo pereigralo politiku. Filmy o Lve Trotskom i Parvuse," *Chaika. Seagull Magazine*, 10 November 2017, at https://www.chayka.org/node/8485.

12 Andrei Shchigolev notes that both actors must have learnt from the images of Lenin, which were created by their great predecessors in the Soviet period. See Andrei Shchigolev, "On vam ne demon: Lenin v otechestvennom kino. Evoliutsiia kinoobraza," *Kinopoisk*, 17 November 2017, at https://www.kinopoisk.ru/media/article/3069492/.

13 Shchukin played Lenin in Mikhail Romm's *Lenin in October* (1937) and *Lenin in 1918* (1939). Shtraukh played Lenin in *The Vyborg Side* (1938), directed by Grigorii Kozintsev and Leonid Trauberg; in Sergei Iutkevich's *The Man with the Gun* (1938) and also his *Yakov Sverdlov* (1940), *Stories About Lenin* (1957), and *Lenin in Poland* (1966); as well as in *His Name is Sukhe-Bator* (1942), directed by Iosif Kheifits and Alexander Zarkhi.

trivialize the narrative of the Revolution and consistently lower the stylistic register that previously defined the portrayal of leading Bolsheviks, it seems at times that Mironov and Stychkin play not so much Lenin but rather play Shchukin and Shtraukh in the role of Lenin. The impression is that of a parody of the formerly canonical image of Lenin, familiar from the Soviet period.[14]

Among other things, undignified images of the Revolution are constructed through numerous scenes that depict fairly comfortable everyday life of Russian revolutionaries abroad. Such scenes create a contrast with the previously established canon of depicting the leaders of the Soviet state as unassuming and even ascetic (supposedly out of considerations of solidarity with the suffering proletarian masses). In *Trotsky* especially, Parvus is portrayed as Trotsky's political technologist who promotes him among émigré revolutionaries by ensuring Trotsky is dressed well, lives in a comfortable apartment, and has enough means to spend on social life.

Both in *Trotsky* and especially in *The Demon* too much screen time is taken by scenes in which characters eat. Many important conversations between leading revolutionaries take place over food. By contrast, in Soviet productions, Bolsheviks were depicted as being above such earthly concerns as dirty dishes and eating (even if on a budget) and would at best be depicted with a glass of tea on their desks. Clearly overdone in *The Demon*, the scenes in which characters eat give the impression not even of the desire to parody lofty Soviet depictions of Lenin and his comrades but quite simply of a poorly written script or/ and a low film budget.

In *Trotsky*, the theme of food is central in the scene that depicts the first encounter between Trotsky and Lenin.[15] The subtitles suggest that this encounter takes place in 1902 in a Parisian café.[16] Trotsky has just presented his political views and accused the émigré revolutionaries of inaction. In his opinion, their revolutionary thought "smells of an apple strudel." After the angered Grigorii Plekhanov, the long-time leader of Russian social democrats, leaves the café, Trotsky comes to the cashier to buy a pastry. Ironically, he does not have enough money to purchase something even simpler than an apple strudel. At this moment, Lenin introduces himself to Trotsky and expresses his support for Trotsky's idea that the masses, if left without proper political guidance, will always 'choose bread over freedom' and thus will limit their struggle against the capital by economic demands. While the scene is accurate in summing up Lenin's theory, the shot that captures Lenin paying for a croissant when speaking of how the proletariat

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14 Mironov said, however, that he studied the images of Lenin by Shchukin and Innokentii Smoktunovskii and then decided to create his own Lenin. See Iuliia Shigareva, "Kakoe vremia – takoi i Lenin. Evgenii Mironov o *Demone revoliutsii*," *Argumenty i fakty*, 2 November 2017, at https://aif.ru/culture/person/kakoe_vremya_takoy_i_lenin_evgeniy_mironov_o_demone_revolyucii. In turn, Evgeny Stychkin, who played Lenin in *Trotsky*, claims that he intentionally did not watch the old films when he was preparing for his role. Instead, he watched only the documentary footage. Nonetheless, he admits that the images created by Shchukin, Shtraukh, and Ulianov are so defining that it is impossible to discard certain conventions without running the risk of making Lenin unacceptable for the viewer. See Elena Fedorenko, "Evgeny Stychkin: 'Igrat Lenina kak cheloveka pochti nevozmozhno,'" *Kultura. Dukhovnoe prostranstvo russkoi Evrazii*, 9 November 2017, at http://portal-kultura.ru/articles/tv/173399-evgeniy-stychkin-igrat-lenina-kak-cheloveka-pochti-nevozmozhno/.

15 The scene is in the 1st episode of the series, at approx. 30-35 min.

16 In reality they first met in London in 1902 where Trotsky began working for newspaper *Iskra*.

must choose freedom over bread creates an unfavorable impression of the proletariat's leader as a cynic.[17]

Trotsky, frustrated that Lenin had not openly supported him, tells Lenin that the masses would not forgive them if they continue to be so diplomatic with social democrats like Plekhanov. As he chews on a piece of a fresh crispy croissant, Lenin mocks Trotsky for caring about the masses. His own desire is "to change the world. What do people have to do with it? People are just an instrument" in the hands of revolutionaries like Trotsky and himself for achieving this goal. In a patronizing tone Lenin invites Trotsky to drop by casually and, to end the conversation, gives him the bag with the remainder of his croissant as a symbol of their newly formed friendship. The cynicism of the Revolution's leaders is rendered here not only through the dialogue but also through the shot composition, an unusual shot that blurs-out and then cuts off the top of Lenin's head, high camera angles that underscore Lenin's small stature (he looks up to Trotsky), and the bourgeois setting of the scene. All of these help to contrast the revolutionaries who comfortably chew on French delicacies while devising how to make the hungry masses choose "freedom" over bread. The film thus destroys a clichéd depiction of Lenin as humane and kind, as lenient and forgiving with regard to common people and ruthless towards the Revolution's enemies.

Another technique that is used in both examined TV series concerns re-contextualization of the familiar iconography for depicting Bolshevik leaders. For example, the following shot from *The Demon* helps to create an undignified depiction of Lenin and his comrades. Lenin's gestures as well as his facial expression and attire are easily recognizable as being the same as in many Soviet posters and cinematic representations.

Image 1. The Demon of the Revolution, or Parvus's Memorandum (2017).

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17 Lenin's critique of the "economic" approach to revolutionary movement and his call for political leadership over the masses in the struggle for power is, for example, given in his pamphlet *What is to be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement* (1902).

The problem here is the setting. On the one hand, it is a historically accurate setting. On the other hand, while perhaps adding to the impression of historical authenticity, this setting serves to destroy the canonical image of Lenin as a leader of the proletariat. Lenin indeed often met with his comrades in this famous café located meters away from the apartment on Spiegelgasse where he lived in Zurich. The café was primarily associated with Dadaists whose installations and performances promoted the Dada vision of the world as irrational, meaningless, and chaotic. Apart from purely practical considerations of the café's proximity to Lenin's apartment, Dadaists' gatherings could also serve as a distraction for the *Okhranka* agents who tried to monitor Russian revolutionaries in Europe. Lenin's vigorous gesture in the shot above, as anyone who has seen Soviet films or posters would recognize, is immediately associated with Lenin's call to the masses to support the creation of a new fair society. However, removed from the dignified setting on the top of an armoured vehicle or a podium at the Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, this gesture as well as Lenin's entire figure look comical. In this shot, Dadaists' surrealist art and installations that are behind the Bolsheviks' leader look like illustrations of the absurd world that Lenin wants to create. Moreover, Lenin's gesture is mocked by the silly cardboard figure that hangs upside down right behind Lenin. The fact that the six out of the seven hands that appear to be growing right from the cardboard head repeat Lenin's gesture intensifies the impression of travesty. The dramatic lowering of the stylistic register of Lenin's image here is completed by the absence of the masses that would eagerly accept his leadership. In this shot, Lenin is the "leader" for several dedicated followers with the rest of the chairs left empty and in disarray.

An even more important aesthetic link between *The Demon* and *Trotsky* is their engagement with the Soviet cliché of the Revolution as a starting point of building a better future. In the Soviet period, the death in the name of this "radiant future" was typically depicted as meaningful. The memory of fallen heroes was to be kept alive as the cause for which they laid their lives was alive. It is hardly accidental in this regard that the best film of 1963, for example, was Samson Samsonov's historical drama *An Optimistic Tragedy*, a screen adaptation of Vsevolod Vishnevsky's eponymous play that depicted the Revolution. The title, *An Optimistic Tragedy*, captures the narrative principle of many Soviet depictions of the revolution and the Civil War and points out the redeeming quality in the heroes' suffering. However tragic the circumstances of their life could be, characters in Soviet films about the Revolution would often dream about a better life in the future. In the famous scene from the Vasiliev brothers' *Chapaev* (1934), for instance, the protagonist instructs his comrade that the future will be so good that one will not even have to die. In other words, the entire Soviet discourse of the Revolution was forward-looking. By contrast, in *The Demon* and *Trotsky* there is no future. The narratives are backward-looking with both stories framed as giant flashbacks. *Trotsky*, in addition, is heavily fragmented by numerous shorter flash-backs.

The Demon is framed as a series of passages from Alexei Mezentsev's memoir. The voice-over that introduces several scenes is also Mezentsev's. What the latter "remembers" is visualized in *The Demon*'s opening scene that depicts how Parvus rejoices over the newspaper announcement of Lenin's death in January 1924. Still in his bathrobe and slippers, Parvus orders champagne to celebrate that Lenin "*sdokh*" (croaked). The scene immediately places the film among other post-Soviet narratives that reverse the clichés of

Soviet representations of Lenin:[18] the latter's death is celebrated, not mourned.[19] From that moment on the narrative is presumably Parvus's recollection of how the Revolution was prepared and how Lenin used him in 1917 in order to return to Russia and then refused to invite him to join the first Bolshevik government. Parvus was cynically told that his hands were "dirty."

Trotsky is more sophisticated in the use of flashbacks as a narrative principle. As Elena Stishova perceptibly notes, the narration here acquires the pace of a thriller.[20] Indeed, instead of the voice-over that necessarily slows the action down and introduces a reflective moment in the film, and, instead of linear chronology, the creators of *Trotsky* chop up the series' eight episodes into fragments that skip back and forth through the "timeline of Trotsky's life, featuring scenes from his early life, the immediate aftermath of the revolution and his exile in Mexico."[21] Trotsky, as depicted in 1940, introduces each flashback himself.

Like in *The Demon*, the protagonist's association with the death is introduced in the very start of the series. Suffering from a heart condition, he barely drags his feet in 1940. The opening scene depicts how a sixty-year-old Trotsky has a heart attack in the midst of a festive Mexican crowd on the Day of the Dead when almost everyone in the street is wearing a skull mask. The association of Trotsky and death is underscored again in a few minutes as the first flashback begins. In 1918, during the Civil War, Trotsky is in his armored train. Poet Larisa Reisner, Trotsky's mistress,[22] is reciting Nikolai Gumilev's poem about death. The suggestion is clear: Trotsky and death are linked no matter whether he is a younger man and a powerful leader of the Red Army or whether he is a sixty-year-old outcast living in constant fear that the assassins sent by Stalin would finally succeed in killing him. Throughout the narrative, different characters repeatedly describe him as unfeeling and (emotionally) dead. Thus, in contrast with the Soviet slogan that Lenin is more alive than any of those who are living and that his deed is alive (as in Vladimir Mayakovsky's famous verse that claims that even after his death Lenin is more alive than any of those who are still living or as in the phrase "Lenin died but his dead is alive," which decorated many Soviet posters in 1924, the Revolution's leaders in both TV series are dead.[23] The aesthetics

18 One of such earlier productions that reduced Lenin to a decaying body is Alexander Sokurov's *Telets* (*Taurus* (2001)).

19 The shots depicting how Parvus orders his servant to serve him the best champagne to celebrate the good news are poorly written. Parvus's servant gives the impression of slacking on the job. His somewhat dishevelled appearance, casual posture, and a low-class address for Parvus ("*hozian*" instead of "*gospodin*" or Alexander Lazarevich) convey disrespect. This style of interaction between Parvus and his servants was hardly possible at Parvus's last luxury residence on the Wannsee. According to Zeman ad Scharlau biographers, formality and "elaborate etiquette" that reigned in that residence, intimidated even some of Parvus's high-profile guests. See Zeman ad Scharlau, *The Merchant of Revolution*, op.cit., 268-269.

20 Elena Stishova, "Cherez krov," *Iskusstvo kino* (No.7, 2017),103-109.

21 Unsigned review, "Russian Revolution's 'rock'n'roll star' Trotsky gets centenary TV series," *The Gardian*, at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/03/russian-revolutions-rocknroll-star-trotsky-gets-centenary-tv-series.

22 The film trivializes the image of Reisner.

23 The phrase "*Lenin i teper zhivee vsekh zhivykh*" became popular following the publication of Mayakovsky's epic poem *Vladimir Ilyich Lenin* (1924). The phrase *Lenin umer, no delo ego zhivet* became popular thanks to a series of posters published in 1924, following Lenin's death.

of the flashback highlights the idea that having brought death to millions of people, communism is itself passé; it has no future.

Further conflation between the two television series might result from the producers' casting solutions. Since both television series cast actor Maxim Matveev for important roles, it is unlikely that the television channels *Rossiia-1* and *Pervyi kanal* could have kept secret their work on such major TV projects of the year as *The Demon* and *Trotsky*. In *The Demon*, Matveev is Alexei Mezentsev, a Russian counter intelligence officer who investigates Bolsheviks' treacherous connections to German intelligence. The entire story of how history remembered Lenin and forgot Parvus, albeit, according to the film's script, both were *crucial* in organizing the October Revolution, is based on Mezentsev's memoir.[24] In *Trotsky*, Matveev is Frank Jackson (Mercader), Trotsky's assassin. He is an essential character in the film, since questions trigger Trotsky's recollections and thus make the story unfold.

Finally, *Trotsky* and *The Demon* have been conflated because of the misleading title under which Khotinenko's TV series appeared on air in November 2017. Neither Parvus nor Lenin were called the Revolution's "demons." Instead, Trotsky was known as "the demon of the Revolution" but he does not even appear in Khotinenko's work.[25] Because of the confusing title, the viewers occasionally referred to Kott's and Statskii's mini-series with the title of Khotinenko's film. Khotinenko, in turn, explains his choice of the film title by his desire to suggest a link to his earlier work, namely his television mini-series *Demons* (2014), a screen version of Fedor Dostoevsky's eponymous novel (better known in the English translation as *The Possessed*).[26] For Khotinenko, the "demon of the Revolution" then is an evil spirit that hovers above everyone at the time of revolutions.[27] As this allusion to Dostoevsky suggests, revolutions for Khotinenko are evil, an expression of madness that afflicts revolutionaries.

Instead of being an unintended side-effect, the doubling of the message regarding the October Revolution in *Trotsky* and *The Demon*, including the strategy to eschew focusing on Lenin in favor of centering on Parvus and Trotsky (both "forgotten" in Soviet cinema), resonates well with present-day Russian politics and culture. Both depictions serve the purpose of intensifying the Russian audience's alienation from the Revolution as

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24 Although there were some historical prototypes for this character, the character of Mezentsev and his memoir are fictional.

25 Nikolai Dorofeev, "Lev Trotskii: Demon ili zloi genii?" *Parlamentskaia gazeta*, 16 January 2018, at https://www.pnp.ru/politics/lev-trockiy-demon-ili-zloy-geniy.html.

26 See more on Khotinenko's *Demons* (2014) in Irina Kuznetsova, "*Demons* on the Screen," *Mundo Eslavo* (Vol. 16, 2017), 154-162.

27 Khotinenko explains his attitude to the title in the discussion of the film in Mikhail Shvydkoi's talk show *Agora*: Mikhail Shvydkoi, "*Agora*: Demon revoliutsii," *Rossiia-K* (*Kultura*), 13 November 2017, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sSxINbUC8nw. On Khotinenko's rendering of the "demonic" revolutionaries in Russia, see also Julia Shigareva, "Vladimir Khotinenko: revoliutsiiu ne ranoi nado schitat, a operatsionnym shvom," *Argumenty i fakty*, 24 May 2017, at https://aif.ru/culture/person/vladimir_hotinenko_revolyuciyu_ne_ranoy_nado_schitat_a_operacionnym_shvom.

a Soviet foundational narrative.[28] These films educate them about morally unscrupulous irresponsible individuals who, relying on help from Russia's national enemies, organize revolutions to serve their personal needs. As these television series maintain, revolutions are either business projects (Parvus), a way to sublimate one's sexual desire (Trotsky), or a cruel experiment that is undertaken in order to verify a theory by a power-hungry individual (Lenin).[29] The (proletarian) masses are but an instrument for achieving these goals.

3. The Centenary of the Revolution and the Day of National Unity.

The belittling of the Revolution and its leaders in *The Demon* and *Trotsky* are only two examples of the manner in which the centennial was remembered in Russia. In 2017, the commemorative events were on a smaller scale that hardly matched the view of the October Revolution as the "most consequential event of the 20th century."[30] The anniversary inspired a new cycle of scholarly discussions as well as many popular representations of the Revolution globally and locally. It seemed, however, that the occasion elicited more enthusiasm regarding the impact of the October Revolution outside of Russia than "in the country of the victorious proletariat."[31] In Russia, apart from the festivities organized by Russian communist parties, there were no large-scale public celebrations of the jubilee of the kind that could be comparable to what used to be prepared by the Soviet government.[32] The absence of government-sponsored public commemorations of the event caused many commentators to note that the centennial was a source of anxiety or even embarrassment for the present-day power.[33] According to Lev Danilkin, the author of the recent popular biography of Lenin, among the authorities in Russia, no one knew in what

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28 As Boris Kolonitskii and Yisrael Elliot Cohen remind us, "The myth of the Great October Socialist Revolution was the founding myth of the Soviet Union, the great myth of the establishment of a new society and a new state" (34). See Boris Kolonitskii and Yisrael Elliot Cohen, "Russian Historiography of the 1917 Revolution: New Challenges to Old Paradigms?" *History and Memory* (Vol. 21 (2), Fall/Winter 2009), 34-59.

29 On the representation of the Revolution as business (*Trotskii*), see Larisa Iusipova, "Kannskii telerynok uvidel revoliutsiiu," *Vedomosti*, 22 October 2017, at https://www.vedomosti.ru/lifestyle/articles/2017/10/22/738924-
-kannskii-rossii-revolyutsiyu.

30 S.A. Smith, *The Russian Revolution: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002), 1.

31 Many works on global socialist movements and Marxist-inspired oppositions around the globe appeared. See, for instance, Bill Dunn and Hugo Radice, eds. *100 Years of Permanent Revolution: Results and Prospects* (London, Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2006); Anthony Gronowicz, "The Global Significance of the Russian Revolution: Imperialism and the Socialist Resistance," *Journal of Labor and Society* (Vol. 20 (3), 2017), 349-372; Roger D. Marwick, "Violence to Velvet: Revolutions – 1917 to 2017," *Slavic Review* (Vol. 76 (3), 2017), 600-609; Sean Sayers, "Reflections on the Centenary of the Russian Revolution," *International Critical Thought* (Vol. 8 (3), 2018), 257-265.

32 Unsigned, "Ot kommunistov do "Iabloka": v den' stoletiia Oktiabr'skoi revolutsii po vsei Rossii proshli mitingi i demonstratsii," *Nastoiashchee Vremia*, 7 November 2017, at https://www.currenttime.tv/a/28840001.html. See also, Unsigned, "V Moskve nachalas demostratsiia v chest stoletiia Oktiabr'skoi revolutsii," *RIA Novosti. Rossiia segodna*, 7 November 2017, at https://ria.ru/society/20171107/1508328868.html.

33 See, for instance, Dmitrii Butrin, "Rossiia, kotoruiu my izbezhali," *Iskusstvo kino* (No.7, 2017), 95-102; Evgeny Dobrenko, "Vse, chto vy khoteli znat' o revoliiutsii, no boialis' sprosit' u Iiuriia Trifonova, ili Ochen' dlinnyi kurs istorii VKP(b)," *Novyi mir* (No. 12, 2017), 184 [183-9]; Ilya Kalinin, "The Spectre of the Revolution," *The Times Literary Supplement,* 15 February 2017, at https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/private/spectre-russian-revolution/; Mark Lipovetsky, "Za chto borolis? Revolutionnyi narrative v sovetskikh i postsovetskikh filmakh o grazhdanskoi voine," *Neprikosnovennyi zapas* (No.2, 2018), 91-111; see also Viacheslav Shmyrov, "Prokliatie Matildy," *Iskusstvo kino* (No.7, 2017), 83-89.

way to commemorate the centenary.[34] In turn, Evgeny Mironov (actor who played Lenin in *The Demon*), said that the jubilee baffled everyone (*zastal vsekh vrasplokh*), as no one knew how to deal with it.[35] Such critical assessment of the Russian authorities' (perceived) incoherence with regard to 1917 reveals a certain longing for guidance on the issue. Indeed, the shifts in the public perception of 1917 continue to take place, and, unlike in the Soviet period, there seems to be no definitive recommendation as to how the Revolution is to be assessed. With celebrations no longer viewed as an acceptable form of commemorating the Revolution (except, almost exclusively, for Russian communist parties and pro-communist circles), how is Russia to remember the event? It is noteworthy in this regard that most reviews of *The Demon* and *Trotsky*, whether highly critical or more favorable, have appeared alongside articles that lament the absence of the authorities' clear policy about commemorating the October Revolution.[36] Some maintain that *The Demon* an *Trotsky* follow a certain guidelines from above (*goszakaz* or *zakaz sverkhu*); others insist that there is no such guidance with regard to depicting the Revolution.[37] The absence of clear disagreements on the issue between the Russian authorities and the so-called liberal opposition to Putin adds to the feeling of incoherence surrounding depictions of the Revolution.[38]

On the one hand, the co-existence of celebratory, appreciative, negative, and mixed responses to the Revolution in Russia may be perceived as indicating society's willingness to engage in a mature discussion of its history. On the other hand, the negative view of the event prevails: the majority of Russian citizens condemn the October coup for destroy-

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34 See Lev Danilkin, Aleksandr Ivanov, Katerina Vakhramtseva, "Ne iubileinoe," *Iskusstvo kino* (No.7, 2017), 121-145. Written in a casual style, Danilkin's 783-page biography of Lenin, like many other recent popular representations of Bolshevik leaders, brings to light casual and even undignified moments in Lenin's biography, which ensure Lenin is never to be placed back on the pedestal from which he had fallen. See, Lev Danilkin, *Lenin: Pantorkator solnechnykh pylinok* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2017).

35 Evgeny Mironov, "Interview to Television Channel *Russia-24*," 12 October 2017 (min. 11-15.30), at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zW_il6iUTUU

36 The complaint is taken further when the absence of the guidelines regarding the celebrations of the Revolution is also perceived as the absence of any clearly defined goals for today's Russia. Iurii Arabov notes the absence of any national idea in today's Russia, of any clear guidance for the people to explain why Russia exists today. See Viktor Matizen, "Iurii Arabov: "Teper po povodu patriotov," *Iskusstvo kino* (No.12, 2013),116-127. On the confusion surrounding the interpretations of the October Revolution, see Butrin, "Rossiia, kotoruiu my izbezhali," op. cit.

37 It is understandable that the filmmakers who worked on *The Demon* maintain that they were completely free to depict the leaders of the Revolution in the way they wished. See, for instance, the pronouncements by Vladimir Khotinenko and Evgeny Mironov (famous actor who played Lenin in The Demon) on Mikhail Shvydkoi's talk-show "Agora" on TV channel *Rossiia-K*: Shvydkoi, "*Agora.* Demon revoliutsii," op. cit. In turn, Shmyrov maintains that whereas there is a clear *goszakaz* on films about World War II, there is nothing like this with regard to the Revolution. See Shmyrov, "Prokliatie Matildy," op.cit.

38 It is noteworthy in this regard that the depictions of the Revolution and the Civil War in Boris Akunin's book series *The Family Album* resonates well with portrayal of these events in state-sponsored narratives. The reputation of Akunin as a vocal critic of Putin's state is not easy to match with the conservative ideology of his popular works.

ing "the great empire and bringing discord."[39] According to Nikita Mikhalkov, the fear of revolution in Russia is, possibly, the society's response to the latest revolution in Ukraine and, possibly, is a manifestation of the public's mature attitude toward Russian history. In Mikhalkov's opinion, the Russian public has now learned the lessons of the past: the revolutions of 1917 resulted in a series of tragedies not to be repeated.[40]

It seems to me that negative interpretations of the Revolution and, generally, of revolutions, which are promoted by patriotically-minded artists are not random. The reasons that explain the appearance of consistently negative depictions of the Revolution and the reasons for keeping the commemoration of the Revolution's centennial relatively low-key are rooted in the profound shift in the symbols used to consolidate the nation. No longer a foundational narrative, the story about the Revolution cannot serve as a "*dukhovnaia skrepa*" (spiritual strengthening) meant to ensure social stability. With any story about the Revolution bound to be contentious, since the middle of the 1990s the Soviet victory in World War II has replaced the narrative of the Revolution as unifying the nation. The Revolution, in turn, has been redefined. However, instead of the authorities' incoherent position regarding it, one can observe consistent efforts at uniting Russians by instilling a negative view of the Revolution and of revolutions in general. In other words, in lieu of the absence of a clear ideological position, in the examples such as *Trotsky* and *The Demon*, one can see a more sophisticated campaign at educating Russians about the revolutions as "projects" brought about by political technologists like Parvus, Trotsky, and Lenin. Instead of being a result of a long-term social and political crisis, the Revolution is presently depicted as an import, imposed onto incoherent masses of people by enterprising Russophobes on the money of Russia's arch enemies.[41] This view of the Revolution resonates well with Russia's recent protectionist policies and the government's efforts at stepping up patriotic education in Russia. It is noteworthy in this regard that one of the experts who condemned the treacherous Bolsheviks in the documentary *Taina Revoliutsii v Rossii. Kto sponsiroval bolshevikov-kommunistov* (2007, channel *Rossiia-1*) is historian Olga Vasilieva, formerly an activist of All-Russian People's Front and, since 2018, Minister of Education of the Russian Federation.

The transformation of the discourse about the Revolution from a positive foundational narrative that united the nation through an annual ritual of celebrations on 7 November to a narrative that is meant to unite people by the idea of non-acceptance of revolutions has taken more than thirty years. A series of re-codifications of the causes, course, and outcomes of the Revolution has taken place since the *perestroika* reforms.

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39 The opinion polls conducted around the 90th anniversary of the Russian Revolution revealed that while about thirty-six percent of the Russian population still celebrate 7 November, forty-nine percent of the respondents view the Revolution negatively as events that destroyed "the great empire and brought discord" and suffering and fifteen percent of the Russian people are indifferent to celebrating or condemning the Revolution. Unsigned, "Tret' rossiian schitaet Den' Oktiabr'skoi revolutsiii prazdnikom – opros," *RIA novosti: Rossiia segodnia*, 7 November 2008, at https://ria.ru/society/20081107/154584116.html. In turn, Ilya Kalinin notes that there is much more public consensus regarding the (negative) evaluation of the 1990s than regarding the assessment of the revolution and its aftermath. See Ilya Kalinin, "Patriotizm eklektiki, ili postsovetskii pishetsia slitno," *Ab Imperio* (Vol. 1, 2011), 274-283.

40 See Nikita Mikhalkov, "Stoletie revoliutsii, rasstavliaem tochki nad 'i'" on Youtube.com channel *Politika Rossii i Ukrainy*, 19 October 2017, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qGYG-NnOWGY.

41 Actor Stychkin's view of his Lenin as an embodiment of evil is very similar to the view expressed by Mironov. See Fedorenko, "Evgeny Stychkin," op.cit.

Established in 1918, the tradition to celebrate the October Revolution with a public demonstration and, starting from 1922, a military parade on Red Square (as well as demonstrations and parades in other cities and towns across the Soviet Union) was abandoned in 1991.[42] In 1995, the military parade on 7 November in celebration of the Revolution was substituted for the first time by a re-enactment of the 1941 parade of the defenders of Moscow, a high point in rallying the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War. This substitution signaled a shift in emphasis, from celebrating the Revolution to celebrating Soviet patriotism during World War II.[43] The whole point of the 1941 parade, namely a demonstration to the entire world that the Soviet state, itself a symbol of the triumphant Revolution, was alive, was no longer highlighted. The re-enactments of the parade on 7 November 1941 have taken place every year since 2000. In turn, the parade and other events in celebration of the Revolution were dropped. Still a statutory holiday, from 1996 until 2004, 7 November was "celebrated" as the Day of Agreement and Reconciliation (*Den' soglasiia i primireniia*). In 2005, this holiday was abandoned and 7 November became a regular working day. To compensate for the loss of a day off, a new statutory holiday was established – the Day of People's Unity (*Den' narodnogo edinstva*) to be celebrated on 4 November. Formally, it refers to the events that took place during the Time of Troubles when, at the end of the Polish-Russian War 1605-1618, Kuzma Minin and Prince Dmitrii Pozharsky formed an army to protect Moscow. Markedly atraumatic for today's Russians and decidedly irrelevant for either re-evaluating the Soviet past, making sense of the post-Soviet decades, or charting the paths for the future, this holiday, nonetheless, suggests the idea of unity. The latter sounds simultaneously less demanding and less pessimistic than the *reconciliation* that was previously suggested as a replacement of the celebrations of the Revolution. At the same time, this ephemeral "unity," suddenly catapulted from the seventeenth century, was a kind of simulacrum (in Jean Baudriallard's understanding of the term), that is a reference with no referent, a pseudo-unity that substitutes, through simulation, something that disappeared in the 1990s.[44] In order to supply a specific referent for the so far empty sign, the state has consistently supported a number of popular festivals, promoted newer state holidays such as the Day of Russia or the Day of the Flag. Additionally, sponsored documentary and popular depictions of the country's history uphold the idea of national unity. In any regard, albeit the Revolution is no longer viewed as an event that could consolidate people, fostering a negative view of it has a unifying impulse. Thanks to narratives such as *Trotsky* and *The Demon*, Russians are to become more united in their non-acceptance of revolutionary changes. The symbolic place holders for unity are being filled with the help of such depictions.

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42 On 7 November 1925 the military parade was cancelled because of public mourning for Mikhail Frunze, a hero of the Civil War and Soviet military commander. See more in Unsigned, "Voennye parady na Krasnoi ploshchadi," *Wikipedia,* at https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%92%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B5_%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B4%D1%8B_%D0%BD%D0%B0_%D0%9A%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B9_%D0%BF%D0%BB%D0%BE%D1%89%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B8.

43 Maria Snegovaia argues that in the 1970s, instead of the Revolution, World War II became viewed as the main historical event in Russia. See Maria Snegovaia, "Kuda i pochemu ischezla Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia iz pamiati naroda?" *Colta.ru,* 11 November 2017, at http://www.colta.ru/articles/society/16626.

44 See Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); See also N. Mankovskaia, *Estetika postmoderna* (St. Petersburg: Aleteia, 2000), 60.

4. The Truths about the October Revolution.

The filmmakers advertised *The Demon* and *Trotsky* as historical films based on a careful study of documents.[45] At the same time, they promoted these products also as entertainment. Ernst, for instance, promoted *Trotsky* as fun that would appeal to younger audiences: "Trotsky is a real rock'n'roll star, and for the whole of his life, not just during the October Revolution. […] When you look at the specially designed glasses and leather jackets and the armored train, it's almost a cyberpunk story. […] He is a character that can be understandable for the younger audience."[46] When professional historians and other academics pointed out numerous historical inaccuracies in both television series plus the fact that the perspective that was chosen to represent the events of the Revolution was too narrow and therefore the representations were ideologically biased, the filmmakers defended their works by claiming the right for artistic license.[47] When defending his film, Alexander Kott insisted that the narrative is based on facts and, at the same time, is not propaganda but pure art.[48] In turn, speaking about *The Demon*, Mironov (actor who played Lenin in the film) dismissed the scholars' observations by essentially stating that even if the films do not represent reality accurately, they are morally right. In a statement that defies logic, he said that the television series about Parvus and Lenin commands respect because it is watched by millions of people whereas the observations expressed in scholarly works interest very few. In other words, in a popular narrative about historical events one does not have to be always accurate.[49] Ironically, even the most vociferous critics of the historical inaccuracies in *The Demon* and *Trotsky* agree that the films are well-acted and aesthetically appealing.[50] Nonetheless, while the critics view this appeal as a cover for propaganda, the creators of the film rejoice that the technical and aesthetic quality of their products facilitate their contribution to educating the public about evils of not only to the

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[45] See, for instance, how the lead actor in *The Demon* insists that the story they told in the film is based on documents. Mironov, "Interview to Television Channel *Russia-24*," 12 October 2017 (min. 11-15.30), at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zW_iI6iUTUU. See also Khotinenko's appearance on Mikhail Shvydkoi's *Agora* where he claimed that his team was driven by the desire to understand Lenin and their work was based on a study of many documents: Mikhail Shvydkoi, "*Agora*. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin: lichnost v istorii," *Rossiia-K*. 24, October 2017, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fhY6CfHaBfw.

[46] Ernst's promotional video from Cannes was broadcast on *Pervyi kanal* in October 2017. It was then quoted in many reviews. See, for instance, Unsigned, "Russian Revolution's 'rock'n'roll star' Trotsky Gets Centenary TV series," op. cit. In the meantime, Ernst's co-producer Tsekalo and the lead actor promoted a much gloomier view of the series' title character as a bloody tyrant. See Unsigned, "*Trotsky*. Serial. Aleksandr Tsekalo o filme," 2 November 2017, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YRnVfx0AofQ; *Vechernii Urgant. V gostiakh u Ivana Konstantin Khabenskii i Olga Sutulova*, 3 November 2017, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z4lbp2s_T3M; Unsigned, "The Series *Trotsky*," 7 November 2017, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JlEgejPWiuw.

[47] Shvydkoi, "*Agora*. Demon revoliutsii," op.cit.

[48] Marat Lashkin, "Chto Pushkin dumal o Lenine: sozdatel *Trotskogo* Kott otreagiroval na skandalnuiu statiu v WP," *Federlnoe agenstvo novostei*, 21 February 2019, at https://riafan.ru/1153607-chto-pushkin-dumal-o-lenine-sozdatel-trockogo-kott-otreagiroval-na-skandalnuyu-statyu-v-wp.

[49] Shvydkoi, "*Agora*. Demon revoliutsii," op.cit.

[50] Dmitry Puchkov, "Klim Zhukov pro serialy *Trotskii* i *Demon revoliutsii*," 13 November 2017, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YCGNdWqFlBM.

October Revolution but also of recent velvet and colored revolutions.[51] In this sense, even though it is not Khotinenko's film but its close ideological relative *Trotsky* that appeared on Netflix, Luke Johnson is right about cautioning Netflix's viewers regarding the message disseminated by such historical films from Russia: "The danger and undesirability of revolutions is a key message of today's Kremlin and state television."[52]

The initial claim of historicity on the part of the filmmakers was likely meant to facilitate the reception of these works as continuing the tradition of "filling in the blank spots of history," which started during *perestroika* when the Soviet framework for telling a story about the Revolution collapsed.[53] In the revisionist representations of the Revolution in the 1990s the *istoricheskaia pravda* (historical truth) was no longer on the side of the Bolsheviks. The events were depicted from the point of view that had not been adequately represented during the Soviet period. In the new millennium the tradition has continued.[54] "Forgotten" in Soviet depictions, the figures of Parvus and Trotsky seemed appropriate for bringing the discussion of the Revolution at its centennial to a new level.[55] However, as has been the case with many historical dramas and biopics, the critics have found numerous inaccuracies in *The Demon* and *Trotsky*.[56]

A comprehensive analysis of mistakes in chronology, locations, costumes, facts regarding the heroes' encounters with each other, etc. is offered by self-identified left-wing

51 See, for instance, Unsigned, "Revoliutsiia – ty…": Vladimir Khotinenko o krovi, grekhakh Lenina i mistike," *Zhurnal Rodina*, 1 December 2017, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ROC9Yi35pt8; See also Unsigned, "*Memorandum Parvusa*. Ekskliuzivnoe interviiu Vladimira Khotinenko telekanalu Katun 24," Channel *Katun 24*, 20 February 2017, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CzeR43QEjjM.

52 Johnson, "You Might Be Binge-watching Russian Propaganda on Netflix," op. cit.

53 See, for instance, Radio "Komsomolskaia Pravda," *Vladimir Khotinenko: Ia dumal, chto znaiu Lenina. Okazalos, chto ia nichego ne znaiu*, 2 November 2017, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qmlf9mzTXWc.

54 Several films depict the events of the Revolution and the Civil War from the point of view of the Whites Such are, for instance, Oleg Fomin's *Gentleman Officers: Save the Emperor* (*Gospoda ofitsery: spasti imperatora*, 2008), Andrei Kravchuk's television mini-series *Admiral* (*Admiral*, 2008) and Nikita Mikhalkov's *Sunstroke* (*Solnechnyi udar*, 2014). See an analysis of these and other films in Steven M. Norris, "Revising History, Remaking Heroes: Soviet -Russian Cinema and the Civil War," *Ruptures and Continuities in Soviet/Russian Cinema: Styles, Characters and Genres Before and After the Collapse of the USSR,* ed. Birgit Beumers and Eugene Zvonkine (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 200-218; see also Lipovetsky, "Za chto borolis?" op. cit.

55 Already in 1992, Michael Cox noticed that of the Bolshevik leaders who were resurrected from oblivion during *perestroika*, Trotsky was "inconvenient." Unlike Nikolai Bukharin's, the role of Trotsky in the Revolution and in the first Soviet government least suited the ideology and the tasks of *perestroika*. See Michael Cox, "Trotsky and His Interpreters; or, Will the Real Leon Trotsky Please Stand up?" *The Russian Review* (Vol. 51 (1), January 1992), 84-102. In other words, Trotsky could potentially turn into a scapegoat figure in interpretations of the Revolution by various political forces within the new Russian political and cultural elite.

56 Here are just a few from the avalanche of reviews that have pointed out the most noticeable historical mistakes *The Demon* and *Trotsky*: in Pavel Aptekar, "10 zhirnykh istoricheskikh liapov seriala *Trotskii*," *Vedomosti*, 11 November 2017, at https://www.vedomosti.ru/library/articles/2017/11/11/741332-10-zhirnih-istoricheskih-lyapov; Konstantin Skorkin, "Serial *Trotskii* stal ocherednoi psevdoistoricheskoi khalturoi pervogo kanala," *Novye izvestiia*, 7 November 2017, at https://newizv.ru/comment/konstantin-skorkin/07-11-2017/serial-trotskiy-stal-ocherednoy-psevdoistoricheskoy-halturoy-pervogo-kanala; Aleksei Tsvetkov, "Kak serial *Trotskii* sdelal supergeroia iz revoliutsionera," *Vedomosti*, 10 November 2017, at https://gradator.ru/news/analytics/1906.html. Socialists (especially Trotskyites) in the West are also adamant about *Trotsky* and its appearance on Netflix. See, for instance, Fred Williams and David North, "Russian television's *Trotsky* serial: A degraded spectacle of historical falsification and anti-Semitism," *World Socialist Web Site*, 19 December 2018, at https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2018/12/19/tele-n25.html?view=print.

patriots.[57] On the one hand, these critics are correct in pointing out that the scripts of *The Demon* and *Trotsky* are based on academically questionable histories that appeared during *perestroika* and in the 1990s.[58] On the other hand, their treatment of historical sources is also selective and serves their own ideological agenda. In particular, the left-wing critics discard the accusation of the Bolsheviks in committing state treason by claiming that the scripts of *The Demon* and *Trotsky* (as well as the scripts of some documentary films about the Revolution) are based on the so-called Sisson documents that have long been proven to be fakes.[59] These critics, however, leave their viewers and readers unaware of the reputable archival sources that were used to substantiate the view that the Bolsheviks relied on Western money in preparing the revolution.[60]

Furthermore, while the mistakes are indeed numerous, they do not *define* the tenor of depicting the Revolution in the examined television series. After all, *October* (1927) by Sergei Eisenstein was also far from being historically accurate, but was nonetheless praised for its contribution to the international art of cinema and had a huge impact on representations of the Revolution throughout the twentieth century.[61] Other Soviet classics among

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57 These include publicist and blogger Dmitry Puchkov (known also by his nick "Goblin"); historian Klim Zhukov who defines his ideology as communist even though he is not a member of any communist party; historian Egor Iakovlev (both Zhukov and Iakovlev are frequent guests on Puchkov's youtube.com video channel); and historian Evgeny Spitsyn who is explicitly pro-Stalinist. The criticisms of *The Demon* and *Trotsky* appear in Dmitry Puchkov, "Klim Zhukov pro serialy *Trotskii* i *Demon revoliutsii*," 13 November 2017, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YCGNdWqFlBM; Dmitry Puchkov, "Razvedvopros: Egor Yakovlev about TV series *Demon of the Revolution*," 19 November 2017, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3l2HcJPanaw; Den TV, "Evgenii Spitsyn. Demon Trotskii: Posleslovie," 29 November 2017: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FqmXNGH5Kug. It is noteworthy that these critics are particularly sensitive to the incorrect portrayals of Lenin and Stalin in these films.

58 Western historians of Russia also criticize the quality of Russia historiography about the Revolution. See, for instance, Stephen Kotkin, "Review Article: 1991 and the Russian Revolution: Sources, Conceptual Categories, Analytical Frameworks," *The Journal of Modern History* (Vol. 70, No. 2: June 1998), 384-425; Kolonitskii and Cohen, "Russian Historiography of the 1917 Revolution" op. cit. Ian D. Thatcher, in particular, has criticized the works by Yu. V. Emelianov, N. A. Vasetskii and Dmitri Volkogonov. Thatcher questions Volkogonov's familiarity with the sources that Volgonov claimed he had studied. Thatcher also points out passages that Volkogonov plagiarized from the works by Western historians. See also Ian D. Thatcher, "First Russian Biographies of Trotsky: A Review Article," *Europe-Asia Studies* (Vol. 46 (8), 1994), 1417-1423; see also Ian D. Thatcher, *Trotsky* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 19-20; and Ian D. Thatcher, "Trotsky Studies. After the Crash: A Brief Note," *Europe-Asia Studies* (Vol. 48 (3), 1996), 481-485.

59 See Puchkov, "Razvedvopros: Egor Yakovlev o teleseriale *Demon of the Revolution*," op. cit. Similar points were made by the same historian earlier: see Dmitry Puchkov, "Razvedvopros: Egor Yakovlev o Lenine," 15 October 2015, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-5FBwZQFUOo.

60 They have nothing to say, for instance, about the documents on Parvus from the archive of the Foreign Ministry of Germany seized by the British in 1945; these were published by Zeman and Scharlau. They do not comment either on the archival sources used by Richard Spence, a historian who specializes in the history of intelligence. See, for example, Richard Spence, *Wall Street and the Russian Revolution, 1905-1925* (Walterville, OR: Trine Day, 2017); Richard Spence, "Interrupted Journey: British Intelligence and the Arrest of Leon Trotskii, April 1917," *Revolutionary Russia* (Vol.13 (1), June 2000), 1-28. Richard Spence, "Hidden Agendas: Spies, Lies and Intrigue Surrounding Trotsky's American Visit of January–April 1917," *Revolutionary Russia* (Vol. 21 (1), June 2008), 33-55.

61 See more on this in, for example, Ron Briley, "Sergei Eisenstein: The Artist in Service of the Revolution," *The History Teacher* (Vol. 29 (4), August 1996), 525-536.

the films about the Revolution were no better in terms of accuracy.[62] At least in theory, the creators of *The Demon* and *Trotsky* could fix mistakes that concern the details of the story (the circumstances under which Stalin first met Trotsky; how Trotsky learned about Freud's theory, etc.), the faulty subtitles that indicate the wrong dates, the costumes, etc. However, even if these had been fixed, the overall message of these narratives would not change: revolutions are unacceptable; they bring discord and suffering; they are financed and prepared by Russia's enemies.

Essentially, films like *Trotsky* and *The Demon* may be viewed as illustrations to part of Vladimir Putin's address to the Federal Assembly delivered on 1 December 2016, which outlined the tasks of society regarding the centennial of February and October revolutions. Putin called to examine the very nature of revolutions in Russia and look at the experience of the past in the context of Russia's present-day tasks of strengthening national unity and fostering patriotism. In view of this and many similar explicit passages in the speeches of Russia's leaders, which had been repeated for a number of years before 2017 and disseminated in many different versions in official scholarship and media, it is unclear why the general perception of the Russian authorities' position regarding the centenary of the Revolution was that of incoherence and even embarrassment.[63] *The Demon* and *Trotsky* are only two depictions among many other (mostly documentary films) state-sponsored depictions and public discussions of the Revolution that have consistently advanced the government's agenda of social unity and economic stability since the first decade of this millennium, particularly between 2004 and 2015.[64] *The Demon* and *Trotskii* as popular representations of the Revolution that are meant for multi-million audiences were preceded by documentaries that mostly appeared on channels affiliated or owned by *Rossiia-1*, talk-shows, and publications, all of which essentially promoted the same view of the leading

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[62] Even a cursory look at the renowned Soviet films that comprised *Leniniana* reveals that all had problems with historical inaccuracy. Notably, in Mikhail Romm's *Lenin in October* (1937), Lenin criticizes Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Trotsky (these three are of course not even shown in a Stalin-era film) for their attempts to persuade the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party that it is too early for the Bolsheviks to seize power in Petrograd. Such purely ahistorical depiction was ideologically suitable for Stalin as it conveniently lumped together his three enemies as if these had had the same views regarding the insurrection in Petrograd.

[63] Ria novosti, "Kiselev rasskazal o proekte MIA *Rossiia segodnia* o revoliutsii 1917 goda," 14 September 2017, at https://ria.ru/20170914/1504777047.html. See also Dmitrii Kiselev's documentary *Velikaia russkaia revoliutsiia* (2017) released on channel *Rossiia-1* in November 2017. This film promotes the same agenda.

[64] See the discussion of the Bolshevik leaders by leading academics (mostly professional historians from Russia's leading universities and Russian Academy of Science): Vitalii Tretiakov, "*Lev Trotskii: genii ili demon Russkoi revoliutsii?*" *Programma Chto delat?*, 8 November 2015, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UFpwXNX8DPA; see also the lecture Leonid Mlechin, "Lev Trotskii: kakim on byl, i pochemu on ne stal vozhdem?" 21 October 2018, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tt9Xqx7ouiY. Mlechin is critical of Bolshevism in general but especially critical of Trotsky.

revolutionaries as immoral individuals, traitors and Russophobes.[65] Among the creators of these representations are activists in right-wing patriotic organizations and even politicians and statesmen that represent Russia internationally.[66]

Conclusion.

Demon and *Trotsky* depict the October Revolution as a foreign import and portray the leaders of the Revolution as selfish traitors who, while using financial assistance from Germany, Russia's enemy in World War I, destroyed Russia from within. Highly entertaining, these narratives help to form a negative view of the Revolution while gutting out its ideological, historical, and political significance as an event that was a result of a long-term political and social crisis. Released for the centennial of the Revolution on Russia's main television channels, these films serve not only commercial but also specific social and political agendas. They are culturally significant in a sense that they reinforce the view of the Revolution as a tragedy. This view is gradually accepted by the majority of Russians thus creating the basis for strengthening the community. Additionally, the depiction of the revolution's leaders as guilty of treason resonates well with the present-day culture of vigilance with regard to the West's attempts to weaken Russia. In the climate of drastic social and political changes in many former socialist countries, narratives like *The Demon* and *Trotsky* educate the viewer about the value of stability, evolutionary path of social and political development, and non-acceptance of revolutions in general, including the so-called colored or velvet revolutions that took place in the former Soviet Union.

The reception of *The Demon* and *Trotsky* demonstrates that the methods of indoctrination in post-Soviet Russia have become sufficiently subtle. Instead of creating explicit guidelines of how historical events such as the Revolution are to be regarded, the elites ensure support for their political agenda through initiatives such as making Russian cinema and television appealing for the masses. Such policy yields results: having sufficiently absorbed the message of *The Demon* and *Trotsky*, the public was still under the impression

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65 See Galina Ogurnaia, dir. *Taina revoliutsii v Rossii. Kto sponsiroval bolshevikov-kommunistov?* (Channel *Rossiia*, 2004), at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVg1C941pZY. The script for this documentary was written by Elena Chavchavadze. She also wrote the script for another documentary directed by Ogurnaia: Galina Ogurnaia, dir. *Lev Trotskii. Taina mirovoi revoliutsii* (Channel *Rossiia*, 2007), at https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B2+%D1%82%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%86%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9.+%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%BD%D0%B0+%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B9+%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%BB%D1%8E%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8. The documentary was followed by the publication of the book with the same title: Valerii Shambarov, Elena Chavchavadze. *Lev Trotskii. Taina mirovoi revoliutsii* (Moscow: Veche, 2016). Shambarov, Chavchavadze's co-author, was a consultant for the film *Taina revoliutsii v Rossii.* It is noteworthy that since both documentaries written by Chavchavadze and directed by Ogurnaia feature similar sources, are based on the interviews of the historians that appear in both films, and rely on the same stylistic elements including the same voice-over for the narrator's text, the "stereophonic effect" from these films is even bigger than from *The Demon* and *Trotsky*.

66 Apart from the aforementioned historian Olga Vasilieva (currently Minister of Education of the Russian Federation), historian Natalia Narochnitskaia was interviewed for Chavchavadze's documentary films. Narochnitskaia was a member of the Russian Duma, was invited to address the Federal Assembly on historical issues, has been director of the Paris-based Institute of Democracy and Cooperation, and has been active in patriotic organizations such as Russkii Mir while appearing on numerous right-wing venues such as Zakhar Prilepin's television show *Chai s Zakharom*.

that the authorities were at a loss as to how to commemorate the centenary of the Revolution. In reality, however, as the above examination demonstrates, instead of being purely commercial projects and random criticisms of the Revolution, which follow the "noble" tradition of "filling-in the 'blank spots' of history," popular television series such as *Trotsky* and *The Demon* conform to and simultaneously perform the official "politics of memory" in post-Soviet Russia. There is no doubt that the October revolution and the Civil War were horrendous trials for the peoples of the former Russian empire and were followed by many other tragedies. The point, however, is that for a very long time these events were not perceived ("remembered") as tragic by the majority of the population in the Soviet Union. The newly constructed "memory" about the revolution as a tragedy has appeared not only as an innocent desire to clean the nation's history from falsifications. Rather, it has replaced the old "memory" of the revolution as a heroic event for the purpose of uniting Russians anew. This time the nation is to be united by the belief in the evolutionary path of social and political development. In this sense, Parvus, Lenin, and Trotsky are useful constructs in the battle for Russian national unity today.

Broken European memories and recovered national consciousness

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Abstract

This paper brings into discussion a concept that has not yet been distinctively and uniquely defined but which, at the same time, can be considered a classical one, thanks to the establishment of the theoretical basis of the social frameworks of memory in 1925 by the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs. Basically, any past memory reaches the fields of human memory causing a process of perpetual transformation.

The social frameworks of memory are pieces of collective memory, past memories that are dominant and persistent in time, which offer explicit historical and social coordinates that lead to the interpretation of the past and the orientation of present values. Both public and collective environments offer the individual social and historical coordinates as well as a certain orientation of these values, an implicit ideology, so that the individual is influenced, and in time, even shaped by these coordinates and values that are implicitly transmitted by the social fields of memory.

Keywords: social fields of memory, collective memory, past memories, present values

I bring into discussion a concept that has not yet been distinctively defined but which, at the same time, can be considered classical thanks to the theorization of the social frameworks of memory in 1925 by the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs. Basically, any past memory goes through the frameworks of human memory causing a process of perpetual transformation and "individuals always use these social frameworks of memory when they remember" (M. Halbwachs, 1925, XI). The social frameworks of memory are pieces of collective memory, past memories that are dominant and persistent in time, which offer explicit historical and social coordinates that lead to the interpretation of the past and the orientation of present values. According to M. Halbwachs, the social frameworks of memory refer not only to the "public" ones, of national importance, but also to those close

to the individual, these latter ones being provided by the community or the group to which one belongs. Both public and collective frameworks provide the individual with social and historical milestones as well as a certain orientation of these values and an often-implicit ideology, so that the individual is influenced and, in time, even shaped by these coordinates and values transmitted by the social frameworks of memory.

The present reorganizes the past which, in turn, triggers the building of a network of social frameworks of memory that is then used to reconstruct and locate memories. If memories are not relevant to the group, then they will be partially or totally forgotten, a point highlighted by M. Halbwachs who argued that "we do not need to claim that we recall all the memories that reproduce all the events and all the images of the past because we actually come across them by hazard" (M. Halbwachs, 1925, 191). Each group feels unaffected by the passage of time and, therefore, tends to evoke common memories and interpret them mostly from the perspective of the present. In this way, the group seeks to maintain its identity, emphasizing continuity and similarity as well as consistency between past and present. If a disturbing event occurs, then another group is born, with a memory of its own (M. Halbwachs, 1925, 398) admits that the group is under the influence of an illusion when it believes that similarity is more important than difference. In order to maintain this illusion and strengthen group identity, groups emphasize similarities to the detriment of differences, with a particular emphasis on what distinguishes them from other groups: "Collective memory is a narrative of similarities and, naturally, there is a belief that the group remains the same because we focus our attention on the group, while what has changed are the relationships within the group or the interactions of the group with others" (M. Halbwachs 1925, 398).

I aim to highlight aspects regarding the construction and reconstruction of social memory which is no longer seen as a deposit or a space in which information and memories are stored, but as an active and flexible structure that is built up by the interaction of the individual with the environment in which he lives. The theoretical discourse will focus on the reorganization of social memory during the transition from a dictatorship to a democratic society, with reference to some European nations that are still involved in finding an identity that was fractured by the traumatic events of a more or less recent past.

In addition, we will try to find answers to questions such as: do we opt for an abuse of memory or an abuse of oblivion? Does the idea of a wounded memory hang more in the balance of reason than the idea of forgetting or assuming guilt as a condition of survival?

Catastrophes, such as wars, especially lost ones, revolutions, occupation regimes, deportations, exiles, etc., create powerful traumas in the memory of a nation. The injustices of history and national sufferings are passed along generations through the mechanism of collective memory as personal responsibility is repressed. It would seem paradoxical, if we did not consider the studies of psychoanalyst Ilany Kogan [1995] (2001) according to which the trauma of the exterminated Jews in the Nazi concentration camps is transmitted to the children of the second generation of the Holocaust (or Shoah, after Ricœur, 2001; Iancu, 2001). Every national catastrophe (or local disaster, such as the village of Nucşoara, Argeş County, Romania, a topic little known before 1989, or the 1950s deportations from Banat and Oltenia to Bărăgan, (see Aurora Liiceanu, *Rănile memoriei: Nucşoara şi rezistenţa din munţi*, 2003, and Smaranda Vultur, *Istorie trăită – Istorie povestită. Deportarea în Bărăgan, 1951-1956*, 1997) provokes strong ideological contrasts that tend to coagulate society and

collective consciousness in camps animated by a passionate adversity which springs from the debate about assuming guilt. The egos, mostly the wounded ones, (Liiceanu, 2003) which manifest under such circumstances, tend to generate a negative polarization of the society/community and lead to instability.

Nucşoara village, as a collective character, became a symbol of anti-communist resistance and revised "a negative image that Romanians had about themselves and which they felt as a common complex, although not spoken about: the Romanians did not stay with their arms crossed" (Liiceanu, 2003, 13). The story is about the drama of the village of Nucşoara which, between 1949-1958, mobilized in an attempt to challenge and deny the communist regime, by establishing groups of partisans in the mountains, adopting drastic measures of repression, including on their own supporters, from the Military, Security and Security Troops. What triggered the violence that followed were the murders, in broad daylight, by a "band of terrorists serving the Communists" (Liiceanu, 2003, 14) of a teacher, a mayor and a "rich man", just before the November 1946 elections and shortly after.

Along the same lines, Smaranda Vultur's approach, which records the testimonies of former deportees, proposes not only an X-ray of a "living" memory, but also a reflection on the relationships that are established between memory and history. The life stories of the people who lived in Banat rehabilitated identities and transformed those who experienced traumatic events into heroes, endowing them with those qualities possessed by men who were sorely tested but who learned not to be overwhelmed by pain. For instance, one of the things they did was to transform the arid, hostile space of the Baragan Plain into a home-like one; in other words, they recreated, albeit from a harmful experience, their inherited model of community life and transformed the place into a new Banat.

A series of factors such as language, cultural traditions, and historical experience have contributed successively throughout history to the creation of the Balkan states. "Without looking back at the glorious myth of historical liberation, nations cannot move forward" (Wolfgang Hopken, after Schönfeld, 2003). During the communist regime and Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, official history placed the partisan myth at its center, so that even World War II could be regarded as a "war of liberation." This mystification seemed to be extremely necessary for the newly installed power, as most of the countries in the region fought alongside Germany in the Second World War. Thus, employing the partisan myth was able to legitimize Communist power and give it a positive historical meaning as a force that was liberating the people from the claws of the "foreign usurper" and the "class enemy."

Nevertheless, the exacerbation of the partisan myth in Eastern Europe was not only an endemic phenomenon. It can also be found in Italy after the war and especially in France, where it was meant to mask the culprit of collaborationism (Judt, 1999; Neculau, 1999). Such heroic mythologies are tools with which a traumatized society attempts to recover an honorable identity, to escape the long-lasting effect of guilt. This seems to highlight the importance that the contemporary French, and perhaps other Europeans as well, place on establishing their collective memory, such as the very lively debate over the nature of the Vichy regime. "Everything happens as if the French, without openly confessing, felt their national identity threatened and tried to remedy this situation by attempting to re-accumulate their memory" (Todorov, 1996/1999, 102). Sooner or later, however, every society will go through an era of reconsideration of its own contribution to its own history,

in an honest and sincere way, beyond manufactured mythologies and group resentment. In a way, this is also how Francis Fukuyama (1992/1997) constructs his speech, trying to find the answer to the question of whether we can build a coherent universal History of Mankind: "for the most part of this century (i.e. the 20th century), left and right totalitarianism has given us too much headache to be able to reflect seriously on this question." Or more harshly, as Edgar Morin (2001) feels, "the character of this century is the organization of massacres."

The suppression of an honest discussion over what happened during the Second World War and the refusal of a fair division/assumption of culpability have created enormous pressure over the years. For those who have experienced war, "forgetting is often the necessary condition of survival" (Todorov, 1995/1999). The silence surrounding war crimes, the official mystification of history, and the forced cohabitation of populations in areas of significant ethnic diversity have led to the transmission, through generations, of living memories of the war years.

An entirely opposite example is that of the German Federal Republic after the Second World War. In this case, all the energies have been used, on the one hand, for economic reconstruction and, on the other hand, for the moral admission of war crimes and the payment of material damages. On May 11, 1951, the first law of historic reparation of the evils committed by the Nazi regime was voted in Bundestag, and the spirit of that first law was to be seen in other laws that followed. The compensation paid by the German state after the war amounted to an impressive DM 200 billion, most of which was allocated following the decree signed in 1952 by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer for damages to Israel, "on behalf of the German state" (Ollick and Levy, 1997, 921-936). Ironically, Timothy Garton Ash (2002) calls this process the "industry of admitting the past" the model being exposed recently (after 1990) in Germany's traditional export markets, such as Central and Eastern Europe.

However, at the symposium on the subject of *Communist State Security Services*, held on May 27-28, 2002, at the Goethe Institute in Bucharest, Hans-Georg Thönges, organizer of the symposium, appreciated in the opening speech that "Auschwitz is the national catastrophe that has stigmatized and continues to stigmatize the German cultural memory, a context in which the need to address the issue of national memory will come to future generations of Germans" (Revista 22, No. 21, 11). Hannah Arendt considered that no death sentence could compensate for the monstrosity of Auschwitz, although, paradoxically, there is a minority in Israel fighting against this "cult", against that obsessive memory that serves "the political interests of those who stubbornly isolate and discriminate the Jews against the non-Jews "(apud Morin, 2001).

It is true that "the tears of all peoples are true tears", but a nation is formed around a common memory that is maintained, cultivated, renewed, and which we must turn to even by taking responsibility of our own past. I agree with Tz. Todorov's view (1996, 61), who pointed out that "far from remaining prisoners of the past, we will have put it in the service of the present, just as memory - and oblivion - must be put to the service of righteousness." One thing is really important - to make sure that such crimes do not happen again.

That is why I ask again, what should we opt for: an abuse of memory or an abuse of oblivion? It is very difficult to find an answer, especially when a nation does not take responsibility for its own past.

The phenomenon of social amnesia - the absence or the (in)voluntary loss of collective memory - can induce serious collective identity disorders to nations. But forgetting can be important in organizing the present and building the future. Firstly, it offers an open space for introducing new ideas, setting the premises for creativity and, thus, gaining new meanings. Secondly, forgetting is a means of safeguarding the person, the group, the community, in order to escape frustrations, secrets, and to gain access to our own truth. Forgetting is a pledge of truth, a selection and hierarchy that the social subject needs, a balance sheet and an invitation to positive reflections by removing facts and events that are inconsistent with the values that are accepted at one time (Neculau, 1999, 188).

The fall of dictatorships in the former communist countries, which subjected collective memory to distortions and forgery, generated the urgency of memory recovery as a tool for fastening, systematizing, analyzing and reconstructing past data. The process is still ongoing today, the rescued European nations remembering and reinterpreting their own history. The question is asked: when did the "Central European tragedy" begin (Kundera, Rupnik, 2002)? Who is responsible for it? Much like the individual, nations must be able to look at themselves in the mirror. Historical stories are such mirrors, and historians are the psychoanalysts of their nation. Nevertheless, it is crucial that for the rewriting of history, but especially for the reorganization of social memory, historians do not resort to forgery contrary to collective memory, such as Mihail Roller's "mandated" history during Romania's communist years. Even though the ones who held power in the past imposed, to a certain extent, a false history, this narrative did not impregnate the post-communist national consciousness (Roller, ed. 1947, 1948, 1950, 1952, 1956). As Chelcea put it, history which is contrary to memory has a short life span and is incapable of providing spiritual support for action (Chelcea, 1996, 116). That is why our present-day historians are in the midst of a task that is as inconvenient as it is enchanting: they are required to deliver an auxiliary instrument that is needed to accept the communist heritage, to help recover a damaged identity and to provide a past that can be used to build a democratic future.

Historians (Ash, 2002) identify eight different goals pursued in the process of restitution/defeat of the past: the truth (factual or judicial, personal or narrative, social and healing or reparatory; justice (transitory); recognition of responsibility or guilt (criminal, political, moral and metaphysical); preventing the repetition of abuses against human rights (or the restoration of dictatorship); democratic consolidation and healing (healing of societies as if they were human beings); cleansing and reconciliation (of the individual with himself, of an individual with another individual, between different racial, social or national groups). Timothy Garton Ash also identifies ten ways to address or face a difficult past: trials; lustration; truth commissions; opening archives, especially secret service files; turning the act of denying reality into a criminal act (the best known example is the transformation of the denial of the Holocaust into a criminal act); commemorative actions through museums, monuments, exhibitions or anniversary ceremonies; symbolic acts of expulsion or public apology; symbolic acts of reconciliation; compensation or reparation and economic reconstruction and the remedy of more profound structural damage committed during a dictatorial regime.

In conclusion, it all has to do with the reestablishment of the line of democracy between the past and the present which, in the so-called "haunted" countries, disappears. The purpose of processing this past is to re-establish the missing link between past and

present, although it is too often the case that a country emerging from a difficult past passes very quickly from an abnormal presence of history to an abnormal absence of it. It should not be understood that this line means amnesia, oblivion, or a conflict between memory and oblivion, but rather an accelerated transformation of memory. This is what Ash metaphorically called *the journey of discovery*, the beginning of the struggle to face a difficult past by a country, society, group, or individual. After three decades of post-communism, we find that such a journey is toilsome to acquire a solid European status or to join a model of European identity.

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Toxic language of contempt:
The real purpose of online hate speech

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'The enemy is fear. We think it is hate; but it is really fear.'
Gandhi

Introduction

While discrimination and prejudice are not new phenomena, current political and social crises are exacerbated by the use of language manipulation and hate speech via social media platforms. As we are witnessing a new surge of nationalism that Hannah Arendt once described as an attack on human dignity, it may seem that new technologies are employing new propaganda tools. However, most techniques have been used before: it is just the ease and speed of spreading dishonest and inciteful information and hateful discourse patterns that makes this new surge of hate speech particularly toxic and dangerous.

Just like the dictatorships and genocides of the 20th century, this new wave of nationalism dehumanizes some of the old, as well as some new *others*: most of all the Muslims but also Jews, refugees, visible minorities, people of other faiths, and, most recently, sexual minorities, etc. (cf. Drzazga, Radisevic & Stroińska 2012). Hateful discourse simply has to keep picking and stigmatizing ever new scapegoats, e.g. refugees from South and Central America detained at Mexico-USA border. Its use also further re-traumatizes other refugees and asylum-seekers because social media platforms give everyone the opportunity to express their views, whether positive or negative, and some governments and political parties give not only tacit but sometimes open permission or even encouragement for discrimination (c.f. Stroińska & Cecchetto 2019). This is the new *banality of evil* (Arendt 1963) and the new dimension of hate that affects virtually everyone.

In the past, we looked at a number of referring expressions that served as lexicalized ethnic stereotypes (e.g. the use of verbs such as *gyp* or *jew*), as well as the increase in

violent terms (e.g. *shatter*, *destroy* or *massacre* when talking about verbal arguments), to show how, through frequent usage, they desensitize audiences to their negative associations (c.f. Stroińska & Drzazga 2018). This paper looks at some features of hate speech from the point of view of its form and function and its linguistic properties. Offended by its aggressive form and content, we may fail to notice that participation in online hate speech (or cyberhate) builds in-group solidarity among the haters, helps them to establish and define their identity and gives them the sense of belonging to some form of community. If we neglect to understand the mechanisms of hate speech and the discourse of contempt it creates, we may not be able to address the root causes of people's aggression towards the *others* in a society governed by fear, isolation and discrimination against disadvantaged groups.

As linguists, we feel that it is our duty to identify and explain the power and the effects of hate speech against the displaced people and other *others* worldwide. For the purpose of this study, we use data from public online discourse on refugee and migration policies in Poland but also show that the same patterns are present in the language used elsewhere, e.g. in the United States.

Hate speech: the form

We may erroneously assume that hateful comments are limited to a number of formulaic types of expressions. The most common ones are still used, but new phenomena appear virtually every day because of the new opportunities created by multimodal communication on online platforms. Here are some typical patterns seen in hateful comments on- and offline:

• Name calling or assertions about an addressee's ethnicity, sexuality, political affiliations, mental health, etc. In Polish, name calling uses mostly vocative forms as in *Ty szmato!* ('you dirty rag!') or simple statements as in *Jesteś szmata!* ('you are a dirty rag!'). Words used as offensive predicative nouns include animal names (dog, bitch, pig, rat, goose, hyena, cow), ethnic labels used as adjectives, nouns, prepositional phrases or participles (e.g. Jew, Israel, German, Russian, European, American, Union – as in European Union, etc.), political affiliations (left or right, membership in parties such as PO – Civic Platform opposition party or PIS – Law and Justice ruling party (sometimes embedded into words as in *POprawa* or *PISowiec* or even *PISior*), mental health diagnosis, sexual orientation or working in sex trade, etc.

• Calls to action and violence state what should happen or what should be done to the addressee. These calls to action may take various syntactic forms such as: *powinno się ciebie/jego/ją…* or *trzebaby cię/jego/ją…* ('one should X you/him/her') followed by a transitive verb such as 'hang', 'throw out of the country', 'put in jail', 'shoot' to name some of the least vulgar suggestions. They may also contain no expressed verb form and the reader or hearer is to supply one themselves, making them complicit in the process of meaning making. Perhaps the most widespread example is the marching chant of the Polish nationalists – *Raz sierpem, raz młotem czerwoną chołotę* ('once with a sickle, once with a hammer, the red rabble/trash'). The verbs that fit the brutal frame proposed by this chant refer to possible actions (e.g. 'hit', 'strike', etc.) that would likely end with the death of the named opponents. This type of calls to action is not atypical in the current politi-

cal atmosphere in the US (e.g. Al Baldasaro who during President Trump's 2016 rally said: "Hillary Clinton should be put in the firing line and shot for treason", cf. https://www.dai-lymail.co.uk/news/article-7363271/Trump-PRAISES-lawmaker-said-Hillary-shot-firing-squad-rally.html?ns_mchannel=rss&ico=taboola_feed or "She should be shot" about Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez in *Daily Mail*, August 9, 2019 at https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7342443/Ohio-man-charged-threatening-shoot-Alexandria-Ocasio-Cortez.html). Another example is the threat expressed as conditional: *Jak by się ciebie/jego/ją … to…* ('if one had done X to you/him/her, you/he/she would…'), as in *jak byś dostał po ryju to byś przestał tak gadać* ('if you had been slapped in the face, you would stop saying such things'), Another form of such threat is *Takiego/taką to by trzeba…* ('one like that should be Xed'), again followed by a verb expressing some aggressive action. These expressions act as direct threats and, if the victims are determined to use legal avenues, can and should be prosecuted.

- Rhetorical questions to the audience. On August 6, a former Catholic priest and ultra-nationalist activist Jacek Międlar tweeted about his court proceedings against a woman whom he was suing for calling him a neo-Nazi and a fascist (note the final rhetorical question in this text): "Dziś Marta L. nie wytrzymała presji w sądzie. Dowodziła, że nazywanie jej słonicą to wypowiedź o… zabarwieniu neofaszystowskim. Z zarzuconą na szyję tęczową ścierką, przygnieciona faktami uciekła z rozprawy. Było puszczane kazanie z fragmentami Biblii… Opętanie?" ('Today Marta L. did not withstand the pressure in court. She was arguing that my calling her a female elephant had neofascistic undertones. With a rainbow rag hanging around her neck, squashed by evidence, she fled from the courtroom. A sermon with quotations from the Bible was being played. Is she possessed?' – full name removed and translation into English provided by the authors). https://twitter.com/jacekmiedlar/status/1158826543684173824

- Vulgarity: swearwords, slurs and other examples of offensive lexical items are likely the easiest to identify. However, not all uses of vulgarity are hate speech and not all instances of vulgar or obscene language can be easily identified by search engines used for monitoring internet because of spelling alterations (see below) or using words that only have negative interpretation for in-group members. The latter type of expressions is often called dog whistle words.

- Dog whistle words – coded language that appears to mean one thing to the general population but has an additional, different, or more specific resonance for a targeted subgroup, like the ultrasonic tone which is heard by dogs but remains inaudible to humans. For instance, PIS government consistently refers to the opposition as *lewactwo*, 'the leftists', knowing that in post-communist Poland left-leaning is often equated with communism. This is an insidious strategy as this term is being applied to the very people who actively opposed the communist regime and were often imprisoned during communist times. Similarly, right leaning nationalistic haters use the word *pedalstwo* to refer to sexual minorities, well aware that it is a slang shortening from 'pedophile', thus making people associate the LGBT+ community with criminal sexual offences against children.

- Misspellings, alternative spellings and coinage of new words are mostly used to avoid detection by anti-hate speech search algorithms but words such as iSSlam additionally make the reader form a mental connection between the religion of Islam and the Nazi paramilitary organization Schutzstaffeln, originally Hitler's personal bodyguards. Other

examples include *erotuman*, an amalgamation of erotomane and *tuman* ('dumb person'), *San Escobar*, a non-existent country that the former minister of foreign affairs claimed to be in talks with or *hatakumba*, well-publicized mispronunciation of the word heca-tombe by a PIS government official and used mostly to deride him and other government members. Other examples include words with parts corresponding to party abbrevia-tions spelled in capital letters: *POpapraniec* ('a messed up person and a member of PO'), POprawa ('PO style improvement'), PISdzielec ('twat from PIS'), "Słownik poprawnej pisc-zyzny" ('dictionary of Standard Polish language according to PIS' by Prof. Głowiński; other examples are "głupi jak pasek w TVP" ('stupid like a PIS sponsored TV news banner') or *szyszkodnik*, a blend of the name of the minister of environment, Mr. Szyszko and *szkod-nik* 'pest').

Perhaps the most nefarious way of influencing people's understanding of facts is ma-nipulating or changing the meaning of words. Semantics is sensitive to even slight mor-phological changes of the shape of words. The next section discusses the effects of such changes in labels used to linguistically identify referents of important concepts in public discourse and how they too serve the spreading of the discourse of contempt.

Changing labels

Language has long been considered as a tool for communicating ideas but it also serves as an instrument for expressing emotions, both positive and negative. As hate speech and propaganda appeal to emotions and not reason, one powerful way to stoke the negative emotions towards the so called 'other' is the manipulation of the labels given to them for reasons that fit the political agenda of the moment. With changed labels come altered meanings. As such shifts in meaning usually take place over relatively long periods of time, we may not even notice that words we use become tainted with meanings we may not be aware of. For instance, the word *fan* seems perfectly innocuous until we realize that it is a clipped form of *fanatical*. How many 'fans' of football teams or country singers are actually 'fanatical' about their idols? This tendency to shorten words is not new and, in most cases, it is a natural process of economic language use that does not always follow the logic or even rules of morphology. The word *bus* we use to refer to a large vehicle used in public transport is a shortening from the full form *omnibus*, "from French *(voiture) omni-bus* «(carriage) for all, common (conveyance),» from Latin *omnibus* 'for all,'. As such, *-bus* it is simply a grammatical suffix, dative plural of the Latin *omnis*, meaning 'all' (c.f. Etymo-logical dictionary online at https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=omnibus). We made it to a full word and think that we know what it means but really we only know what we mean when we are using it. Sometimes we cut words into smaller chunks and assume that they retain the meaning but they never had that meaning in the first place. A *hamburger* is not a *burger* made of ham but a name of a dish derived from the name of a city it originated from, Hamburg. Thus a burger did not mean a patty and so a veggie burger or the latest "beyond meat burger" make little sense from a logical point of view which does not stop manufacturers and customers from using such expressions.

Similarly, the use of the label *migrants* instead of the well-established *immigrants* (or *refugees* or *exiles* or *asylum seekers*) could be seen as an example of such shortening in

the name of economy in communication. However, this clipping also gives rise to negative perception of people labelled as such. A *migrant* is defined as a "person who moves from one place to another to find work or better living conditions" (Oxford English Dictionary) or one who moves from place to place to do seasonal work (Google Dictionary). Undocumented migrants are now called *illegal aliens*; while *aliens* are simply people from a foreign country, it is a term with war time connotations, especially as 'enemy aliens'. *Illegal aliens* brings back those negative associations and shifts focus of the discussion from 'escaping persecution' to 'moving from place to place' for no specific reason (cf. Stroińska & Cecchetto 2019).

Replacing words with their approximate but still only partial synonyms (as in the war on *terror* instead of *terrorism*) can change the perception of reality and shape the emotional response to political and social events. Klemperer (2000) demonstrated how in Nazi Germany old words were assigned new toxic meanings. Using the term *migrant* to describe people who need emergency assistance robs the victims of violence of societal compassion, takes away their – and in turn also our – humanity and removes compassion towards people in need from the picture. Removing compassion and empathy towards someone results in the feeling of contempt, an emotion less dramatic than hate but one that dehumanizes its object. Hatred is a very strong negative emotion but it acknowledges its object while contempt puts it down as inferior and worthless.

Communication as a form of cooperation

From the linguistic point of view, human interactions are forms of cooperation. This idea was best formulated by H.P. Grice (1975) in his Cooperative Principle: "Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged (Grice 1975: 41). The cooperative principle is then spelled out as four maxims of conversation, the so called Gricean maxims.

- Maxim of quality: *make your contribution one that is true.* This is further explained as you do not say what you believe is false and do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
- Maxim of quantity: *make your contribution as informative as is required* for the purpose of the conversation you are engaged in but not more informative than needed.
- Maxim of relation (or relevance): *be relevant, i.e. make what you say relate to the conversation.*
- Maxim of manner: *be perspicuous*, i.e. avoid obscurity of expression, ambiguity, unnecessary prolixity, and keep your contribution orderly.

We are, of course, aware that the maxims cannot be viewed as prescriptive: no one really follows them in real life. However, we generally assume, without even thinking about it, that other people follow them. This is how we make sense of what others say: we impose the assumption that what is said must be relevant for the current conversation and so we search for meaning going beyond literal interpretation. We assume that the speaker is cooperative and know that they also expect the same from us. They say things that they believe we can interpret. Gricean maxims help us understand non-literal uses of language, e.g. metaphors

or presuppositions. E.g. when a bartender asks the customer what they would like to drink and the customer responds "I am driving", on the surface, the answer does not seem to fit the question. If we assume that the customer is cooperative and that they are following the maxims, the response starts to make sense. The speaker is not driving right at the moment so, clearly, they mean that they came by car and will be driving home. This is only relevant because of the common knowledge that one is not supposed to drink alcohol while operating a motor vehicle, thus the customer would not be drinking alcohol. Based on such an interpretation, the possible meaning communicated by the statement "I am driving" could be something along the lines "What non-alcoholic beverage can you offer?" A meaningful response from the bartender would then be, e.g. "I have Pepsi." The customer is using what Grice calls conversational implicature, i.e. they violate a maxim (here the maxim of relation) but still follow the principle of cooperation to imply a meaning that they assume the hearer will decode. There are plenty of examples related to offensive language that are based on conversational implicature. We shall return to this topic.

Geoffrey Leech (1983) added a maxim of politeness. It includes notions of tact, generosity, approbation, modesty, agreement, and sympathy. Leech suggested that even though different cultures may put emphasis on different aspects of polite behaviours, most people do not intentionally hurt others or act in downright rude way without provocation or specific reason. Thus, in interpreting what others say, we naturally expect people to act in a non-offensive way. In particular, the approbation submaxim states: "Minimize the expression of beliefs which express dispraise of other; maximize the expression of beliefs which express approval of other." It suggests that it is generally preferred to praise others and, should this be impossible, to remain silent. The maxim advocates avoidance of disagreement and attempting to make others feel good. The agreement maxim states: "Minimize the expression of disagreement between self and other; maximize the expression of agreement between self and other." This maxim practically sums up the principles of what Brown and Levinson (1987) describe as positive politeness strategies of seeking agreement and avoiding disagreement, to which they attach great importance. Finally, the sympathy maxim states: "minimize antipathy between self and other; maximize sympathy between the self and other." This maxim suggests that using positive statements such as those wishing someone well, congratulating them on their achievements, or expressing sympathy when something bad happens to them should be more encouraged than expressing ill wishes or feelings of Schadenfreude.

People expect other people to be polite because impoliteness is face-threatening. It threatens both the hearer's face by humiliation or offence and the speaker's face because they may appear rude and uncivilized. We generally expect an apology when impoliteness occurs and if none is forthcoming, it adds to the offence and face threats.

While it is just linguists and communication theory researchers who look at verbal interactions in terms of rules and strategies, we all make sense of communication assuming that others cooperate with us. They too give us the same credit when communicating with us: we all make assumptions that the other is at least trying to be cooperative and follows the maxims, even though we do not literally do so ourselves. And then, there is hate speech.

Hate speech as non-cooperation

Many types of discourse are atypical in terms if adhering to the principle of cooperation. Deductive sciences usually follow the maxims to a tee. Mathematical discourse is based on providing evidence for its claims in form of well-constructed proofs. Most of the written scientific discourse follows the maxims of Quality, Quantity, and Relation even though it may seem to violate the maxim of Manner from the point of view of an outsider because of field specific terminology or jargon. Social sciences are more ideological and popular media discourse outlets, especially tabloids follow sensation rather than facts.

Grice himself acknowledged that there are many situations when people deliberately *flout* maxims, that is do not follow a specific maxim while expecting the listener to be able to still understand the message. By doing so, the speaker is yielding a conversational implicature. The message is recovered by interpreting what has not been said, as in the example of the bartender and a customer who was driving. Sometimes maxims are flouted to trigger a negative pragmatic effect, as is the case with irony or sarcasm. We say something positive that violates the maxim of quality or relevance to communicate a negative comment. When a person known for their racist jokes is described as an example of tolerance, the hearer familiar with the situation will know that it needs to be interpreted in a non-literal way. Thus, even when a maxim has been violated, the cooperative principle still applies, though in a round-about way, i.e. not literally.

As different cultures may prefer different types of communication, they may also attach different value to the principle of cooperation. Having information may be considered as having power and so some people may be less inclined to share what they know even if the price they pay is violation of maxims.

Hate speech violates the basic principles of human communication in every imaginable way, seemingly contradicting the generally accepted purposes of entering an interaction, such as sharing or gaining information. Yet, whatever we do in communication, whether it is uttering words or remaining silent, serves a purpose. What then is the purpose of hate speech?

The purpose of hate speech

It is evident that hate speech messages are rarely assertions of facts, i.e. they are not true. Name calling or statements that attribute mental states, quesyionable occupational status, or political affiliations to targets of hateful messages are meant to influence what others think about the subject under discussion but they are rarely factual. As it is difficult to assess communicative value of hateful comments, the maxim of quantity hardly applies either. A hateful comment may be inserted anywhere in a conversation; thus it does not seem to be important to what extent it is relevant to the progress of the verbal exchange. An assertion "You are a complete idiot", addressed to the other speaker could appear virtually anywhere in an online conversation. It is meant to upset or hurt the hearer, but it is not necessarily uttered in relation to anything that was said. The maxim of manner, "be orderly", and the maxim of politeness do not seem to apply either. If hate speech is not used to communicate information or contribute in a meaningful way to the topic of the conversation, what is its purpose? The obvious and most often used answer is that its

goal is to offend people who have different opinion than the haters but there is usually no personal connection and so one wonders why would anyone care about offending perfect strangers.

It has been often observed that Internet has been changing the ways in which we communicate (c.f. Gernsbacher 2014 for an overview), preferring text over speech, allowing anonymity, facilitating identity shifts, and creating space to off load pent up frustration and anger. The Internet allows its users any level of anonymity they desire and this anonymity, in turn, reduces inhibitions, especially in expressing negative emotions and offers a new kind of freedom from real-life and real-world norms. Anderson and Brown McCabe (2012) conducted research on the self-socialization of the adolescents on the Internet and looked at their behaviour on-line and how it carries over to their ways of acting offline. They observed that their "participants described a carryover of aggressive language that is typical of the hot context of the Internet [...]. This hot language's construction and delivery frequently stood outside conventional, societal norms regarding appropriate discourse offline, thus demonstrating the conflict that may occur when going between worlds with different norms and symbolic boundaries" (249). One of their participants, a young male, said, "'Online, your natural instinct is when somebody doesn't do something right, you verbally abuse them in some way or somehow. It's just common ground online'" (249). This points to the fact that online hate is a breeding ground for offline aggression. And it is not so much video games that promote hate and contempt, it is the social media platforms and comment pages of news websites.

But people, both adolescents and adults, also look to online exchanges for acceptance they crave and often do not find in their own social groups. Anderson & Brown McCabe concluded that "the adolescents strove for connection to receive validation for their actions and acceptance by others and talked about the importance of being understood" (2012: 245). Some of the comments made by participants included statements such as: "Any level of acceptance, any level of friendship was wonderful"; "So that's why the Internet was so important.... [It was] the only force of acceptance I had" (2012: 245).

Engaging in hate speech on Internet websites and social media platforms helps haters to build an identity and the feeling of belonging to a group that shares the same disregard of societal norms. They build their identity by joining the exchange of aggressive messages and thus aspire to belonging to a group that shares a code of conduct. Even 5 years ago, that code of conduct would have been looked upon as arrogant, vulgar, and shameful as racism, xenophobia, misogyny, homophobia, and belief in white supremacy were considered a career suicide for a politician or a journalist in any democratic country. The wave of populism has changed this. When presidents or prime ministers of powerful nations or church leaders use language of racist or homophobic slurs and openly call for violence against minorities, this verbal aggression quickly percolates down to Internet discussions and then translates to acts of physical aggression in the streets. We have been witnessing in the last few years such acts of physical aggression, more and more often ending with casualties, from Charlotteville to El Paso in the USA and from Radom to Białystok in Poland.

The banality of evil

As Waldorn (2012) points out, no matter what side one is on, the presence of verbal aggression in the public discourse hurts the targets, incites the haters, and robs the bystanders of their humanity by conditioning them to become indifferent and numbing their sensitivity to evil.

There is, unfortunately, no shortage of examples of such situations. In July 2019, US President Donald Trump held a rally in North Carolina. His speech criticized four democratic congresswomen of colour and – directly or indirectly – his inflammatory rhetoric incited the audience to break into a chant "Send her back" when he spoke about one of them. Conor Friedersdorf, writing for *The Atlantic*, commented on this event echoing Waldorn's observations:

> Already, the civic poison of the chant has been televised and celebrated on social media by Trump supporters. Naturalized immigrants must have heard it and felt anxious. Racists must have heard it and felt glad. Children must have heard it, too, and felt uncomfortable, knowing in their gut that the chant is wrong. Some kids are surely being malignly influenced by its repudiation of the American creed. (Friedersdorf 2019)

The intensity of verbal aggression that surrounds us both online and offline makes most people react to its form and message without realizing the underlying mechanism that is at work. Most people once considered incomprehensible the images of German soldiers smiling in pictures taken in front of corpses of murdered Poles or Jews, or the photos of grinning personnel of the US Army and the CIA tormenting prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq during the 2003 war. They are not unlike the pictures of lynches of black people conducted in America and probably not unlike the reactions to burning women accused of witchcraft centuries ago. It is, unfortunately, not uncommon for human being to rejoice at the cruelty suffered by others, especially if the victims are members of groups designated as inferior, etc.

Adam Serwer (2018) writes:

> Taking joy in that suffering [of others – the authors] is more human than most would like to admit. Somewhere on the wide spectrum between adolescent teasing and the smiling white men in the lynching photographs are the Trump supporters whose community is built by rejoicing in the anguish of those they see as unlike them, who have found in their shared cruelty an answer to the loneliness and atomization of modern life.

Donald Trump is just one of several political leaders using this technique very successfully. We see this done in Poland, in Italy and in other places where people who have the power to influence others use cruelty for the purpose of bonding their supporters. Sewer (2018) continues:

It is that cruelty, and the delight it brings them, that binds his most ardent supporters to [Trump – the authors], in shared scorn for those they hate and fear: immigrants, black voters, feminists, and treasonous white men who empathize with any of those who would steal their birthright. The president's ability to execute that cruelty through word and deed makes them euphoric. It makes them feel good, it makes them feel proud, it makes them feel happy, it makes them feel united. And as long as he makes them feel that way, they will let him get away with anything, no matter what it costs them.

Getting rid of hate online

It is difficult, even increasingly impossible to remove hate speech from online platforms. Users are always coming up with new ways of avoiding detection and most of hateful rhetoric comes these days from bots and paid haters rather than from actual individual human users of the Internet. It may be easier to target the hate speech by revealing the mechanisms that underlie the spread of hate online and by talking about it. Maybe when people see how they have been used by political leaders, manipulated into political support by this appeal to their lowest instincts, they will reject it. But we are likely being naïve or overly optimistic. Political leaders who rule by appealing to the lowest layers of human nature are usually also skilled at usurping for themselves the language itself.

Jarosław Kaczyński introduced the term "industry of contempt" to refer to the political opposition's attempts to fact check his propaganda, thus hijacking the perfect term to describe what populist leaders worldwide are doing themselves. They industrialized contempt, capitalizing on its insidious effects on human emotions and behaviour. As we indicated earlier, contempt is a specific emotion that blocks empathy and objectivizes (dehumanizes) the other person. As linguists, we need to be the whistle-blowers and we need to talk openly to people of all ages about this discourse of contempt and its toxicity.

At the 2016 Warsaw East European Conference, we talked about hate speech becoming a worrisome phenomenon in Poland and across Europe and beginning to be noticeable in North America. In terms of Gordon Allport's (1954) pyramid of aggression, we were then moving from Level 1, described as Antilocution [in modern terminology hate speech], i.e. verbal abuse, using derogatory language, name calling and stereotyping, to Level 2, labelled as Avoidance and described as withdrawal, avoiding contact, making people invisible, acting on prejudice. Merely 3 years later, in 2019, we have already passed through Level 3, Discrimination (using power to control who gets what, excluding people from access to immigration, jobs, education, etc.) and reached Level 4 – Physical Attacks, described as spreading hateful graffiti, property damage, harassment, physical bullying, beating, and rape, real or threatened. There is only one level left in Allport's pyramide, Level 5. It's labelled Genocide and it involves ethnic cleansing, mass scale murder, and bringing people to suicide. We are not there yet but history teaches that it is easy to reach that level even in highly cultured societies such as Germany in the first half of the 20th century where the propaganda of Aryan supremacy and contempt towards inferior races led to millions of victims worldwide. We have to keep repeating that it always starts with language deterioration. At the level of language, the tendency can be stopped and reversed

but when we move past that threshold, the avalanche of hate may become unstoppable. This pessimism should not stop us from acting at every possible level and every possible forum because once the fire storm of hatred and contempt is unleashed, it's our humanity that will perish and then we shall all be dead.

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The small state's role in the Euro-Atlantic area:
Potential changes in Lithuania's foreign policy

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Summary

Lithuania is a small state by objective features (population, territory, GDP) and subjective ones (geopolitical position, resilience from external security threats, national identity). The goal of this research is to define the main roles of Lithuania, which are relevant to the Lithuanian foreign policy decision-making process nowadays. Those roles are the structure for Lithuania's new President Gitanas Nausėda. While during his presidency he will have the possibility to modify them, for now for the roles formed and enacted over the last ten years serve as the limits of the change of the policy in the Euro-Atlantic area. The main assumption regarding the roles of Lithuania in the Euro-Atlantic area is that policymakers emphasize the smallness of the state. Accordingly, being a small state is translated to a set of expected and appropriate behavior. Therefore, the classical definition of smallness suggests that Lithuania's roles should include the strategies of hiding and appeal to democratic values. In order to deny or confirm the assumptions, the research includes the definition of small states, an analysis of small state foreign policy strategies, the main thesis of the Role theory, the theoretical basis of subjective smallness concept, and discussion of Lithuania's roles in the Euro-Atlantic area, using an interpretive methodology of Social constructivism.

Keywords: small state, Lithuania, role, Social constructivism, foreign policy.

Introduction

Since 2004, Lithuania has been a member of the EU and NATO. Nowadays Lithuania expresses support for the Common European Defense policy and the leading role of Germany and France in this process. On the other hand, Lithuania is a NATO member and links national security with the Alliance and the USA. Simultaneously, both memberships

act as external sources of expectations for Lithuania's foreign policy. A pattern of expected behavior defines the state's role. Competition over its national role arises from an evident disagreement between domestic political parties, different branches of government and even between relevant political figures. In this context, the internal expectations are linked with what subjectively is considered to be appropriate behavior in a given situation. Domestic characteristics affect the definition and performance of the role of continuity or change of the subjective element. The core of the subjective element is the perception of 'appropriateness', i.e. the decision-makers' persuasion and ideas as to what as representatives of the state they should say or do while implementing foreign policy.[1]

According to Lithuania's constitution, the president of the republic settles basic foreign policy issues and, together with the government, implements foreign policy (Article 84). During the presidency of Dalia Grybauskaitė, for the past ten years, it was agreed that the main figure in implementing foreign policy was the president, while the prime minister and minister of foreign affairs followed the president's lead. For the past decade, Lithuania's foreign policy became personalized: "Grybauskaitė has become the most important foreign policymaker in Lithuania, and even a supervisor of the process itself."[2] Consequently, Lithuania's roles in the Euro-Atlantic area resulted from the conjunction of changes in the international environment and the stability of domestic features. Lithuania's agency in the EU and NATO represents the political actions of policymakers within the constraints of the given structure and particular situation.[3] Continuity or change of the evident foreign policy depends not just on the structural constraints. The change of the policymakers enacts a domestic state's role bargaining and changes in foreign policy.[4]

On 12 July 2019 Gitanas Nausėda was officially inaugurated as Lithuania's president. The new president was widely known as an economist but had no political experience. During his presidential campaign, Nausėda stressed the continuity of foreign policy. In his inaugural address, the President stated that his main strategic goals would be deeper Euro-Atlantic integration, maintaining close relations with the European Union and the United States, and developing relations with neighboring countries: Poland, Latvia, and Estonia.[5] The goals are mainly conditioned by external structural demands, i.e. Russia's threat to the eastern flank of NATO, US politics towards Europe, the European policies of Germany and France, Brexit and other actions of more powerful states. Equally the goals are predefined by Lithuania's already established policies, that were formed as subjective responses by the state's former political leaders. While the process of role changes takes place in a continuum, the 'appropriate' implementation of foreign policy by President Gi-

1 Gvalia, G., Siroky, D., Lebanidze, B., and Iashvili, Z. (2013) Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States, Security Studies, 22:1, pp. 98-131.

2 Janeliūnas, T. (2019) Prezidento įtaka Lietuvos užsienio politikos formavimui: galios centro pokytis D. Grybauskaitės prezidentavimo laikotarpiu. Politologija 2019/2, vol. 94, pp. 8–55. Retrieved from: http://www.zurnalai.vu.lt/politologija/article/view/13332/12250.

3 Gigleux, V. (2016) Explaining the diversity of small states' foreign policies through role theory, Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 1:1, pp. 27-45.

4 Cantir, C., and Kaarbo, J. (2016) (Introduction) Unpacking Ego in Role Theory: Vertical and Horizontal Role Contestation and Foreign Policy. In C. Cantir, & J. Kaarbo (Eds.), Domestic Role Contestation, Foreign Policy, and International Relations [1] Routledge.

5 Inauguracija (2019, liepos 12) Lietuvos Respublikos presidentas. Retrieved from: https://www.lrp.lt/lt/prezidento-institucija/prezidentas-gitanas-nauseda/inauguracija/32824.

tanas Nausėda evolves from the foreign policy of President Dalia Grybauskaitė. Moreover, appropriate politics are supported by demands from the electorate. Consequently, the beliefs of the population revealed in public opinion polls enable or diminish changes in foreign policy. In 2019 according to public opinion polls Latvia, Poland, Estonia, and Germany were named as priority partners by Lithuania's citizens, while 68 percent defined Russia as the main threat.[6] The results of the polls are linked to the perpetuated narrative that Lithuania is a small state in the neighborhood of big and threatening state.

The goal of this research is to define the main roles of Lithuania, which are relevant to the Lithuanian foreign policy decision-making process nowadays. Those roles are the structure for the new Lithuania's President Gitanas Nausėda. While during the presidency he will have the capacity to modify them, nowadays for the past ten years formed and enacted roles serve as the limits of the change of the policy in the Euro-Atlantic area. Consequently, the research includes six steps:

1. qualitative content analysis of the annual speeches to the parliament of Dalia Grybauskaitė (2009-2019);
2. qualitative content analysis of government programs (2012-2019);
3. qualitative content analysis of the annual government activity reports on foreign policy (2012-2019);
4. qualitative content analysis of the Agreement between the Political Parties Represented in the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on the Strategic Guidelines of the Republic of Lithuania on Foreign, Security and Defense Policy 2014-2020; and

discourse analysis of the presidential debates and interviews (March – May, 2019; national television, three most popular TV stations (LRT, LNK, TV3), three most popular news websites (delfi.lt, lrytas.lt, 15min.lt), and the most popular television on the www. youtube.com platform (Laisvės TV) to identify the existing narrative of Lithuania's roles.

The content and discourse analysis are based on the nine categories of the state's roles' analysis: identity, purpose, functions, level of commitment to the social group, the duties in the social group, the values of the group, expectations of others, the punishment for the inappropriate behavior, opportunities and constraints for actions presented in the political narrative. The main assumption on the roles of Lithuania in the Euro-Atlantic area is that policymakers emphasize the smallness of the state. Accordingly, being a small state is translated to a set of expected and appropriate behavior. Therefore, the classical definition of smallness suggests that Lithuania's roles should include the strategies of hiding and appeals to democratic values. In order to deny or confirm the assumptions, the research includes the definition of small states, analysis of small states foreign policy strategies, the main thesis of the Role theory, the theoretical basis of subjective smallness concept, and discussion on Lithuania's roles in the Euro-Atlantic area, using an interpretive methodology of Social constructivism.

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6 Lietuvos gyventojai draugiškiausia valstybe laiko Latviją, o keliančia didžiausią grėsmę – Rusiją, rodo visuomenės apklausa (2019, sausio 29) Lietuvos užsienio reikalų ministerija. Retrieved from: https://www.urm.lt/default/lt/naujienos/lietuvos-gyventojai-draugiskiausia-valstybe-laiko-latvija-o-keliancia-didziausia-gresmerusija-rodo-visuomenes-apklausa.

Definition of Smallness

The concept of a small state is usually associated with the size of a country's territory and population. However, being small is not an absolute, but rather a relative concept. For example, a country with a small territory, but a developed economy will be more powerful than having a large territory, but a low GDP indicator.[7] Until the twentieth century, the small state category was known as a small power. 'Being small' emphasized a quantitative lack of power.[8] The origins of the term can be traced to the Vienna Congress held after the Napoleonic wars. The winners of the wars (Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, France, and Austria) were the most powerful states and had the power to decide the future of Europe. Hence, they were named as great powers. Other states that were invited to participate in the resolution of certain issues during the Congress were later named medium powers. States that were not included in the Vienna Congress, because they were considered insignificant, became known as small powers.[9] Consequently, the term 'small state' in Classical theories of International relations is interpreted by the notion of power.

Classical IR theories define power in terms of military and economy capacity. However, power cannot be measured objectively.[10] For example, geographic location, human and natural resources can be measured and compared. While, technological development, good governance, and political institutions, national character or culture are qualitative data that is constantly changing.[11] For this reason, Studies of Small states developed during '60-'80s are based on assumption, that small states should be defined not in absolute power measures, but relative ones.[12] Thus, small states are the ones that are unable to guaranty their own national security and must seek alliances or coalitions. From this perspective, 'being small' state arises from circumstances in which the state recognizes that:

1. external assistance is necessary, because of the lack of resources;
2. security is limited and there is little time for error correction;
3. state leaders value state incapacity to ensure its own security as a constant state.[13]

The circumstances of acknowledging one self's smallness can occur from the international structure. For instance, Robert Keohane (1969) introduced the term of the role played by states systematically. Keohane has suggested that the states can be divided

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7 Manning, D. (2010) Small States and Traditional Concepts of Sovereignty: Anachronism or Hopeful Aspiration". Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and Practitioners, New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, The Loews New Orleans Hotel, New Orleans, LA, Feb 17, 2010.

8 Ingebritsen, C. (2006) Small states in international relations. University of Washington Press; Reykjavik : University of Iceland Press, Seattle.

9 Ibid.

10 Vandenbosch, A. (1964) The Small States in International Politics and Organization. The Journal of Politics, 26(2), pp. 293-312.

11 Ibid.

12 Rothstein, R. L. (1992) The Evolution of theory in international relations: Essays in honor of William T.R. Fox. Columbia, S.C: University of South Carolina Press.

13 Ibid.

into four categories.[14] Great power is that whose leaders believe that one can make a decisive impact on the international system; secondary power has influence on the system, but it is not decisive; middle power cannot act alone, but through unions or international institutions it can influence the system; and the one that believes that with or without allies affect the international system is a small power. Consequently, a small state's foreign policy is to adapt to the system and external conditions, not to change them.[15] This prescription for a small state's foreign policy is not dominant in IR.

Vital (1967) presents another approach to small states, using the concepts of inability and opportunity. He states that states should be treated as small if they have 10-15 million inhabitants and are economically developed or have 20-30 million inhabitants and are economically underdeveloped. In this context, the size of the territory, the economic and social development shows the country's ability to withstand unfavorable external pressure. According to Vital (1967), the strategy of a small state should be to change the external environment: reducing the unfavorable difference in forces, expanding the field of maneuvers and choices, and increasing all the resources needed in times of tension.[16] Consequently, a small state's foreign policy can be based on three strategies: a passive strategy of renunciation, an active strategy designed to alter the external environment, or a defensive strategy.[17] These strategies illustrate basic agreement in IR, that states differ in power, position in the international system and level of national security; they must form and implement their foreign policy accordingly.[18]

Analysis of scientific literature dedicated to small states shows that they have a limited impact on the external environment and/or low resistance to the changes in the external environment.[19] Therefore, dependence on other states and the international system limits the range of foreign policy actions, but does not deprive them of strategic thinking, and allows them to implement their national interests by intelligently maneuvering.[20] Summarizing the strategic behaviors of the small states mentioned in international relations studies, according to Toje six approaches may be distinguished:

1. Small states, in terms of their resources, geographic location, and system, must break down the risks into a hierarchical system and try to reduce the risk that is considered to be the highest (Hoffman, 1965).
2. As already mentioned above, Vital (1967) proposes that states adopt a passive, active or defensive foreign policy strategy, based on diplomatic means;

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14 Keohane, R. (1969) Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics. International Organization, 23(2), pp. 291-310.
15 Ibid.
16 Vital, D. (1967) The inequality of states: A study of the small power in international relations. Oxford: Clarendon.
17 Milsten, D. (1969) Small Powers--A Struggle for Survival. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 13(3), pp. 388-393.
18 Haugevik, K. and Rieker, P. (2017) Autonomy or integration? Small-state responses to a changing European security landscape, Global Affairs.
19 Wiberg, H. (1987) The Security of Small Nations: Challenges and Defences. Journal of Peace Research, 24(4), pp. 339–363.
20 Toje, A. (2005) The EU Strategic Culture: A Small State Approach. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii Online.

3. East (1973) believes that in order to reduce the cost of foreign policy, small states tend to opt for joint action, increase their influence through multilateral agreements and extensive membership of international organizations;

4. According to Rothstein (1968), small states are defined by their dependence on others because, as discussed earlier, they cannot secure themselves only by their own efforts;

5. Russett (2001) states that small states tend to promote normative and moral international politics;

6. Small states are trying to respond to events as they are expected and avoid decisions or positions that might offend powerful states.[21]

Hey (2003) summarized the behavior of foreign states' foreign policy, which either appears in the international system or is most likely: limited participation in international politics; narrow foreign policy interests; limits the behavior of the near geographic dimension; use of diplomatic and economic foreign policy tools; emphasis on international norms, international law and moral ideals; the importance of security agreements and membership of international institutions; neutral position; trust in the great powers in defense, partnership and resource issues; tendency to cooperate and avoid conflicts; disproportionate use of foreign policy resources to secure security and survival.[22] The pattern of behavior suggests that small states do not act alone, i. e. their primary goal is to seek external support.

Foreign policy of Small state

In essence, two small-country foreign policy strategies can be distinguished: hiding, which is described as an effort to remain invisible and not interfere with the disputes of the more powerful states, or an obligation that emerges through the prevention of threats and challenges by the creation and strengthening of international norms and institutions.[23] Thus, the states either isolate themselves in order to protect themselves, adapt to the international environment, or take an active foreign policy to influence the international environment in a way that is more favorable and more appropriate.[24] Basically, small states participate in alliances, coalitions, international intergovernmental institutions, multilateral forums, promote international law, global governance, and multilateralism.[25] To reduce the cost of conducting foreign policy, small states tend to choose joint actions, increase their influence through multilateral agreements and extensive membership of international organizations.[26] Vulnerability and lack of autonomy are the driving forces of the small states' foreign policy.

21 Ibid.

22 Hey, J. A. K. (2003) Small states in world politics: Explaining foreign policy behavior. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

23 Steinmetz, R. and Wivel, A. (2010) Introduction in Steinmetz, R. and Wivel, A. (Eds), Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities. Routledge.

24 Goetschel, L. (1998) Small States Inside and Outside the European Union Interests and Policies. Kluwer Academic Publishers.

25 Hey (2003), op. cit.

26 East, M. (1973) Foreign Policy-Making in Small States: Some Theoretic Observations Based on a Study of the Uganda Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Policy Sciences, 4(4), pp. 491-508.

Nowadays, political practice denies theoretical prescriptions for a foreign policy of small states. For instance, if small states are defined in relation to other states,[27] then every single state should be considered as small in relation to the USA or China. In contemporary international system small states project regional soft power and virtually become more powerful[28]; small states exert agenda-setting power in regional organizations[29]; small states create international norms in the security field[30]; small states occupy leading positions in global governance or mediate conflicts between more powerful states[31]; small states even shape balancing strategies of the great powers[32], while middle-range powers engage in foreign policy strategies recommended for small states[33].

Belonging to the category of small states does not mean that all small states behave identically in international politics. These tendencies illustrate subjective smallness, i.e. self-identification and interpretation of 'being small' impacts foreign policy accordingly. The key to the subjective evaluation of smallness is an interpretation of small as a weakness. Consequently, states can be divided into three categories: small and weak, small, but not weak, and not small. [34] Small states can promote an active foreign policy, be autonomous and even redefine their vulnerabilities, according to IR scientists promoting the 'subjective smallness' concept.[35]

The interpretation of 'being small' is a narrative that a state's political elite constructs based on a self-imagination of the state and the role of the state in the international system. The definition of appropriate behavior arises from the expectation linked to the particular role attached to the state.[36] A pattern of expected behavior defines the states' role, which is a result not just of self-definition and construction of national identity. A role is acquired during socialization when other international actors express their expectations. Social interaction between states enacts role performance.[37] Consequently, a state role has internal and external sources, which represent 'ego' and 'alter'.

27 Bjol, E. (1971) The Small State In International Politics in A. Schou and A.O. Brundland (Eds) Small States in International Relations. New York: Wiley Interscience.

28 Chong, A., and Maass, M. (2010) Introduction: The foreign policy power of small states. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 23(3), pp. 381-382.

29 Nasra, S. (2011) Governance in EU Foreign Policy: Exploring Small State Influence. Journal of European Public Policy, No. 18.

30 Crandall, M. and Allan, C. (2015) Small States and Big Ideas: Estonia's Battle for Cybersecurity Norms, Contemporary Security Policy, 36:2, pp. 346-368.

31 Mohammadzadeh, B. (2017) Status and Foreign Policy Change in Small States: Qatar's Emergence in Perspective. International Spectator, 52 (2), pp. 19-36.

32 Kluth, M. F., and Lynggaard, K. (2017). Small State Strategies in emerging Regional Governance Structures: Explaining the Danish advocacy for China's inclusion in the Arctic Council. European Politics and Society, 19(1), pp. 103-119.

33 Brommesson, D. (2018) 'Nordicness' in Swedish foreign policy – from mid power internationalism to small state balancing? Global Affairs, 4:4-5, pp. 391-404.

34 Szalai, M. (2017) The identity of smallness and its implications for foreign policy – the case of Hungary and Slovakia, Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 25:3, pp. 345-366.

35 Browning, C. S. (2006) Small, Smart and Salient? Rethinking Identity in the Small States Literature. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 19:4, pp. 669-684.

36 Breuning, M. (2017) Role Theory in Foreign Policy. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia.

37 Walker, S. G. (2017) Role Theory as an Empirical Theory of International Relations: From Metaphor to Formal Model. In Oxford Research Bibliographies on Politics.

Domestic characteristics and external expectations affect the definition and performance of the role. On the one hand, national role conceptions collectively make the state's identity, which is expressed by the political narrative and the conduct of foreign policy.[38] On the other hand, international structure and its members contribute to the enacted role, i.e. the role signalizes states position or status, which is recognized by others.[39] For instance, the status of regional or great power is not given or declared but acquired through self-identification and identification of others.[40] The role is an interplay between demands or expectations of other states and domestic expectations, between international structure and state's position, between self-identification and identification, between material factors and ideational factors.[41]

The role has normative power. The role is attached to the particular values and attribution to those values, influences foreign policy decision-making.[42] However, two practical problems could arise. First of all, states have a few roles and some of them can contradict themselves in a particular situation.[43] However, the selection of the role in a particular situation forms the state's agency.[44] For example, Lithuania has the role of 'independent', which is defined and performed as being self-governing and promoting self-determination right. The other role is as 'supporter', which defines Lithuania as a loyal partner and supporter of the US. Both roles can be enacted, then the US supports or seeks the independence of a territory and group of people. The Palestinian National authority's decision to become a member of UNESCO brought for Lithuania the inter-role conflict. At the same time, the Palestinian issue made Lithuania choose which role must be enacted. The second practical problem is how that role would be fulfilled. Lithuania after enaction of the 'supporter's' role had a choice to vote against Palestinian membership or to refrain from voting. 14 states voted against Palestinian membership. Lithuania was one of them. The 'appropriateness' of this decision arose from the constraints of the situation and the demands of the audience. The decision was made on the base of social identity, which is defined by the state's status in the structure, the value of role enactment for other states and the state's involvement with other states.[45] However, the decision was made by the policymakers based on their perception of what decision was appropriate and the main scientific problem is how role conflict was solved and how domestic actors with various conceptions interacted in the foreign policy-making process.[46] This example illustrates that the roles are not an instrument that allows the state's actions to be accurately predicted. Rather, they summarize the trends that can be expected.

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38 Thies, C. G. (2013) The United States, Israel and the Search for International Order: Socializing States. Routledge.

39 Wehner, L. E. (2015) Role expectations as foreign policy: South American secondary powers' expectations of Brazil as a regional power. Foreign Policy Analysis, 11(4), pp. 435-455.

40 Harnisch, S. (2011) Role theory: operationalization of key concepts. In Harnisch, S., Frank, C., and Maull, H. W. (Eds) Role Theory in International Relations. Routledge.

41 Lantis, J. and Beasley, R. (2017) Comparative foreign policy analysis. In Thompson, W. R. (Ed.), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics (Oxford Research Encyclopedias). Oxford University Press.

42 Walker (2017), op. cit.

43 Thies (2013), op. cit.

44 Wehner, L. E., and Thies, C. (2014) Role theory, narratives, and interpretation: The domestic contestation of roles. International Studies Review, 16(3), pp. 411-436.

45 Gigleux (2016), op. cit.

46 Cantir and Kaarbo (2016), op. cit.

Set of Lithuania's roles in the Euro-Atlantic area

For the past decade, Lithuania had expressed a set of goals, expectations, and measures to implement foreign policy. According to conducted content analysis and discourse analysis, being a productive member of the EU is one of its main goals. Lithuania's main interests are energy security and independence, security concerns at the Astravets nuclear power plant, and a secure and friendly neighborhood, including Belarus and Ukraine. The main area of cooperation is the Baltic sea region, emphasizing Scandinavia and the Baltic states. In the NATO structure, the main goal is 'real' membership, i.e. actually being secure from military threats. This goal was mainly linked to defense plans of the eastern flank, but nowadays the main interests are the anti-ballistic shield, air policing mission, and permanent military units. Consequently, the main areas of interest are territorial defense, energy security, cybersecurity, and informational security. The main partners in NATO are Germany, France, the US, Poland, and Sweden. Those features arise from the active persuasion that Lithuania is not secure. For example, even before the annexation of Crimea President Dalia Grybauskaitė stated, that:

> Geopolitical processes are changing the world dramatically. Attempts to belittle us, to stop, to deceive, to bribe, to make us dependent, to decide for us - will not end. Because of the geographic location and size, we were and are in the East and West area of interest, so we must constantly fight for the opportunity to create our own state.[47]

After the annexation of Crimea Lithuania's security concerns were supplemented with values. First of all, Ukraine's security issues were connected to international law and justice. Afterward, Lithuania's President started to put emphasis on an active involvement in international politics:

> The goal of foreign policy is not only to ensure national security, independence and the well-being of citizens, but also to contribute to the establishment of an international order based on law and justice.[48]

The change of narrative was based on the assumption that small states acting in international organizations according to international law can manacle powerful states. Consequently, Lithuania's foreign policy was based not on a hiding strategy, but actually taking greater responsibility for regional and national security:

> We no longer can expect to be protected by others. It is necessary to strengthen bilateral relations with the strategic partners and the nearest neighbors and to expand the circle of friends. We need to search for new forms of collaboration, try to avoid transatlantic divisions and

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47 Lietuvos Respublikos Prezidentės Dalios Grybauskaitės metinis pranešimas (2013 m. birželio 11). Retrieved from: https://grybauskaite.lrp.lt/lt/metinis-pranesimas-2013.

48 Lietuvos Respublikos Prezidentės Dalios Grybauskaitės metinis pranešimas (2015 m. birželio 4). Retrieved from: https://grybauskaite.lrp.lt/lt/metinis-pranesimas-2015.

> seek a more efficient European Union and a rapidly responding NATO
> adapted to the new security environment.[49]

In summary, a qualitative analysis of the discourse suggests that for the past decade Lithuania enacted a set of roles in the Euro-Atlantic area, which are supported by Lithuania's political leaders and society:

1. Small, but effective, i.e. agenda-setting;
2. Driven by smart diplomacy, i.e. maneuvering in the EU and NATO;
3. Small, but rare, i.e. securing Lithuanian identity;
4. Small, but proud, i.e. relying on the achievements of the citizens;
5. Respected by others, i.e. an example for the other post-communist countries;
6. Not an object!, i.e. having a loud voice on matters;
7. Being ready, i.e. military and defense matters are as important as values;
8. Being right!, i.e. Russia's threat is real.

All those roles are developed through a subjective perception of smallness. At first, smallness was defined in terms of lack of influence. Unilateral Lithuanian foreign policy actions have a limited impact on the international environment.[50] This circumstance is largely influenced by objective factors, i.e. limited resources. For this reason, the ability of the state to achieve desired results is leveraged through the power of its partners through international organizations, particularly the EU and NATO. Thus, Lithuanian smallness is associated with the ability to utilize diplomatic relations, to make proposals, to support initiatives of powerful countries in exchange for their support of Lithuania. The second element of subjective smallness is based on uniqueness.

During the past ten years, the roles of Lithuania evolved. The self-image of smallness became less prominent. Moreover, being a small state was interpreted more in positive terms. The Lithuanian narrative on roles in foreign policy has a strong element of being small, but unique. This perception relies first of all on a need to keep national identity while facing a demographic crisis and not decreasing the flow of Lithuanian emigrants. Second, identity is built on a sense of sovereignty and survival.[51] At the same time, the success of native Lithuanians in science, sport, business or any other area is presented as evidence that objective and subjective smallness do not coincide. Subjective smallness is less and less defined as a lack of influence and more as an ability. In the listed roles, being a small state is increasingly interpreted by the political elite as being proud, special, expert, successful, making progress or being better than before. The small state concept has changed due to the international environment and the subjective perception of those changes by Lithuania's president Dalia Grybauskaitė and government members.

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49 Lietuvos Respublikos Prezidentės Dalios Grybauskaitės metinis pranešimas (2018 m. birželio12). Retrieved from: https://grybauskaite.lrp.lt/lt/kalbos/metiniai-pranesimai/2018-m./30193.

50 Lamoreaux, J. W. and Galbreath, D. J. (2008) The Baltic States As 'Small States': Negotiating The 'East' By Engaging The 'West', Journal of Baltic Studies, 39:1, pp. 1-14.

51 Lamoreaux, J. W. (2014) Acting small in a large state's world: Russia and the Baltic states, European Security, 23:4, pp. 565-582.

Since 2014, the EU and USA have imposed restrictive measures against Russia due to the annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of Ukraine. Moreover, NATO has introduced a Readiness Action Plan and increased its presence and activity in Eastern and Central Europe. The Western states' stance towards Russia's actions in Ukraine and towards Ukraine has created a positive environment for Lithuanian foreign policy based on the assumption that Russia poses a threat to the national security of the post-communist states. In this context, Lithuania aims to exclude the chance to legitimate Russia's actions. Lithuania's appeal to international law and organizations is a way of preventing Russia's possible military intentions towards the Baltic States while pursuing national security. Historical experience and examples of self-proclaimed states in the post-communist area induce Lithuania's political elite to search for EU and NATO member states' actions that would support Lithuania's declared values. Rationalization of foreign policy brings Lithuania to believe that military and defense matters are as important as values. Therefore, Lithuania is increasing military expenditure and emphasizing military cooperation in bilateral and multilateral relations, especially NATO and CSDP.

Foreign policy is conducted relying on the narrative that Lithuania is small. However, the more recent roles of Lithuania enable it to define smallness as not weakness. On the contrary, Lithuania's roles are built on the subjective persuasion of political leaders that objective features of smallness do not eliminate pro-active policy measures. Since 2008, when the Russian – Georgian war happened and Russia legally recognized the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Lithuania's political elite has been convinced that Russia's foreign policy will be imperialist. The first and foremost objects of aggressive imperialist policy will be Ukraine and Belarus, and then Central Asia and Baltic states, i.e. former members of the Soviet Union. This conviction is the main reason why Lithuania embraced the role as an example for the other post-communist countries and supports the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine.

During the past ten years, the enacted roles of Lithuania have become more situated towards hard security measures. After integrating with NATO and the EU, the foreign policy of Lithuania was based on ceremonial diplomacy and had an approach of 'more talking than doing'. Since 2014, President Dalia Grybauskaitė rejected a set of Lithuania's roles based just on values and diplomacy. In order to be heard by the great powers in the Euro-Atlantic area and not to try to silence so-called partners to keep economically beneficial relations with Russia, the president relied on the concept of 'truth', i.e. not to meet with US President Barack Obama in 2010, because of his reset policies with Russia; not to visit Warsaw to celebrate Poland's independence day in 2012 due to offensive allegations of intentional violations of the rights of the Polish national minority; or just call Russia a terrorist state due to aggressive politics towards Ukraine in 2014. Living by subjective truth became the active role embraced by the president in order to redefine Lithuania's smallness and change a 'hiding' strategy to a 'being heard' strategy. Despite the fact that this pattern of behavior was considered one of the reasons why Dalia Grybauskaitė was not presented as a candidate for the presidency of the European Council in 2019[52], now Lithuania is more militarily safe than ever.

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52 Lithuania's president Grybauskaitė comes empty-handed from top Brussels jobs division (2019, July 5) Baltic News Network. Retrieved from: https://bnn-news.com/lithuania-s-president-grybauskaite-comes-empty-handed-from-top-brussels-jobs-division-202640.

Conclusions

During the presidency of Dalia Grybauskaite, Lithuania's smallness was linked to the ability to be heard by its partners. Since 2012, the smallness concept has been changing. Nowadays Lithuania's political elite presents Lithuania as small, but not weak. The 'power' of the small state was linked to straightforwardness, telling the truth, support for victims (Georgia and Ukraine), and a responsible attitude towards its own future. Lithuania's main goal in the Euro-Atlantic area is to be secure. Consequently, Lithuania's roles are built on an active search for hard security and to maintain Lithuanian identity. There is not too much freedom of choice nor range of options in the foreign policy of Lithuania. Therefore, the roles should remain but the enactment of those roles could change. The main reason for this change is domestic expectations. Gitanas Nausėda is widely popular in Lithuania because he is softly spoken. Consequently, the tone of politics will change, but the main patterns will remain. As the old saying goes: "you can banish a wolf from the forest but not the forest from the wolf."

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"Why Putin Did Not Try to Help Elect Trump"

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Introduction

Vladimir Putin ordered or countenanced Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election *not* to help elect Donald Trump but rather, convinced that Hillary Clinton was certain to win and launch a new campaign of pressure on him and his political machine, he sought to neutralize U.S. "soft power", pro-democracy assets by fomenting as much embarrassment about the U.S. political process as possible. The pattern of U.S.-Russian relations since the unraveling of the Obama "reset" in 2011, culminating in the virtual collapse of the bilateral relationship after the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis and Russia's seizure of Crimea in March 2014, had persuaded Putin that Moscow had nothing to hope for and still much to fear from Washington. This conclusion is based on the consensual evaluation by U.S. experts of Trump's chances to be elected, the pattern of Russian interference via Facebook and other social media, as well as the dynamics of U.S.-Russian relations in the Obama years. In other words, the key to understanding Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election lies not in inferring Putin's electoral preferences but rather his political expectations: i.e., not only about who was likely to win but also about the likely future trajectory of relations with Washington. Concerns about the solidity of his own political machine, as well as Russia's influence in bordering states like Ukraine, drove Putin's assessment of the costs and benefits of intervening in the American election. The stupendous irony is that, had Hillary Clinton been elected, Putin's policy could have been judged a success: it was in order to contain her own expected interference in Russian political affairs and those states of vital interest to Russia that Putin ordered or allowed the amply documented interference that did take place.[1] But with Trump unexpectedly winning, Putin's policy has been exposed as a failure: the bipartisan domestic backlash

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[1] *Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election* (hereafter *The Mueller Report*) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept of Justice, March 2019), vol. I, pp. 14-33, 36-51, 174-79.

to Russian electoral interference—most of which was not significantly camouflaged—has hamstrung Trump in his dealings with Russia. American-Russian relations have continued to get worse under the Trump administration and the incentive structure that faced Putin in 2014-16, little to hope for and much to fear, remains in place. In this context, Ukraine remains a zero-sum contest between Moscow and Washington; unless Washington as well as Moscow rethink the foundations of their respective policies, its partition can be expected to continue apace.

The Improbability of Trump's Election

To believe that Putin interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election in order to help elect Donald Trump is also to believe, at least implicitly, that Putin thought that Trump had a sufficiently good chance to win and that dedicated outside intervention could tip the scales in his favor. How plausible is this premise?

With very rare exceptions, experienced American academic experts, journalists and political operatives thought that Hillary Clinton would become the 45th president and that the election would not be close.[2] As political journalists Jonathan Allen and Amy Parnes have written, "…[I]t was hard to find serious election analysts who were predicting a Trump victory."[3] Consider the evidence:

A. Professor Larry Sabato of the University of Virginia, who directs the historically reliable "Crystal Ball," predicted that Hillary Clinton would win 322 electoral votes (the threshold to win is 270) four days before the election.[4]

B. *The New York Times* calculated the probability of a Clinton victory at 93% (more than 14:1) just two weeks before the election.[5]

C. ABC's political analyst Matthew Dowd gave Clinton a 95% chance of winning (20:1).[6]

D. Hilary Clinton was so confident of winning Wisconsin's 10 electoral votes that she never set foot there as the candidate during the campaign.[7] (She lost there.)

E. The Obama Administration made little mention of Russian interference during the campaign: by all accounts, President Obama was so sure that Clinton would

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2 Both Allan Lichtman of Georgetown University and Helmut Norpoth of Stony Brook University predicted Trump's victory. "Professor Predicted Trump Win…," *cnn.politics*, November 16, 2016, at: www.edition.cnn.com; "Stony Brook PoliSci Professor Predicted Trump Victory," *Stony Brook University News*, November 9, 2016, at: www.news.stony-brook.edu.

3 Jonathan Allen and Amie Parnes, *Shattered. Inside Hillary Clinton's Doomed Campaign* (New York: Crown, 2017), p. 369.

4 "Larry J. Sabato's Crystal Ball » Our Final 2016 picks," *Centerforpolitics.org*., November 7, 2016.

5 *The New York Times*, October 23, 2016, at: @nytimes. On Election Day itself, the "Upshot" section of the *Times* lowered its estimate of Clinton's chances to 85%: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/upshot/presidential-polls-forecast.html.

6 Time Haines, "Matthew Dowd: Clinton Has 95% Chance to Win…," *RealClearPolitics, November 6, 2016, at: www.realclearpolitics.com*.

7 *Shattered., op. cit.,* p.368.

       win and win big that he did not want to say or do anything that might diminish her expected mandate, which would crown his own political legacy.[8]

F.   Wikileaks' Julian Assange, who would play a major role in disseminating Clinton-related e-mail traffic, was initially motivated not to help Trump, whom he gave at most a 25% chance of winning, but rather Bernie Sanders against Hillary Clinton.[9]

G.   Trump's own campaign manager, polling expert Kelly Anne Conway, gave Trump no more than a 29% chance of victory; she was also heard to say on Election Day, after seeing the first exit polls, "We're going to be wiped out!"[10]

H.   David Plouffe, who managed Barack Obama's two successful campaigns for president, gave Hillary Clinton a 100% chance of winning when confronted with the five most plausible scenarios for a Trump victory.[11]

I.   Finally, Trump himself seemed to have been astonished that he actually won.[12]

How, under these circumstances, can we imagine Putin concluding that Trump's chances were good enough to justify a provocative intervention on his behalf? To be sure, Putin has a long record of taking bold and even risky decisions. For instance, his decision to wage total war in Chechnya in September 1999 was taken against the advice of every previous prime minister of Russia, whom he consulted in council.[13] The seizure of Crimea in March 2014 and the military intervention in Syria's civil war in late September 2015 were comparably bold moves. Yet in each of these cases, among others, Putin assessed risks and probabilities carefully and above all took care—consistent with his mastery of judo—not to become overextended. As a self-styled realist devoid of ideological obsessions, there is no record of Putin (unlike, say, a Khrushchev) taking major risks for improbabilities. How was Putin to conclude that Trump's election was anything other than such an improbability? It is therefore unsurprising that the Mueller Report found no evidence of criminal conspiracy between the Trump campaign and the Russian government: if Moscow was not in fact trying to help elect Trump, then *ipso facto* Trump could not have conspired with Russia to get elected.

Still, the Mueller Report, as well as several heads of Obama Administration intelligence agencies, concluded that Putin's government *did* try to help elect Trump. Indeed, there appears to be a general bipartisan (if unexamined) consensus on this point in the United States. The pattern of Russian interference via Facebook and other social media is not, however, easily compatible with this thesis.

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8 Obama told Clinton on election eve, "You've got this." As cited in the *Daily Mail* (UK), September 6, 2017, 10:34 EDT, at: www.dailymail.uk.

9 *The Mueller Report,* p. 45. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/politics/read-the-mueller-report/.

10 Private knowledge, conveyed on a not-for-attribution basis.

11 "David Plouffe on Why Donald Trump Can't Get to 270," *Bloomberg Politics*, September 27, 2016, accessible on Youtube.

12 "Trump was Shocked that He Won," *Taegan Goddard's Political Wire*, November 10, 2016, 7:21 a.m., at: www.politicalwire.com.

13 Roy Medvedev, *Vladimir Putin: Chetyre goda v kremle* [Vladimir Putin: Four Years in the Kremlin] (Moscow: Vremya, 2004), p. 103.

The Pattern of Russian Involvement on Social Media

Neither the scale nor scope of Russian-origin social media involvement in the 2016 U.S. presidential election can be reconciled with the thesis that the aim of such activities was the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president. According to testimony from Facebook executives under oath before the U.S. Congress, as well as the Mueller Report, the total value of Russian Facebook ads placed for political purposes during *and after* the 2016 U.S. presidential election amounted to $100,000. That compares with more than $81 million spent on such ads by both the Democratic and Republican campaigns, a ratio of 810:1. So the Russian effort, such as it was, was faint. Moreover, these ads were placed *before* Trump became a plausible candidate for president (as early as September 2015, when common odds were 18:1 against him being elected president) as well as *after* he was elected (56% of those viewing such ads saw them after November 4, 2016).[14] A further 25% of Russian Facebook ads were not seen by anyone. Therefore: well over half of Russian-based Facebook political posts during the electoral campaign could not by design have had any effect on Trump's electoral prospects. When we subtract the 81% of Russian-origin posts that were either seen after the election or by no one at all, the ratio of Democratic and Republican posts to Russian posts balloons to some 3,000:1. In addition, nearly all of the Russian Facebook postings were paid in rubles, not dollars, and thus easily traceable. In other words, this was not a surreptitious campaign designed to avoid detection, a prerequisite if the aim was to actually help elect Trump. Instead, the character of Russian Facebook postings appears to have been indifferent to its specific electoral effects.

So much for the scale of the Russian effort. What about its scope?

Restricting our discussion to Russian-origin Facebook postings: if the aim of such postings was to help elect Trump president, we would expect to see a pattern of placements intended to enhance Trump's chances of obtaining the 270 electoral college votes needed to win. In other words, we should expect to see Russian efforts focused on the key battleground states, where small margins might make a big difference in Trump's chances. But we do not see this. Again according to testimony from Facebook executives, of the $100,000 spent in Russian-origin political ads from September 2015 through November 2016, Russians committed scarce resources to three key battleground states as follows:

Wisconsin (10 electoral votes):	$ 1,979
Michigan (16 electoral votes):	$ 823
Pennsylvania (20 such votes, the 5th highest in the country):	$ 300[15]

If all three states—which were very narrowly decided--had gone for Clinton instead of Trump, or even if just Michigan and Pennsylvania had gone the other way, then Hillary Clinton would now be president of the United States. Yet in such crucial states, in which Trump appeared to be losing until Election Day itself, Russian-origin Facebook ads amounted to just 3.1% of the total. The thesis that such interventions had the aim of electing Trump is

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14 Mueller Report, pp. 24-26.

15 *The Washington Post,* July 9, 2017, at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/09/07_russian...

thus not compatible with either their size or distribution across the electoral map. Finally, detailed analysis of the 2016 election returns examining a range of demographic, partisan and historical factors indicates no apparent Russian influence on the outcome;[16] if Putin was not in fact trying to help elect Trump, this should not be surprising.

The pattern that is instead revealed is of a scattershot messaging, designed to inflame the extremes of the American political spectrum rather than influence potential crossover voters in swing states. By portraying Hillary Clinton as a kind of anti-Christ and without any specific focus on the dynamics of the Electoral College, Russian Facebook postings could not by their nature be expected to influence the outcome of the election. Indeed, the Mueller Report cites three pro-Trump rallies in New York City (where Trump would lose to Clinton 60% to 33%) that Russian agencies were allegedly involved in as evidence of Russian intentions![17] No doubt, individual (and incompetent) Russian agents of various kinds were trying to show Moscow their value in trying to stir up pro-Trump sentiment: but in New York City, a Democratic stronghold? Rather, if we look at the overall pattern of such interventions: by attempting to inflame passions without plausible electoral intent, they seem aimed at highlighting unattractive aspects of the American political system, thereby helping to undermine the impact of U.S. "soft power" at a time when Putin was plotting his own reelection campaign (for March 2018) and thus highly sensitive to expected pressure from what appeared certain to be the incoming Hilary Clinton Administration.

The Pattern of Russian-Origin Hacking

Russian hacking and dissemination of Democratic Party e-mail traffic is also consistent with this interpretation.

According to the Mueller Report, attempts by Russian military intelligence to penetrate Democratic Party computer systems began on March 10, 2015, well before Trump could be considered a plausible candidate for president and just a week after *The New York Times* reported that Hillary Clinton had been using a private e-mail server as Secretary of State.[18] In September 2015, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) was warned by the FBI that foreign entities were attempting to hack its computer systems; again, well before Trump could be imagined to be a serious candidate for the Republican nomination, not to mention the presidency. The DNC ignored this warning.[19]

Breaching DNC firewalls was not a technically difficult task: for instance, DNC Chair John Podesta used the following security sequence for his Windows 8 operating system:

Login ID: jpodesta
Password: p@ssw0rd

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16 Alan I. Abramowicz, "Did Russian Interference Affect the 2016 Election Results?" *Sabato's Crystal Ball*, vol. XVII, no. 30 (August 2019).

17 Mueller Report, p. 31.

18 *The New York Times*, March 2, 2015; Mueller Report, p. 37.

19 "Sources: U.S. Officials Warned DNC of Hack Months Before the Party Acted," *CNN Politics*, July 26, 2016, at: http://cnn.com/2017/07/25/politics/democratic-convention-dnc-emails-russia/index.html.

Podesta also used the following password for his e-mails: "runner4567" (his hobby was running).[20] (Russian-origin hackers also tried to penetrate Republican Party sites but were unsuccessful and apparently soon gave up in light of their higher levels of security.)[21]

Very likely, not only Russian but many other intelligence agencies and even private actors proved able to hack or otherwise compromise DNC computer networks. Since the DNC never allowed the U.S. government to examine its servers directly—a contractor hired by the DNC gave the government a summary of its findings instead—there are strict limits to what may be concluded about who (or even how many) hacked DNC systems or even whether hacking was required to give Wikileaks access to the treasure trove of DNC e-mail traffic that Julian Assange published during the election campaign.[22] What *can* be said with confidence conforms to our thesis that the objective of such Russian interference was not the election of Trump but the neutralization of Hillary Clinton's expected presidency as far as Russian interests were concerned:

A. Russian spear phishing of the DNC began well before Trump could be considered a serious presidential candidate;

B. Russian intelligence clearly also sought to discredit Donald Trump: Russian sources were the backbone, after all, of the salacious—and discredited--report that GPS Fusion (funded indirectly by the DNC) circulated about Trump's time in Moscow (lurid evenings with prostitutes, etc.);

C. As noted, Russian-origin entities also sought to penetrate the computer systems of the Republican National Committee (RNC) but failed;

D. The Democrats' narrative that Trump conspired with Putin to throw the election was agreed within 24 hours of Clinton's defeat, before any evidence could be properly evaluated.[23]

The object of Russian electoral interference as a matter of policy thus could not have been to help elect Trump. Rather, it was to foment embarrassment about the American political system in the eyes of the world and especially of the Russian population at a time when Putin was planning his own reelection. By exposing American hypocrisy, double-standards, and ordinary interest-based political calculations, the Russian aim was to neutralize, insofar as possible, future Clinton-Administration pressure on Putin in the name of democracy, human rights, and high ideals in general, i.e., the basis of American "soft power."

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20 "Assange: Podesta's Password was 'password'," *Townhall*, January 4, 2017, 12 p.m., ET, at: www.townhall.com; Martin Matishak, "How Podesta Became a Cybersecurity Poster Child," *Politico*, October 21, 2016, 05:07 EDT, at: www.politico.com; for the treasure trove of material that the hacking of Podesta's network yielded, see, "The Podesta E Mails," at: www.Wikileaks.org.

21 "RNC Security Foiled Russian Hackers," *The Wall Street Journal*, December 16, 2016, 12:27 a.m. ET, at: www.wsj.com.

22 Mueller Report, pp. 42, 47; Patrick Lawrence, "A New Report Raises Big Questions About Last Year's DNC Hack," *The Nation*, August 9, 2017, at: www.thenation.com.

23 *Shattered., op. cit.*, p. 395.

Rushing to Judgment

On January 6, 2017, the heads of three U.S. intelligence agencies—the CIA, FBI, and National Security Agency (NSA)—issued a brief report in which they claimed not only that Russian government entities had interfered in the 2016 U.S. election but that they did so in order to help elect Donald Trump president.[24] The Mueller Report, though it exonerated Trump and his campaign from criminally conspiring with Russia to affect the election, agreed, as did two outside groups hired by the U.S. Senate. Yet none of these reports attempted any detailed analysis of Russian motives in launching such interference. The Mueller report conspicuously omits any consideration of the role that Russian sources played in attempting to discredit Trump through the GPS Fusion episode and does not cite unsuccessful Russian attempts to hack Republican National Committee computer networks.[25] Moreover, the January 2017 Intelligence report contains mistakes, omissions and references that bear the mark of a rush to political judgment rather than a dispassionate consideration of the breadth of evidence, specific and circumstantial. For instance:

1. Key intelligence agencies were excluded from the enterprise, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the State Department's Bureau of Research and Intelligence, which were known beforehand to be skeptical of the thesis that Putin was aiming to help elect Trump. The DIA in particular believed that Russia's electoral interference should be seen in the context of Russian reaction to U.S. pressure along Russia's historical borderlands, especially in Ukraine. As *New York Times* reporters Scott Shane and Mark Mozzetti put it in a September 2018 article melodramatically (and misleadingly) entitled, "The Plot to Subvert the Election": "But why did Mr. Putin care about the election?…he was seething. The United States, in his view, had bullied and interfered with Russia for long enough. It was high time to fight back….By making mischief in the 2016 election…[he] could highlight the polarized state of American democracy, making it a less appealing model for Russians and their neighbors. And he could send a message that Russia would not submit to a domineering America."[26]

2. The report contained none of the standard qualifications about what was unknown or uncertain; neither did it contain references to dissenters, even in footnotes, thereby violating standard procedure in intelligence reports.

3. The report--issued January 6, 2017--mistakenly identified Aleksei Pushkov as Chair of the Russian Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee: in fact, Pushkov had resigned that post on September 18, 2016, three and a half months earlier. This is yet another indication of a rush to judgment, bypassing intelligence professionals who would ordinarily review such reports for basic factual accuracy.

4. Fully half of the report is given over to republishing a five-year old study of RT TV, the Russian international television station. Such material could not have any bearing on the question of Putin's motives concerning the 2016 U.S. election and seems intended to lend the report more *gravitas* than its substance warrants.

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24 The text of the report, entitled, "Assessing Russian Activities in Recent U.S. Elections," may be found at: https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.

25 *Wall Street Journal*, *op. cit.*

26 *The New York Times,* September 20, 2018.

5. The report cites Russian politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky in support of the thesis that Putin intended to help elect Trump: Zhirinovsky, who plays the loyal clown in Russian politics and who claims that Russia never sold Alaska to the United States, stated in August 2016 that he would be overjoyed if Trump won. No doubt. But how does this relate to the question of Putin's motives? Above all, how was Putin to conclude that Trump's chances were good enough to warrant backing him?

6. Finally, while the CIA and FBI directors expressed "high confidence" in their assessment that Putin was aiming to elect Trump, the NSA director, without giving further explanation, qualified his confidence on this point as "moderate." Translated from the jargon of the U.S. intelligence community: "I could well be wrong."

In sum, the case that Putin interfered in the election in order to elect Trump has been asserted rather than argued. Our review of the widely accepted improbability of Trump's electoral chances; the small-scale and scattershot character of Russian interventions on social media (and relatedly, persuasive evidence that Russian efforts had no appreciable effect on the election); the shaky evidentiary basis presented by those claiming Putin tried to turn the election in Trump's favor; as well as the Mueller Report's conclusion that there was no criminal electoral conspiracy between the Trump campaign and Russia—call into serious question the most widely accepted interpretation of Russian motives. A much more persuasive explanation focuses on the ways in which the trajectory of American-Russian relations, specifically, the almost hydraulic U.S. geopolitical pressure along Russia's historical borderlands, framed Putin's incentives faced with the seeming inevitability of Hillary Clinton's election as president. This requires moving beyond partisan lenses and inherited stereotypes in order to reconstruct the ways in which the interaction of the United States and Russia over many years could make Russian interference in U.S. elections a rational choice from Moscow's point of view.

An Alternative Explanation of Putin's Motives: The Dynamics of Russian-American Relations

Every Russian attempt to forge a post-cold war partnership with the United States has failed. The Yeltsin-Clinton alliance of the 1990s collapsed under the weight of Russian socio-economic disintegration and NATO expansion, culminating in NATO's war against Russia's client state Serbia in 1999. Putin himself twice tried to establish such a relationship with Washington, based on U.S. recognition of Russia as an equal in global security affairs and Russia's primacy along its historical borderlands. These also failed: First, in the wake of the successful U.S.-Russian alliance to unseat the Taliban and destroy al-Qaeda in the fall of 2001, as the U.S. abandoned the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, invaded Iraq and encouraged Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO. The Russia-Georgia war of August 2008 was Putin's attempt to push back and draw a red line against further NATO expansion toward Russia's frontiers. Second, beginning in the spring of 2011, Putin concluded that the Obama-Russia "reset" could not satisfy Moscow's global and regional interests:

(a) NATO promoted a massively destabilizing regime change in Libya, in spite of formal U.S. assurances to Russia to the contrary (as the price of securing Russian abstention in the U.N. Security Council for such intervention)—this experience

played a formative role in shaping Putin's resistance to any U.S. or NATO role in the subsequent civil war in Syria;

(b) by late 2011-early 2012, the U.S. government, led by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, publicly castigated Putin for the obvious manipulation of the December 2011 Russian parliamentary elections—the newly arrived U.S. Ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, immediately reinforced this criticism as he engaged in positive Twitter exchanges with Russian street protestors, inviting them to his residence just days after assuming his post;[27]

(c) in October 2012, the Russian government banned the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which had been providing counsel and tools for civil society agency in Russia, from operating in the country, seeing it as a Trojan horse for U.S. interference in Russian politics;

(d) in late 2012, after Russia had been admitted into the World Trade Organization with the help of the Obama Administration, the U.S. Congress passed a veto-proof human rights bill that sanctioned a series of Russians close to Putin: in retaliation, the Russian government in December 2012 passed a law forbidding U.S. citizens from adopting Russian orphans.[28]

It was in this atmosphere that the eventual Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney declared Russia to be the "number one geopolitical threat" facing the United States.[29] By summer 2013, then, *before* the onset of the Ukraine crisis, Russian-American relations lay in a state of virtual ruin. Putin's refusal to extradite U.S. defector Edward Snowden that summer reflected his belief that there was simply nothing to hope for in the relationship. In reply, Obama cancelled a summit meeting with Putin planned for September 2013.[30]

Relatedly, in seeking to create a broad-based Eurasian Union including Ukraine, Putin had evidently abandoned any hope that Russia could realize its chief global and regional objectives in partnership with the Western world. If Russia wished to staunch the loss of its power and influence, not to mention "get it back," as U.S. Secretary of State designate Rex Tillerson then put it, it would have to do so on its own. The subsequent denouement of the Ukraine crisis, culminating in the collapse of the Russian-backed Yanukovich government; its replacement by a Russophobic, pro-NATO ministry; the Russian annexation of Crimea, fomenting revolt throughout eastern Ukraine and the subsequent imposition of serious economic, financial and technological sanctions against Russia by the United States and its European allies—completed the ruination of Russian-Western, and especially Russian-American relations.

While Putin bore a special animus toward Hillary Clinton—who publicly attacked Putin in late 2011 and 2012 and once even compared the policies of Putin (who lost numerous

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27 Angela Stent, *The Limits of Partnership. U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century* (Princeton University Press, 2015), pp. 245-46.

28 *Ibid.*, pp. 217-306.

29 In an interview with CNN on March 26, 2012, at: http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/26/romney-russia-is-our-number-one-geopolitical-foe/.

30 Stent, *op. cit.*, pp. 269-71.

family members in World War II) to those of Hitler[31]—his core concern was that the United States and its allies, or indirectly NGOs funded by their governments or affiliated foundations, would work with the Russian opposition to undermine Putin's government at home and Russian allies abroad, all in the name of "democratization," "human rights," "Western values," etc. U.S. reaction to the December 2011 Russian parliamentary elections reinforced this point. (As noted, within the year, USAID would be ousted from Russia.) How was Putin to take the public statement by President Obama in October 2014 that the three most dangerous threats facing the United States were: Ebola (to be eradicated), ISIS (to be annihilated), and Russia (?).[32] Keeping in mind that Hillary Clinton ran for President on the theme of continuity, i.e., that her presidency would be tantamount to Obama's third term, Putin had defensible grounds to conclude (1) that Clinton was almost certain to be elected president (as discussed above), and (2) that she would initiate a campaign of political pressure on Putin and his political system in the name of democracy at a time when he was planning his own reelection. (Clinton would have been inaugurated on January 20, 2017; the Russian presidential election was scheduled for March 18, 2018.)

Our conclusion, then, is that insofar as Russian policy is concerned, Moscow's interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election was not based on trying to help elect Trump but instead to neutralize expected efforts by an expected Clinton presidency to pressure Putin and his clients, at home and abroad. Inside Russia, the primary aim was to insulate Putin's system from U.S. pressure. Outside Russia, the chief goal was to ensure that countries like Ukraine not fall into a pro-Western, anti-Russian economic, political and security orbit. In sum, it is the context of U.S.-Russian relations over many years that best explains Russian motives for Moscow's fateful electoral interventions, not the issue of which candidate Putin preferred.

Concluding Thoughts

If our analysis is correct, then the main implication for U.S. policy is not how best to secure the 2020 U.S. elections against Russian electoral interference but instead to reexamine the relationship between Washington and Moscow so as to reduce the incentives for such behavior. Ironically, with Trump unexpectedly winning, Russian-origin involvement in the 2016 U.S. elections backfired badly: the bipartisan backlash that it triggered has effectively tied Trump's hands as far as Russia policy is concerned. If there is a consensus point in U.S. politics today, it is that there can be no movement in U.S.-Russian relations so long as Putin rules Russia; indeed, this is proving to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Some problems, however, may not wait that long.

For instance, the United States government continues to maintain that Ukraine and (Georgia) "will" one day join NATO.[33] However improbable or long-term such an eventuality might be, no Russian government could afford to ignore this. It is just 400 miles between

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31 Adam O'Neal, "Hilary Clinton Compares Putin to Hitler," *RealClearPolitics,* March 5, 2014, at: www.realclearpolitics.com.

32 *Daily Mail* (UK), October 8, 2014, at: www.dailymail.co.uk.

33 As stated in the NATO communique of April 3, 2008; cited in Stent, *op. cit*., p. 167. See also Ronald D. Asmus, *The Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 111-140.

Moscow and the northeast border of Ukraine, along flat steppe land that no general in the world could devise a plausible defensive scenario for. The United States is thus, in effect, providing Moscow with incentives to take offensive action to protect its interests along the Russian-Ukrainian borderlands. Consider also that, while Ukraine is not and may never become a formal member of NATO, Ukraine's relations with NATO are fast assuming the character of a strategic partnership:

(a) the United States has been training Ukrainian army units in the Lviv region and, under the Trump Administration, has begun the delivery of lethal weaponry to the Ukraine's armed forces; U.S. military aid to Ukraine amounted to $250 million in 2019;[34]
(b) Ukrainian soldiers are based in Lublin, Poland (a NATO member), serving under Polish command;
(c) Ukrainian units have served in Iraq under Polish command;
(d) a Ukrainian battalion trained by NATO forces in Ukraine was recently certified NATO-compatible;
(e) some of those soldiers, upon certification, went immediately to the front in eastern Ukraine to combat Russian-backed rebel forces.[35]

It is difficult to see how Putin's government, or any likely alternative to it, can accept the logic of Ukraine's de facto integration into NATO. By pursuing policies toward Ukraine that assume that the country must be in the exclusive orbit of Russia or the West, Russia and the West have been pushing Ukraine—with its numerous East-West fault lines—toward partition. Indeed, this has already begun, with the Russian annexation of Crimea and the secession, backed by Moscow, of far eastern Ukraine from Kiev's jurisdiction. To preclude further partition, not to mention a direct U.S.-Russian confrontation over Ukraine, U.S. national security elites will have to address an issue that their Russophobia—reinforced by Moscow's ineffectual electoral interventions—precludes them from admitting: i.e., that Ukraine cannot be stabilized without Russia's agreement. Simply stating this obvious point underscores how improbable it is that either Washington or Moscow will soon reevaluate policies that have led to the current dangerous impasse. As far as Russia is concerned, its leaders need to take Ukraine's sovereignty seriously, or they risk creating a kind of continental, anti-Russian "Cuba" on their most sensitive western borderlands. As for Washington, how long will it take for American leaders to realize that providing a power like Russia with nothing to hope for and much to fear is a recipe for impasse at best and war at worst?

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34 Brett Forrest, "U.S. Aims to Block Chinese Acquisition of Ukrainian Aerospace Company," *Wall Street Journal*, August 23, 2019, 05:08 EDT, at: www.wsj.com.
35 NATO, "Relations with Ukraine," April 6, 2019, at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.html; also: https://nato.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-nato/Partnership; and "NATO Soldiers Train Ukrainian Paratroopers," June 29, 2018, at: www.en.hromadske.ua.

Information disorder and What Ukraine is Doing About It.
Analysis of Ukraine's Policies and Actions to Combat Russia-Generated information disorder

Tetiana Poliak-Grujić

Abstract

It is a conventional wisdom that information is power, but even more power lies in the manner in which it is (mis)used. Disinformation, misinformation, malinformation, all parts of so called 'information disorder', are phenomena that seem to be wreaking havoc worldwide nowadays. The emergence of the Internet and social media has brought fundamental changes to the way information is produced, communicated and distributed and thus has given new momentum to the phenomenon of 'information disorder'. Its effects, in combination with online technologies, are proving to be devastating: it destabilizes public discourse, undermines general belief in democratic institutions and threatens national, international and civilian security.

Based on a theoretical analysis approach, the paper will look into the nature of the 'information disorder', and how the Internet and social media contribute to its growing influence. It will also examine what are the effects of the phenomenon, and how it threatens national and international security. With Russia arguably being the most aggressive in spreading disinformation nowadays, and Ukraine being the country affected by Russia's information offensive the most, the paper will try to analyze Ukraine's policies and actions to combat Russia-generated 'information disorder'. In the conclusion, the paper will make an effort to suggest recommendations on tackling negative informing.

Introduction

It is a conventional wisdom that information is power, but even more power lies in the manner in which it is (mis)used. Disinformation, misinformation, malinformation, all

parts of so-called information disorder,[1] are phenomena that seem to be wreaking havoc worldwide nowadays. Internet and social media have become instrumental in spreading information disorder. In combination with online technologies, information disorder destabilizes public discourse, undermines general belief in democratic institutions,[2] and threatens both national and international security.

Ukraine is not an exception to the current trends in the realm of information and this is where a significant part of Russian aggression in 2014 lies. Though Russia's attempts to disrupt Ukrainian information space go years back,[3] it is the events of 2014 (*i.e.*, the annexation of Crimea and military intervention in Donbas) that triggered Ukraine's reinvigoration to address such informational threats. In particular, the national legal framework has been complemented with a number of relevant legal acts,[4] educational programs that teach how to recognize information manipulation have been implemented,[5] and many fact-checking and debunking initiatives have been created.[6]

Based on a theoretical analysis approach, this paper will look into the nature of the information disorder, and how the Internet and social media contribute to its growing influence. It will also examine what the effects of the phenomenon on security worldwide are. The case of Russia vs. Ukraine will be presented in order to look into Russian tactics to destabilize Ukraine by information warfare. It will also make an effort to analyze Ukraine's policies and actions to combat Russia-generated information disorder. In conclusion, recommendations to tackle negative informing will be suggested.

1. Information disorder. General overview

Information manipulation has been a feature of history long before modern standards that require communicating news impartially were established. However, in the 21st century societies are facing an unprecedented level of information misuse and jugglery. New technologies make it extremely simple to fabricate and manipulate the content, as well as amplify it via social networks of uncritical population, once obtruded by interested entities, groups or individuals.[7]

In their report for the Council of Europe, Wardle and Derakhshan (2017) have comprehensively scrutinized modern information disorder and introduced a new conceptual framework for examining it. According to them, information disorder is a complex con-

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1 C. Wardle and H. Derakhshan, 'Information disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policy making', *Council of Europe*, 2017, p. 5, https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-researc/168076277c, (accessed 15 March 2019).

2 H. Farrell and B. Schneier, 'The Most Damaging Election Disinformation Campaign Came From Donald Trump, Not Russia', *Vice*, [website], 2018, para. 11, https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/mbyg3x/the-most-damaging-election-disinformation-campaign-came-from-donald-trump-not-russia, (accessed 7 March 2019).

3 Y. Magda, *Hybrid War: To Survive and To Win*, Kharkiv, Vivat Publishing, 2015, p. 5.

4 *Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine*, [website], 2019, https://mip.gov.ua/content/pro-ministerstvo.html, (accessed 29 March 2019).

5 Wardle and Derakhshan, 'Information disorder', p. 70.

6 Wardle and Derakhshan, p. 89.

7 C. Ireton and J. Posetti (eds.), *Journalism, Fake News and Disinformation. Handbook for Journalism Education and Training*, Paris, UNESCO, 2018, p. 15. Available from: UNESDOC Digital Library, (accessed 21 March 2019).

cept which consists of *disinformation*, *misinformation* and *malinformation*, all distinguished based on the dimensions of their harm and falseness.[8]

More specifically, *disinformation* is the false information that is deliberately created to harm a person, social group, organization or country (*i.e.*, fake, imposter, manipulated, fabricated content).[9] It is designed to confuse or manipulate people through delivering untruthful information to them and using a wide range of tactics like hacking or compromising individuals or institutions.[10] *Misinformation* is also the information that is inaccurate, however, created and disseminated without intention to cause harm. It rather has to do with false connection or misleading content. *Malinformation*, in its turn, is the content based on reality, but specifically used to harm a person, organization or country, and include leaks, harassment and hate speech.[11]

All of these types of messages mainly serve to distort domestic or foreign political sentiment, frequently in order to achieve strategic or geopolitical outcome. Due to the abundance and easy access to the relevant technical tools, the creation (development) of such messages, their (re)production and distribution have become easy to complete. The large variety of such messages, agents that create and distribute them, and recipients that interpret them add to the amplification of the trending discourse.[12]

Although all three phenomena are a problem to a society, it is disinformation that seems to be particularly dangerous. Typically, there are organized efforts and vast resources behind it, which in combination with modern automated technology makes it extremely challenging to tackle. The proliferators of disinformation exploit the vulnerability and ideological disposition of recipients and engage them as amplifiers or multipliers of their messages that are designed to captivate, taking advantage of people's proneness to share such information. People who has limited access to independent and non-partisan news media are specifically vulnerable to information disorder, including disinformation.[13]

Another term that needs to be mentioned in the context of information disorder is propaganda. Though the two notions are not synonymous, propaganda usually goes hand in hand with disinformation that often serves the interests of the former. Propaganda tends to be more evidently manipulative, as it thrives on emotional rather than informational messaging.[14]

1.1 New realities of the information disorder: Internet and social media

Mixed blessings, the Internet and social media, have taken the attempts to influence people's minds and actions, overwhelmingly in a malevolent way, to the next level. Their emergence has brought fundamental changes to the way information is produced, communicated and distributed, and easy access to the technology has made it easier than

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8 Wardle and Derakhshan, 'Information disorder', pp. 4-5.
9 Wardle and Derakhshan, p. 20.
10 Ireton and Posetti, *Journalism, Fake News and Disinformation*, p. 7.
11 Wardle and Derakhshan, 'Information disorder', p. 20.
12 Wardle and Derakhshan, p. 11.
13 Ireton and Posetti, *Journalism, Fake News and Disinformation*, pp. 7-8.
14 Ireton and Posetti, p. 47.

ever for anyone to take part in these processes. These factors have given new momentum to the phenomenon of information disorder.[15]

Social technology has created a mass of challenges worldwide. An infinite number of content types, techniques to bolster malicious information, and platforms that host such content, have brought information pollution to the global scale.[16] The variety of actors who produce and amplify information disorder online is nearly endless and include trolls, bots, fake-news websites, conspiracy theorists, politicians, highly partisan media outlets, the mainstream media, and foreign governments.[17] Such a situation creates fertile ground for the information disorder to go viral and is impossible to pull back.[18]

Social media are essentially driven by sharing emotional content and exploiting the vulnerabilities that derive from people's cognitive and social biases. Due to the super-charged speed of information dissemination, it has become more difficult for people to judge the credibility of information, making it less likely to be challenged.[19] A flood of thousands of messages adversely affects a user's ability to perceive information critically.[20]

These circumstances create a favored setting for undemocratic regimes to use social media and Internet to their ends using a whole range of means to mislead societies even more. Special information operations, dissemination of propaganda, the creation of fake news and manipulative messages[21] are tactics that serve to spread "information warfare" online in order to affect both internal and external public.[22]

1.2 Information disorder and its effects

Being at the early stage of understanding the implications of information disorder, it is rather difficult to quantify its direct and indirect impacts, as well as long-term consequences.[23] However, the effects of information disorder, in combination with online technologies, are already proving to be devastating.

Disinformation has played a prominent role in shaping electoral results in modern and well-established democracies, thus undermining the trust in democratic institutions and systems.[24] Disinformation campaigns also became a perfect tool for sowing mistrust and confusion in the societies. A wide variety of conflicting messages in the media create an impression with the audiences that there are many versions of events, thus making it

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15 Wardle and Derakhshan, 'Information disorder', p. 11.

16 Wardle and Derakhshan, p. 4.

17 J. A. Tucker et al., 'Social Media, Political Polarization, and Political Disinformation: A Review of the Scientific Literature', *SSRN*, 2018, p. 22, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3144139, (accessed 10 June 2019).

18 Ireton and Posetti, *Journalism, Fake News and Disinformation*, p. 59.

19 Wardle and Derakhshan, 'Information disorder', pp. 11-13.

20 A. Babak et al., *Words and Wars. Ukraine Facing Kremlin Propaganda*, Kyiv, KIC, 2017, p. 62. Available from: https://ukraineworld.org/, (accessed 10 April 2019).

21 Babak, p. 62.

22 Tucker et al., 'Social Media, Political Polarization, and Political Disinformation', p. 28.

23 Wardle and Derakhshan, 'Information disorder', p. 4.

24 European Broadcasting Union, 'Position Paper. 'Fake News' and the Information Disorder', *European Broadcasting Union Publications*, 2018, p. 6, https://www.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/Position%20 papers/EBU-Position-EN-Fake_News_Disinformation-18.04.2018.pdf, (accessed 28 June 2019).

nearly impossible to find way around towards the truth.[25] Instead, people tend to take as credible any information that circulates in their social networks, or echo chambers, and which agrees with their hearts, rather than minds.[26] As a result, citizens struggle to distinguish between truth and falsehood, and the intentionally misleading content affects their understanding of reality, as well as undermines trust, informed dialogue, mutual consent, and political participation in the societies.[27] Besides, information disorder create new or sharpen existing societal or political divisions, taking advantage of nationalistic, ethnic, cultural or religious tensions,[28] leads to the growing sense of panic and disappointment.[29] The most harrowing impact of information disorder is a full-blown violence, resulting in deaths of people worldwide, *e.g.*, in Ukraine,[30] India,[31] Myanmar,[32] Ethiopia.[33]

2. Harnessing information disorder. The case of Russia vs. Ukraine

Ukraine has been subject to Russian information offensive for years, or even decades now.[34] This is coherent with the fact that modern Russia increasingly regards information in the context of power and security, rather than, for example, in that of human rights. It means that information has become an instrument of domination and war, as Russian information policy grows to be aggressive, militarized, charged with hate speech and antagonism. Moreover, information warfare has become a military and foreign policy priority in Russia. Russian official documents and information activities prove it.[35]

Russian disinformation's distinguishing feature is a lack of reality, as it is either half-truth or based on complete falsehood.[36] It is cleverly targeted, technically adept, cynically fact-free, enjoyable and emotionally engaging. In this new information sphere where nothing is true, everything is equally believable.[37]

Instead of holding back information, Russia frequently floods Ukrainian media with it, providing an overwhelming amount of content about a single event skillfully blended with

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25 Wardle and Derakhshan, 'Information disorder', p. 30.

26 Ireton and Posetti, *Journalism, Fake News and Disinformation*, p. 9.

27 Ireton and Posetti, p. 33-36.

28 Wardle and Derakhshan, 'Information disorder', p. 4.

29 Magda, *Hybrid War*, p. 285.

30 K. Mashovets, 'Timeline of the Events in Donbas: From Meetings to Tanks', *Informational-Analytical Center of the National Security of Ukraine*, [website], 2014, para 15 etc., http://mediarnbo.org/2014/10/18/hronika-viyni-na-donbasi-vid-mitingiv/, (accessed 5 June 2019).

31 R. Kumar, 'The growing tide of fake news in India', *Al Jazeera*, [website], 2017, para. 13 etc., https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/growing-tide-fake-news-india-171210122732217.html, (accessed 5 June 2019).

32 A. Subedar, 'The country where Facebook posts whipped up hate', *BBC Trending*, [website], 2018, para. 2 etc., https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-45449938, (accessed 5 June 2019).

33 A. Lime, 'A year in fake news in Africa', *BBC*, [website], 2018, para. 1 etc., https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46127868, (accessed 5 June 2019).

34 Magda, *Hybrid War*, p. 280.

35 A. Kulakov et al., *To Tame a Hydra: How to Resist Kremlin's Information Aggression*, Kyiv, Internews Ukraine/ Ukraine World, 2018, pp. 4-18. Available from: Civic Synergy Publications, (accessed 8 April 2019).

36 Babak et al., *Words and Wars*, pp. 90-91.

37 E. Lucas and P. Pomeranzev, 'Winning the Information War. Techniques and Counter-strategies to Russian Propaganda in Central and Eastern Europe', CEPA Reports, 2016, pp. 9-17, https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=2715, (accessed 8 April 2019).

disinformation. Such media campaigns stimulate strong emotions, promote a culture of fear, and create panic.[38] Russian information warfare, as part of the information-psychological war, seeks to keep the audience hooked and distracted, passive and paranoid, instead of agitating them into action. It is a tactic used to disorganize and demoralize an opponent.[39]

Russian disinformation campaigns are easily spread. As seen in Ukraine, the initial outlet is unimportant; the point is for many nominally independent organizations to run a story so that it is eventually repeated by outlets that have no connection to Russia and appear, at least to some readers, to be real.[40] Moreover, Russia technically ensures that certain messages reach specific audiences and others do not (*i.e.*, by controlling TV and radio towers, mobile phone operators etc.).[41]

The Kremlin's approach to disinformation in Ukraine entails simultaneous activities on multiple fronts. The primary one is distribution of internal Russian narratives via official Russian-speaking media, proxy-media that are Russia-funded or pro-Russian, and Russian information agencies. Additionally, there are fake non-governmental organizations, networks of Russian security services agents, pro-Russian experts and politicians who participate in diverse conferences and meetings promoting Russian narratives that serve the purpose of disinformation.[42]

In the cases when the suspicion clearly falls on the Russian Federation, it immediately proposes an array of theories, apart from those that are true.[43] Also, to disguise or justify its actions Russia develops a specific narrative and steers it in the necessary direction.[44] In addition, it uses Ukraine's pressure points, such as decreasing standards of living, ongoing war in Donbas, lack of reforms, protest moods among population, or the Orthodox Church.[45]

The tactics Russia uses for its information operations in Ukraine are highly flexible. It employs the attainments of democratic societies, such as diversity of opinions, or technological achievements, however, for opposite ends: own leverage, power and dominance.[46]

The "provocation" message within the Ukrainian context suggests a narrative of the West provoking Russia to defend itself. As a result, the offender becomes the victim and the victim is accused of starting the conflict. The narrative of "humanitarian catastrophe" was developed as a subtle (?) deception scheme to conceal the presence of Russian armed forces in Donbas. It provided a convenient cover for supplying illegal military groups and Russian regular troops with weapons and ammunition. Another of the Kremlin's "favorite"

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38 V. Sazonov et al., 'Russian Information Campaign Against the Ukrainian State and Defence Forces', *Estonian Military Academy Publications*, 2016, p. 115, https://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Report_infoops_08.02.2017.pdf, (accessed 8 April 2019).
39 Lucas and Pomeranzev, 'Winning the Information War', p. 5.
40 Lucas and Pomeranzev, , p. 17.
41 Sazonov et al., 'Russian Information Campaign', p. 7.
42 Kulakov et al., pp. 11-13.
43 Babak et al., *Words and Wars*, p. 25.
44 Lucas and Pomeranzev, 'Winning the Information War', p. 16.
45 Kulakov et al., *To Tame a Hydra*, p. 20.
46 Kulakov et al., pp. 4-9.

terms that has become official, is "Russophobic". The dismantling of the Second World War monuments in Ukraine was described as "barbaric Russophobic action."[47]

Additionally, specific discourses are added in order to destabilize Ukraine psychologically and to advance a belief that the country is a failed state. This way Russia hopes to destroy both domestic and international support for reforms that would make Kyiv more independent from Moscow. An example that may serve are the narratives (i) about Euromaidan as a coup d'état in which a Western-backed junta seized power from Ukraine's rightful rulers, and (ii) that the emerging democratic regime in Ukraine is "fascist" [48] by spreading myths and narratives related to the Second World War, Stepan Bandera, Ukrainian nationalists of the 1940s, and Nazism.[49] This dual narrative has "cultivated unrest inside the country by sowing enmity among segments of Ukrainian society and confusing the West with waves of disinformation." Against this backdrop "...Russian proxy forces and covert troops launch just enough military offensives to ensure that the Ukrainian government looks weak." This way Russia hopes to radicalize potential supporters in Eastern and Southern Ukraine and discredit the Ukrainian government in the eyes of Europe and NATO.[50]

The Kremlin's disinformation campaign targeting Ukraine uses a wide variety of techniques. It often twists and distorts facts or cover only negative aspects of events.[51] Russia adapts its messages to different audiences, ensuring that its lies are entertaining and emotionally engaging, and incorporates them into a strategic narrative tailored to match the preconceptions and biases of the audiences. To make the content appealing, Russia does not hesitate to fabricate stories entirely, by, for example, manipulating photos and videos depending on needs,[52] or mixing comments, opinions, or facts.[53] Russia also does not hesitate to use corrupt schemes, like mud-slinging or hit pieces.[54]

The Kremlin exploits a multitude of instruments to achieve its disinformation objectives in Ukraine:

1. Russian national television channels (*e.g.*, LifeNews, Russia24, First Channel, NTV, REN TV). Although they are banned in Ukraine, it is possible to watch them via satellite.[55] Actively engaged into Kremlin's information policy towards Ukraine,[56] Russian mass media and information agencies have used their dominance in the Ukrainian media space to spread disinformation about events in Ukraine that happened in 2013-2014, and continue to do so.[57] Rather than informing the audience, their strategy is based on creating information disorder, spreading demotivation

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47 Lucas and Pomeranzev, 'Winning the Information War', p. 16.

48 Lucas and Pomeranzev, p. 15.

49 Sazonov et al., 'Russian Information Campaign', p. 69.

50 Lucas and Pomeranzev, 'Winning the Information War', pp. 15-16.

51 Babak et al., *Words and Wars*, pp. 90-91.

52 Lucas and Pomeranzev, p. 20.

53 Babak et al., *Words and Wars*, p. 24.

54 Kulakov et al., *To Tame a Hydra*, p. 23.

55 Sazonov et al., 'Russian Information Campaign', pp. 102-103.

56 Magda, *Hybrid War,* p. 285.

57 Magda, pp. 38-39.

among population and undermining their trust towards existing social and political institutions;[58]

2. Ukrainian TV channels that support and contribute to Russian anti-Ukrainian narrative (*e.g.*, Inter and Ukraina);

3. Internet resources including traditional online media and social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Odnoklassniki, VKontakte, LiveJournal, LiveInternet, YouTube, RuTube.[59] They actively deploy a multitude of bots and trolls for disinformation and propaganda purposes.[60] The nature of social media allows the Kremlin to work inside "echo chambers", where facts and fact-checkers cannot penetrate. Russian tactics exploit the anonymity, ambiguity, ubiquity and flexibility of the Internet and social media;[61]

4. Ukraine's pro-Russian newspapers (*e.g.*, Kyiv-based Vesti);

5. The separatists' information channels;

6. Russian radio channels that broadcast in Ukraine (*e.g.*, Radio Mayak);

7. Mobile phone operators. The largest mobile operators in Ukraine, such as KyivStar and MTS/Vodafone are under control of Russian capital.[62] As part of the Russian psychological warfare, these operators were used to send disinformative messages to the Ukrainian military and their families in order to spread panic and fear;[63]

8. Loudspeakers and media players used for targeting Ukrainian soldiers in Donbas and influencing their morale;

9. Russian security services agents, as well as pro-Russian activists in Donbass, who support Russian information activities against Ukraine;[64]

10. Ukrainian politicians, whose position is advantageous to the Kremlin.[65]

To summarize, the Kremlin uses a so-called "4D" strategy: dismissing, distorting, distracting, dismaying, which in its turn includes "4F" disinformation campaign: fake news, fake media, fake experts, fake events.[66]

3. Analysis of policies and activities in Ukraine to protect its information space and combat information disorder

Ukraine knows very well what information manipulations are able to invoke. A significant part of Russia's 2014 offensive against it lies in the realm of information, which together with its military actions in Crimea and Donbas makes a grim cocktail called hybrid

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58 Kulakov et al., *To Tame a Hydra*, p. 21.

59 Sazonov et al., 'Russian Information Campaign', pp. 102-103.

60 Tucker et al., 'Social Media, Political Polarization, and Political Disinformation', p. 33.

61 Lucas and Pomeranzev, 'Winning the Information War', pp. 8-10.

62 Sazonov et al., 'Russian Information Campaign', pp. 102-103.

63 Sazonov et al., pp. 105-106.

64 Sazonov et al., 'Russian Information Campaign', pp. 102-103.

65 Babak et al., *Words and Wars*, p. 34.

66 'Best Counter-Propaganda is Truth. Report on the Activities of the Ministry of Information Policy in 2018', *Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine Documents*, 2019, p. 222, https://mip.gov.ua/documents/169.html, (accessed 20 July 2019).

war.[67] Ukraine's reaction to Russian information threats, in particular, has been manifold. A national legal framework has been complemented with a number of acts to counteract the Kremlin's propaganda. Educational programs designed to teach citizens to deal with the information disorder have been implemented. Since March 2014, several dozen voluntary associations have been established to resist Russian information warfare. Furthermore, access to a number of Russian media resources, including TV and social media, has been blocked.

3.1 Legal framework

As a response to the pressing need to react to the existent and potential national security threats, the *Verkhovna Rada* (the Parliament of Ukraine) adopted the Law of Ukraine on Sanctions in August 2014. The law allowed, in particular, to freeze the assets of the Russian media, deny them permission to use Ukrainian radio frequencies, and limit or terminate the telecom services provision or exploitation of the telecom networks of general use.[68] Based on this law, the Council of the National Security and Defense of Ukraine has drawn up, and the President of Ukraine approved by his Decrees, several sanction lists that contain a number of Russian media resources and individuals involved in propaganda, including but not limited to about twenty major Russian TV outlets and online resources.[69] Based on one such Presidential Decree, Ukrainian Internet providers were required to block access to Russian online resources on the sanction lists,[70] and most of them did. However, despite the ban, there are a number of ways to go around it, thus allowing Ukrainian users to continue to use these social media and internet resources.[71]

Promotion of print products has been part of the policy, too. In February 2015, changes to the Tax Code were adopted in order to exempt from taxation the supply and delivery of printed Ukrainian periodicals, as well as production and distribution of Ukrainian books, including electronic ones. In addition, in December 2016 the president of Ukraine signed revisions to several laws related to restricting the distribution of anti-Ukrainian printed pro-

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67 Magda, *Hybrid War*, pp. 4-5.

68 *Law of Ukraine On Sanctions 2014* (Verkhovna Rada) s4, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/main/1644-18, (accessed 3 May 2019).

69 *Decree of the President of Ukraine On the Resolution of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine to Apply Sanctions 2017* (President of Ukraine) s1, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/133/2017, (accessed 3 May 2019); *Resolution of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine to Apply Sanctions 2017* (National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine) s2, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0004525-17#n2, (accessed 3 May 2019); *Decree of the President of Ukraine On the Resolution of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine to Apply and Cancel Sanctions 2018* (President of Ukraine) s1, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/126/2018, (accessed 3 May 2019); *Resolution of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine to Apply and Cancel Sanctions 2018* (National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine) s 2, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0006525-18, (accessed 3 May 2019).

70 *Decree of the President of Ukraine On the Resolution of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine to Apply Sanctions 2017* (President of Ukraine) s1, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/133/2017 (accessed 3 May 2019).

71 I. Rozkladay, 'How Ukraine Tackles Russia's Information Aggression', *Center for Democracy and Rule of Law*, [website], 2018, para. 58, https://cedem.org.ua/analytics/chastyna-2-zakonodavchi-zminy-parlamentu-vprovadzhennya/#, (accessed 10 June 2019).

duction. Also, Russian printed materials now must be licensed by the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine.[72]

February 2015 saw the adoption of the law that prohibited distribution and demonstration, including broadcasting, of films that promote Russian agencies as such of the aggressor state, and films that may contain no such promotion, but are produced by Russian entities after 1 January 2014. The same law provided for a list of individuals who endanger Ukrainian national security to be drawn by the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine based on the references from the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine, Security Service of Ukraine, National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting (the "NCTRB").[73]

Adoption of the decommunization laws in April 2015, despite international outcry, nearly removed the Soviet narrative from the public space,[74] and, thus, certain threats to Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security.[75] Locations named after Soviet figures were renamed, their monuments, as well as Soviet symbols, were removed. Besides, the laws opened access to the security services archives from the period of 1917-1991, which contributed to interrupting Russian narratives related to the Soviet period. Additionally, laws prohibited the propaganda of the communist and Nazi totalitarian regimes.[76]

The Law on the System of Foreign Broadcast of Ukraine, adopted in December 2015, established Ukraine's broadcast abroad, in foreign languages.[77]   A UATV channel was launched with the primary task of offering (primarily) the foreign public objective, unbiased, comprehensive and balanced information about events in Ukraine.[78] A number of foreign cable networks started broadcasting the channel in their countries, while additional efforts were undertaken for transmission in the Donbas and Crimea.[79]

Starting in September 2015, the transparency of media space in Ukraine has seen some enhancement. Initially, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a law that facilitated the process of media ownership disclosure. In January 2016 the media ownership legal framework was further complemented by the NCTRB resolution regarding the procedure of ownership schemes disclosure by the media. Despite certain problematic aspects of this legal framework, it is certainly a step forward in making Ukrainian media space "cleaner" and, thus, less exposed to foreign (Russian) malign interference.[80]

Musical compositions quotas on the radio have become one of the most effective instruments to counteract Russian influence. A relevant law was adopted in June 2016 which

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72 Rozkladay, 'How Ukraine Tackles Russia's Information Aggression', para 110.

73 Rozkladay, para. 65-68.

74 Rozkladay, para. 114.

75 *Law of Ukraine On Condemnation of the Communist and Nazi Totalitarian Regimes in Ukraine and Prohibition of Their Symbolics Propaganda 2015* (Verkhovna Rada) preamble, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/317-19, (accessed 3 April 2019).

76 Rozkladay, 'How Ukraine Tackles Russia's Information Aggression', para. 114.

77 Rozkladay, para. 132.

78 *Law of Ukraine On the System of Foreign Broadcast of Ukraine 2015* (Verkhovna Rada) s6, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/main/856-19, (accessed 14 June 2019).

79 'Best Counter-Propaganda is Truth', p. 146, 176.

80 M. Lytvyn, 'Burning Issues of the Media Legislation of Ukraine', *Yurydychna Gazeta Online*, [website], 2018, para. 19, http://yur-gazeta.com/publications/practice/informaciyne-pravo-telekomunikaciyi/aktualni-problemi-mediazakonodavstva-ukrayini.html, (accessed 7 June 2019).

resulted in an abundance of modern Ukrainian-language songs on the radio. The law became part of the policy to remove Russian content from the Ukrainian information space.[81]

March 2017 saw the adoption of a law on state support of filmmaking in Ukraine, providing for the mechanism of the Ukrainian movie industry financial support and promotion.[82] It resulted in the significant increase in Ukrainian movies produced and distributed both in Ukraine and abroad.[83]

Another quota law was adopted in May 2017 and provided for significant Ukrainian-language quotas on TV. Further on, the law established the obligation to broadcast in Ukrainian movies produced after 1 August 1991, including those for children and cartoons. The movies that were produced before this date are subject to subtitling.[84]

In November 2017 the president of Ukraine approved changes to the Law on Guest Performances. The performances containing, *inter alia*, calls to seize power and dismantle statehood, hate speech, war, separatism, communism and/or Nazi regimes propaganda, were banned. Guest performances that promote Russia as an aggressor state, including its institutions or representatives, create their positive image, support the occupation of Ukrainian territories are also illegal. Moreover, the Security Service of Ukraine now has authority to prevent Russian citizens who are listed as a threat to the national security from participation in such shows.[85]

A new Law on National Security, adopted in June 2018, was another response to Russian aggression. Though it does not explicitly deal with elements of information disorder, it implies the information security of Ukraine, and establishes EU and NATO partnership as of fundamental national interest.[86]

September 2017 saw the adoption of a new Law on Education which, among other things, stipulated even wider use of Ukrainian as the language of education.[87] Another attempt to limit Russian influence resulted in the adoption of the so-called "language law" (the Law of Ukraine "On the Support of Ukrainian as the State Language"). While the law does not apply to private communication and the religious domain, it prescribes obligatory use of Ukrainian in the national and municipal sectors, in the medical, educational, transportation and restaurant spheres, in the mass media, as well as in marketing products and services. At the same time, the Russian language is supposed to ultimately lose its status as the dominant spoken language, in favor of Ukrainian.[88]

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81 Rozkladay, 'How Ukraine Tackles Russia's Information Aggression', para. 74-77.

82 Rozkladay, para. 71.

83 Y. Horban, 'Ukrainian Cinema: 2 Million Tickets Sold and First Great Revenues', *Ukrinform*, [website], 2019, para. 1, 9, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/2625326-ukrainske-kino-2-miljoni-prodanih-kvitkiv-ta-persi-veliki-pributki.html, (accessed 2 August 2019).

84 Rozkladay, 'How Ukraine Tackles Russia's Information Aggression', para. 78-80.

85 Rozkladay, 'How Ukraine Tackles Russia's Information Aggression', para. 84-86.

86 *Law of Ukraine On National Security 2018* (Verkhovna Rada) s3, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2469-19?lang=uk, (accessed 7 April 2019).

87 *Law of Ukraine On Education 2017* (Verkhovna Rada) s7, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2145-19, (accessed 15 August 2019).

88 O. Savytsky, 'Language Law: What is Important to Know About the Change of Russian Language Status in Ukraine', *Deutsche Welle*, [website], 2019, para. 1, 4, https://p.dw.com/p/3HPlk, (accessed 15 August 2019).

3.2 Other activities

In November 2014 the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted a resolution that established the Institute of National Memory tasked with implementing national policy on the renewal and preservation of the national memory of the Ukrainian nation.[89] This step was seemingly intended to quash the Russian interpretation of Ukrainian history and develop a narrative that would correspond to the task of consolidating Ukrainians. Besides, to counter the Russian narrative about the Second World War, the Ukrainian government has renamed Victory Day as Remembrance and Reconciliation Day, which is being celebrated on both May 8 and 9. The symbol for the holiday has also been changed from the Kremlin's orange-and-black ribbon to the poppy, an international symbol of mourning war dead. This step has brought Ukraine's commemorative celebrations closer in line with those in the rest of the world.[90]

In response to the 2014 events, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in January 2015 also approved a resolution that established the Ministry of Information (MIP) with the task to ensure Ukraine's information sovereignty.[91] Despite being a constant target for criticism as a redundant institution, it has created and participated in a number of significant initiatives to combat Russian influence.[92]

The influence of Russian channels in Ukrainian information space during 2014-2017 was significantly reduced due to the restricted broadcasting of 77 out of 82 channels on Ukrainian cable networks. Now Ukrainians can watch these channels only on the Internet or via satellite.[93]

In 2015, the government launched an advertising campaign featuring well-known Soviet actors of Ukrainian origin, but also iconic films of that period. The ads linked Ukraine's victory against Nazi Germany to the ongoing conflict with Russia, and turned the Russian narrative upside down, depicting Putin's Russia, not the new Ukraine, as the modern incarnation of the wartime fascists.[94]

In February 2017 the president of Ukraine approved the Information Security Doctrine to counteract Russia's destructive information influence in the context of its hybrid war against Ukraine. The Doctrine has also stipulated Ukraine's priorities in the information sphere, in particular, fighting Russian disinformation and propaganda, and promoting the Ukrainian Public Television and Radio Broadcaster.[95]

In April 2018 the system to combat anti-Ukrainian broadcasting in the antiterrorist operation area in Donbas was launched to block analogue and digital signals of more than

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89 *Statute on the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory 2014* (Cabinet of Ministers) s 3, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/684-2014-%D0%BF, (accessed 15 June 2019).

90 Lucas and Pomeranzev, 'Winning the Information War', p. 47-48.

91 'About the Ministry', *Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine*, [website], 2019, para. 4, https://mip.gov.ua/content/pro-ministerstvo.html, (accessed 29 March 2019).

92 Rozkladay, 'How Ukraine Tackles Russia's Information Aggression', para. 129.

93 Babak et al., *Words and Wars*, p. 31.

94 Lucas and Pomeranzev, 'Winning the Information War', p. 48.

95 *Doctrine On the Information Security of Ukraine 2017* (President of Ukraine) s1, 3, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/47/2017, (accessed 10 June 2019).

40 Russian and pro-Russian TV channels to prevent Russian propaganda and information disorder.[96]

In 2018, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved two separate strategies on informational re-integration of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as Crimea, to be coordinated by the MIP.[97] The strategy on Donetsk and Luhansk regions seeks to create support for Ukrainian political, economic and cultural space by the population living on occupied territories, as well as neutralize Russian informational influence in the area.[98] The Crimean strategy's general objective is to keep the Crimean narrative alive, both in Ukraine and abroad, including reporting on human rights violations on the peninsula.[99]

Though still not very common, the educational programs focused on critical thinking and source evaluation have been part of the efforts to tackle information disorder in Ukraine. In 2015 and 2016 IREX trained over 15,000 people in a program designed to teach citizens how to separate fact from fiction and recognize manipulation and hate speech.[100] In 2018 the MIP also initiated the Media Teenz project, that implied a number of lectures on media literacy for youth.[101]

With support and guidance from the MIP, the state information agency Ukrinform has been reformed to become an institution of high journalistic standards, now offering quality news product to the public.[102]

Finding itself on the frontline of the battle, Ukraine has made a significant contribution to research on Russian propaganda, which was independently initiated by several NGOs, the most prominent examples being StopFake, VoxCheck, the Institute of Mass Information, Detector Media, Euromaidan Press, InformNapalm, Ukraine Crisis Media Center, UkraineWorld Group, Verify.org.ua, Hromadske.ua and the English-language Hromadske International.[103]

4. What is the solution for Ukraine? Best practices and recommendations

The measures Ukraine undertook in the years after Russian aggression are not a panacea, but they certainly contribute to the country's information security and the mitigation of information disorder that has gathered pace since 2014. Any further solutions will obviously need to be based on an understanding of the complexity of the issue,[104] keeping in mind that finding middle ground between information security and right to freedom of

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96 'MIP: The System to Combat Anti-Ukrainian Broadcasting Launched in the Antiterrorist Operation Zone, *Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine*, [website], 2018, para. 4, https://mip.gov.ua/news/2343.html, (accessed 23 July 2019).

97 'Best Counter-Propaganda is Truth', pp. 114, 130.

98 *Strategy of Informational Re-Integration of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions 2018* (Cabinet of Ministers) s2, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/539-2018-%D1%80, (accessed 12 August 2019).

99 *Strategy of Informational Re-Integration of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol 2018* (Cabinet of Ministers) s2, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1100-2018-%D1%80, (accessed 12 August 2019).

100 Wardle and Derakhshan, 'Information disorder', pp. 69-70.

101 'Best Counter-Propaganda is Truth', p. 28.

102 Rozkladay, 'How Ukraine Tackles Russia's Information Aggression', para. 129.

103 Lucas and Pomeranzev, 'Winning the Information War', pp. 99-101.

104 Wardle and Derakhshan, 'Information disorder', p. 79.

opinion and expression is essential.[105] The experience of Germany could suggest how to approach this issue, where a 2018 law provides for fines for digital platforms if they do not remove 'fake news' and hate speech within 24 hours after being reported.[106]

Thorough research and examination of the information disorder elements are a requisite for the Ukrainian government to be able to counter them in a meaningful way. Knowing, in particular, what types of information disorder are most common, which media or platforms are the primary vehicles for dissemination, and how audience responses to a specific type of content would assist in steering efforts in the right direction.[107] Moreover, to remain effective tackling the information disorder, it is necessary to examine the scale, scope, and precise nature of the problem, as well as evaluate responses, continually.[108]

Supporting quality journalism at the local, regional and national levels is essential in order to reduce the impact of information disorder.[109] It is also a time for news media to tack more closely to professional standards and ethics.[110]

The Ukrainian Government and Parliament should adhere to the principle of "explaining, not lying", thus, avoiding risks of damaging the truth; communicate openly with people, pointing out both positive and negative processes in the country; establish channels for long-term communication with international audiences in order to build trust; enable coordination of key state institutions with regard to information security; monitor and assess the implementation of relevant national policy; cooperate with tech-giants like Facebook, Twitter, Google to address Ukrainian online-related concerns; work closely and support the NGO sector dealing with disinformation and increase support for the Public Broadcaster, which could become one of the agents supporting media literacy.[111]

It also seems to be necessary to create a government center that would be tasked with the monitoring and analysis of information threats and responding to them. The Center to Counter Terrorism and Hybrid Threats of the Czech Republic could serve as an example. Its main task is to act against disinformation and foreign information attacks. Another similar agency is the Department of Strategic Communication and Public Relations of the Ministry of National Defense of Lithuania. It is equipped with the resources for discovering threats and promptly reacting to them.[112]

Ukraine also needs to develop public and culture diplomacy, and support the activity of the Ukrainian Institute, the Ukrainian Book Institute, and the Ukrainian Cultural Fund. Active communication with audiences in eastern and southern regions of Ukraine is crucial. Even more broadcasting facilities should be installed, in order to block the signals of Russian and separatist media on Ukraine-controlled territory.[113]

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105 Wardle and Derakhshan, p. 82.

106 Ireton and Posetti, *Journalism, Fake News and Disinformation*, p. 20.

107 Wardle and Derakhshan, 'Information disorder', p. 82.

108 'A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation. Report of the independent High-level Group on fake news and online disinformation', *European Commission Reports and Studies*, 2018, p. 12, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation, (accessed 20 May 2019).

109 Wardle and Derakhshan, 'Information disorder', p. 82.

110 Ireton and Posetti, *Journalism, Fake News and Disinformation*, p. 10.

111 Kulakov et al., *To Tame a Hydra*, pp. 26-33.

112 Kulakov et al., pp. 26-28.

113 Kulakov et al., p. 29.

As the Kremlin refuses to cooperate, the economic and financial sanctions against it should become, and remain, an instrument of leverage. As long as Russia has financial resources, it will continue to fund its hybrid war and disinformation apparatus. Thus, implementation of such sanctions could limit its destructive activity.[114]

The key response to the information warfare challenges is enhancing media literacy and critical thinking skills among the population. It is necessary to implement relevant long-term strategies, like introducing such topics into the educational curriculum, or establishing free courses. Media literacy education should tackle fake content and manipulation technology analysis. For example, Scandinavian countries also assist their citizens by warning them about the danger of information attacks, including by Russia.[115]

Conclusion

Information disorder in combination with new technologies has challenged the current world order. Its long-term effects are still to be discovered and studied, however, its destructive capacities are already evident.

The Kremlin's information attack on Ukraine in 2013-2014 has demonstrated the vulnerability of the Ukrainian media environment, but also society as a whole.[116] Though Ukraine has put serious efforts into protecting itself, Russian informational influence remains strong there,[117] and the potential for such influence will remain. Therefore, Ukraine has nothing but to learn to live in a constant state of alertness. It should face that making sense of mis-, dis- and mal-information and learning how it works has become a necessity.[118] Building a national identity separate from Russian, adopting and implementing effective policies and programs aimed at neutralizing information disorder, incorporating the teaching of relevant skills and knowledge into the educational system could enhance the existing, though rather weak, protective shield. However, most important are internal transformations: regaining foreign policy subjectivity, pursuing real reforms, strengthening military defense, and building coherent information policy.[119] Only then can Ukraine win the hybrid war against Russia on its own terms.[120]

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114 Kulakov et al., p. 13.

115 Kulakov et al., p. 24-38.

116 Babak et al., *Words and Wars*, p. 47.

117 Kulakov et al., *To Tame a Hydra*, p. 22.

118 Wardle and Derakhshan, 'Information disorder', p. 14.

119 Magda, *Hybrid War,* p. 291.

120 Magda, p. 9.

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THE CONFERENCE will be held in the Old University Library building at the University of Warsaw main campus, in the historical centre of Warsaw, at 26/28, Krakowskie Przedmieście Street.

SCHEDULE

THE CONFERENCE will begin on Friday, July 2 at 11 AM, and end on Sunday, July 4 at 6 PM, 2020. Further information concerning chedules will be delivered to registered participants by email and the registration system.

CONFERENCE PROGRAMME BOARD

RIGELS HALILI – professor at the Centre

PAWEŁ KOWAL – professor at the Centre

MYKOLA RIABCHUK – visiting professor at the Centre

JAN MALICKI – director of the Centre for East European Studies

WIKTOR ROSS – secretary of the WEEC Programme Board, professor at the Centre

CONFERENCE ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITTEE

JOHN MICGIEL – Conference Director, visiting professor at the Centre

MACIEJ DUSZCZYK – Vice-Rector of the University of Warsaw for Research

PAYMENTS

ALL CONFERENCE SPEAKERS are obliged to **pay the registration fee in advance**. Speakers must pay the fee before May 25, 2018, Listeners may pay on the first day of the conference. The payment will be handled through the registrations system (Dotpay).

FUNDING

PARTICIPANTS of the WEEC are responsible for covering all travel and accommodation costs.

WEEC organizers will no longer provide free accommodation to participants of the Conference. However, registered speakers will be offered **free accommodation in University student hostels, double rooms**.

For listeners of the Conference paid accommodation (at a reduced price € 20 per night) in Warsaw University student hostels and hotels can be arranged.

SPEAKERS REGISTRATION FEE

1. East and Central European non-EU countries, Russia, Caucasian and Central Asian countries:

– scholars (incl. Ph.D. students) - 200 PLN (~50 €)

– students – 80 PLN (~20 €)

2. Poland and the EU "new" countries:

– scholars (incl. Ph.D. students) - 250 PLN (~60 €)

– students – 125 PLN (~30 €)

3. Other countries:

– scholars (incl. Ph.D. students) - 500 PLN (~120 €)

– students – 300 PLN (~60 €)

LISTENERS REGISTRATION FEE

All listeners registration payment:

– scholars (incl. Ph.D. students) - 60 PLN (~15 €)

– students - 60 PLN (~15 €)

Students and graduates of the Centre
for East European Studies – free of charge

Deadline for payment: May 25, 2020

*/** - All payments can be handled through the Registration System or a Standard Bank Transfer

Payment from abroad:
Bank name: Bank Millennium S.A.
Bank address:
Al. Jerozolimskie 123 A 02-017 Warszawa

SWIFT CODE: BIGBPLPWXXX
IBAN:
PL64 1160 2202 0000 0000 6084 9207
Account number:
64 1160 2202 0000 0000 6084 9207
Ref:
University of Warsaw, Studium WEEC

Payment in Poland in Polish zlotys (PLN)
to the University of Warsaw bank account

Bank Millennium S.A.
Al. Jerozolimskie 123 A
02-017 Warszawa

Account number:
08 1160 2202 0000 0000 6084 9633
Ref:
Uniwersytet Warszawski, Studium WEEC

University of Warsaw
July 2-4, 2020
Warsaw, Poland

DEADLINE FOR PAPER PROPOSALS:
APRIL I5, 2020

Warsaw
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DEADLINE FOR PAPER PROPOSALS:
APRIL I5, 2020

WEER vol. X/2020

THE POST-SOVIET SPACE THREE DECADES LATER TIME OF TROUBLES OR TRIUMPH?

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